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Cover image

Ruins in Sarajevo

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Editorial

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Dear Reader,

A few changes have caught up with our venerable journal since our last issue. As you have noticed, JHS is now published by Librello, an excellent new publishing house based in Switzerland. Volumes 1 through 7 are still available through the RMIT website. The two issues of volume 8 are available freely through our personal blog site [1] and from this current issue onward our issues will be available by open access through the Librello website [2]. All archived volumes are also accessible through the Librello site, although volumes 1 through 7 are still on pay per view. We are grateful to the people at Librello for providing access to our archive in its entirety through their website.

The state of human security has also experienced some notable changes. The 2012 *Human Security Report* [3] painted a glowingly optimistic picture of human security improving worldwide. Of course such sweeping proclamations always rely heavily on their small print, in this case the particular definition of human security employed. Unfortunately there is not even a small print definition to be found in the Report. The reader is obliged to infer that definition from the sources of insecurity that the document recognises. They encompass all forms of 'organised violence': interstate and intrastate armed conflict, the severity and persistence of warfare, and various kinds of military interventions. Thus, the Report limits itself to what Johan Galtung, the pioneer of peace studies, calls 'direct violence'.

What the Report does not count as human

insecurity is what Galtung calls 'structural violence', the slow death from hunger and preventable or curable diseases, caused not by intentional acts of commission, but by neglect, by acts of omission, by gross inequality and by an unjust structure of society. It is estimated that structural violence kills over 100,000 people every day, mostly children [4]. Galtung [5] also introduced the concept of 'cultural violence', the advocacy of direct and structural violence in education, the media, literature and art, in the form of nationalism, racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination and prejudice. One wonders how differently the Report's pronouncements would have come out under such a more inclusive perspective.

Furthermore, the Report fully ignores the fourth pillar of human security, on which the other three so frequently depend: the stability, productivity and resilience of environmental support structures. It represents the ecologically naïve position that we encounter from time to time in a minority of students, that food comes from grocery stores and disease from germs. With respect to the fourth pillar, the decline of human prospects hardly requires any further argument.

Given its narrow focus, the Report's assessments and prognoses assume a similarly narrow validity. Its optimistic outlook is not anything new; previous Reports from 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009/10 invariably announced declines in the number of armed conflicts and their deadliness, in genocide, in human rights abuses, and in terrorism [6]. Those claims are supported by the work of Joshia Goldstein

and Steven Pinker, showing that wars are becoming less common and on average less deadly.

Even when one engages with the Report on its own narrow conceptual territory, not all of its proclamations appear equally defensible. The claim that the number and severity of human rights violations in general are in decline can hardly be supported by data showing decreasing incidence of direct violence alone. Moreover, even in terms of direct physical violence the US State Department's data on its Political Terror Scale (PTS) indicate more of a steady state, or at best a return to 'normal' after a post-Cold War upsurge [7]. This curiously stands in contrast to a demonstrable increase in the number of 'democratic' governments.

An additional reason why overly optimistic reports like this may do more harm to global human security (however defined) than they reassure an already complacent OECD consumer is in its implicit message. Take, for instance, the claim that rape has decreased as a weapon of war: "mainstream narratives on wartime sexual violence and the impact of war on education are often one-sided and misleading". The Report blames NGOs for over-reporting. "The worldwide incidence of sexual violence has likely declined" ([3], p. 79). Framing the information in this way can do severe damage to the cause of human rights. Readers too often infer that things are getting better all the time anyway, which is of course what everybody wants to believe and constantly looks to see confirmed, but this is also fundamentally counterproductive to the quest for human rights. That quest relies desperately on continuous funding, which under neoliberal administrations must come increasingly from private donors and charitable organisations. Those in turn base their allocation decisions on research reports such as this one.

This objection has nothing to do with the fact that the Report's claims may be factually correct, at least in part. It rather addresses the strategic blunder, the outrageous offence to millions of women, and the damage to the cause of human rights and women's security. It raises the question about underlying motives, and Jürgen Habermas's famous question, "who benefits?" What might be the reasons why an organisation dedicated to human security would dissociate itself ideologically from the human rights movement? The Human Security Report Project (HSRP), affiliated with Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada, claims to be an independent research centre even though it receives funds from several national governments (Switzerland, Sweden, UK, Norway) and a private investment banking organisation.

Among the actors who might benefit from the proposition that the global situation of women and human rights has improved (and been misrepresented

by others) are organisations in charge of allocating scarce resources, as well as all those who would rather see those funds be allocated towards more expressly industrial interests, such as defense contracts. The idea of empowering women particularly has never sat well with groups of certain ideological bents, from orthodox religious organisations to extreme conservatives.

As an active educator, I was also surprised by the Report's claim, based on data published by UNESCO's Institute for Statistics, to the effect that educational outcomes did not decline during periods of warfare. Intuitively such a claim seems grotesque. To put it bluntly, if the schoolhouse burning down has no impact on education, then why do we bother with building schoolhouses? Surely kids who are drafted into armies will be unable to attend school? One wonders about the quality of the data used to make this claim sound even marginally convincing. But again my concern lies as much with possible motives as it does with the claim's veracity. Is it intended as a justification of military conflict, or as belittlement of its horrors? Who benefits from it?

On the other side of the coin is the researcher's obligation to report whatever conclusions their data indicate unequivocally. And, as we all know but not do not always acknowledge, bias of framing is unavoidable. Ideally the researcher would cope by representing their conclusions in more than one form, framing them from diverse ideological viewpoints. Academics are (or should be) well acquainted with such dialectical approaches. However, such ideological fence-sitting tends to be frowned upon by funders. Their interest is to see their points of view confirmed. These two approaches appear fundamentally irreconcilable, which usually leaves the decision up to the power differential. I leave it to the reader to guess which side is more powerful, a funding organisation or the researcher.

Taking this argument one step further, the question arises what counterhegemonic obligations arise for the researcher from this inequitable situation. Many would name a judicious screening of possible funding agencies, taking into account the extent of academic latitude, possible conditional strings leading to moral or financial commitments, and the overall ideological bent of the organisation. This ideal clashes of course frequently with what are perceived inevitably as 'realities on the ground'. But so do other academic ideals, such as objectivity, veracity, and equity. We still are expected to try our best. Sadly, the authors of the Human Security Report evidently did not.

Wishing you all a very peaceful 2013!

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The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability

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Abstract: It should come as no surprise that prisons can become breeding grounds for radicalisation and terrorism [1]. In many cases, extremist ideologies can flourish in prisons through recruiting vulnerable inmates to follow their path. Despite being a popular topic among researchers and policymakers, there still remain significant gaps in our understanding and many unanswered questions. This paper provides an overview on prisoner radicalisation, specifically exploring the role religion plays in prison and its link to radicalisation, prisoner vulnerability to radicalisation and the radicalisation process. The paper also outlines the current debate regarding where is the best place to house terrorist prisoners (isolation vs. separation). The paper concludes by identifying the major gaps in the literature and offers concluding remarks.

Keywords: radicalisation; terrorism; prisons

1. Introduction

Prisoner radicalisation is not a recent phenomenon and yet it is an area that is misunderstood and theoretically underdeveloped. Throughout history prisons have served as recruitment centres and headquarters for ideological extremists (such as Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler), where they used their time behind bars to develop extremist philosophies and recruit others into their mode of thinking [2]. Some of the most powerful criminal groups, such as

the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in São Paulo, Brazil, and the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, originated in prisons [3]. Even so, since 11 September 2001 (9/11) several individuals have been radicalised while being incarcerated [4]. For example, prisoner Richard Reid converted to Islam while incarcerated and when released attempted to smuggle explosives on an American airline flight in December 2001 [5]. Research suggests that many prisoners enter prison with little or no religious calling, but over the duration

of their incarceration some adopt a faith (e.g. Islam) [6]. However, of those who convert to Islam only a very small percentage will turn into radical extremists and an even smaller percentage will go on to join a terrorist organisation [7]. An interesting study conducted by the United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, claim that roughly 80% percent of prisoners within America turn to Islam when seeking for faith behind bars [6]. This percentage translates into a prisoner conversion rate of approximately 30,000 yearly [7].

Prisons by their very nature are hostile environments (e.g. their isolation, cultural dissatisfaction, and predisposition for violent tendencies) and as such are susceptible to radicalisation extremists [8]. The 2009 World Prison Population List estimates that more than 9.8 million people are held in penal institutions around the world and almost a third of these are in the United States (USA, 2.29 million [9]). Even more interesting, is that around 300 federal prisoners in the US are serving sentences on terrorism-related charges [8]. Terrorists jailed for criminal activities can thrive in prison. Recruiters are able to spot, assess, and encourage potential recruits to follow their path, drawing from a constantly regenerating pool of candidates [10,11]. Terrorist recruitment therefore "operates in the deep underground of inmate subculture, between the seams of prison gangs and extremist religions that inspire ideologies of intolerance, hatred, and violence" ([7], p. 111). This type of environment allows terrorist recruitment to flourish and can remain virtually undetected. However, with the many advances in technology, education and increased prison personnel, these advances are making it extremely hard for terrorist recruitment to remain undetected.

Prisoner radicalisation is a popular topic of discussion; however, despite this recognition it has not been fully explored and is a phenomenon that is not well understood [1,12]. Furthermore, the process of radicalisation in prisons in particular is poorly understood because of the very limited information researchers can obtain and this consequently obstructs the development or improvement of effective intervention methods [4]. Radicalisation, by most accounts, can create the motivational or cognitive preconditions for terrorism and therefore it is important that we understand the prerequisite for effectively combating terrorism [13].

An even more interesting and well-rehearsed argument among researchers and practitioners is that there has been an inadequate effort to define radicalisation [14]. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) to radicalise is to: 1) cause (someone) to become an advocate of radical political or social reforms and 2) introduce fundamental or far-reaching change [15]. Only recently has the OED defined radicalisation. Radicalisation according to the OED means: "The action or process of making or becoming radical, esp. in political outlook" [15]. This

definition however, is extremely vague. Currently, many organisations and scholars have come up with their own definition; however, despite having some similarities among these definitions there still lacks a generic definition that can be used across all disciplines and organisations. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark defines radicalisation as "the phenomenon of people embracing opinions views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism" ([16], p. 8). This definition is very subjective in that the radicalisation label applied to an individual requires making an assessment about the possible harm that an individual poses to another party [13]. This definition is also very general, stating that embracing any views/opinions can ultimately lead to acts of terrorism.

In contrast, the Office of the Inspector General of the US Department of Justice [17] claims radicalisation is "the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes" (p. 6). Similarly, a review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers by the Department of Justice [17] states that radicalisation "refers to the process by which inmates ...adopt extreme views including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes" (p. 6). This places more emphasis on the cognitive (that views and beliefs justify violence) and behavioural aspects (invitation to join a group) [13]. These definitions acknowledge that radicalisation is a process and, unlike the definition by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, they state that radicalisation is when an individual adopts 'extremist' views, rather than simply adopting any opinions or views. More recently, Fraihi [18] provides a succinct definition which brings us closer to defining radicalisation. In a recent essay Fraihi [18] states:

Radicalization is a process in which an individual's convictions and willingness to seek for deep and serious changes in the society increase. Radicalism and radicalization are not necessarily negative. Moreover, different forms of radicalization exist. This concentration on the individual is indicative of the focus of expert and government concern (p. 135).

An important distinction from the previous definitions is that Fraihi [18] acknowledges that not all radicalisation is negative and that radicalisation is not always a precursor to terrorism. It also suggests that radicalisation is an individual experience, whereby the individual has to be 'willing' to undergo some deep or serious change. Moreover, it is a psychological process where individuals move towards more extremist views [19].

As with radicalisation, terrorism also seems to be a hard concept to define. Bilgi [20] outlines that this stems from two main reasons: first, the term

terrorism is often interpreted as a pejorative concept, meaning that those who are defined as terrorists are said to 'deserve the blame', and secondly, terrorism is used in highly emotive settings, meaning that terrorism is often associated with violence, death, and war. Although these reasons make it seem impossible to define, it is not an impossible task to do so. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objection" ([20], p. 12). While the European Union's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism defines it as:

An intentional act which may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures by means of attacks upon a person's life, attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, kidnapping, hostage-taking, seizure of aircraft or ships, or the manufacture, possession or transport of weapons or explosives (cited in the European Report [21], p. 6).

This is a legal definition of terrorism and, as such, only partially overlaps with those used by academics. There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism, often emphasising a variety or feature of terrorism such as:

...its often symbolic in nature, its often indiscriminate nature, its typical focus on civilian and non-combatant targets its sometimes provocative and retributive aims, the disruption of public order and endangering of public security, the creation of a climate of fear to influence an audience wider than the direct victims as well as its disregard of the rules of war and the rules of punishment ([22], p. 6).

Many scholars have also come up with their own definition of terrorism. For example, Jenkins [23] defines terrorism as "the use or threatened use of force to bring about change" (p. 3). Similarly, Sederberg defines terrorism as "the threat or use of violence for political purposes when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than its immediate victim" (cited in [24], p. 4). What is common among these definitions is that terrorism includes the unlawful use of violence with the aim of pursuing political or social objectives that target enemies [20]. Also, many scholars agree that the root cause or procurer of terrorism is not radicalisation—simply because not all radicals become terrorists [25].

Today, many governments, especially Western

governments (after the 9/11 attack) are concerned about the threat of terrorism and are primarily focused on what is called 'Radical Islam', a term defined as "the politico-religious pursuit of establishing—if necessary by extreme means—a society which reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible" ([26], p. 3). However, it is important to note that 'Radical Islam' does not always mean violence and cannot be a sufficient cause of terrorism because most radicals are not terrorists [13,25].

Overall, it is a well known argument among scholars that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' definition of radicalisation or terrorism that will satisfy all disciplines and practitioners. The terms radicalisation and terrorism are not precise concepts but rather pejorative labels, and therefore it is not surprising that there has been an inadequate effort to define them.

This paper begins by outlining the penal system and the role of religion. Next, it outlines the different types of recruitment methods employed by Islamic extremist groups and discusses the process of radicalisation. Finally, it concludes by examining an ongoing debate as to whether terrorists should be isolated, concentrated, or separated from ordinary criminals.

2. Prison and Religion

Some prisons are notorious for being harsh environments and for many inmates religion is one of the methods used to cope with the prison environment [27]. There is a belief, especially in prisons in the US, that religion plays a profound and necessary role in the creation and maintenance of a moral and law abiding community [28]. For example, religion is widely practised among the two million prisoners in the US [28]. In the United Kingdom (UK), the Muslim population has risen from 4,298 in 2000 to 10,672 in 2011 [29]. In the US approximately 350,000 inmates are Muslim (2003) and 80% of prisoners who convert while in prison convert to Islam [8]. Islam conversion in prisons is not a new phenomenon and has been present in American prisons since their inception in the early nineteenth century ([30], p. 90). As Lofland and Stark [31] state:

The intellectual mode of conversion commences with an individual, private investigation of possible new grounds of being, alternate theodicies, personal fulfilment, etc., by reading books, watching television, attending lectures, and other impersonal or disembodied ways in which it is increasingly possible sans social involvement to become acquainted with alternate ideologies and ways of life. In the course of such reconnaissance, some individuals convert themselves in isolation from any interaction with devotees of the respective religion (p. 376).

The literature on Islam in prisons is divided into two schools of thought. One side indicates that Muslim groups in prison are breeding grounds for terrorists and the other side indicates that there is no relationship between prisoner conversion to Islam and terrorism [7]. Nevertheless, research shows that religion plays an important role in prison security and rehabilitation [7]. Clear and Sumter [27] administered self-report questionnaires to 769 prisoners from 12 state prisons and found that increasing levels of religiosity are associated with high levels of in-prison adjustment and are also significantly related to a smaller number of times inmates are placed in disciplinary confinement for violating prison rules. O'Connor and Perreyclear [28] also found that as religion intensified prison disciplinary infractions declined.

Similarly, Roy [32] argues that it makes more sense to separate theology from violence:

'The process of violent radicalisation has little to do with religious practice, while radical theology, as salafisme, does not necessarily lead to violence'. The 'leap into terrorism' is not religiously inspired, but better seen as sharing 'many factors with other forms of dissent, either political (the ultra-left), or behavioural: the fascination for sudden suicidal violence as illustrated by the paradigm of random shootings in schools (the "Columbine syndrome")' (Roy, cited in [19], p. 21).

However, there are also cases where religion has been used to breed terrorists. For example, Kevin Lamar James recruited more than a dozen fellow prisoners into a terrorist group called Jam'iyyat U-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS) [7]. According to Ian Cuthbertson, James convinced these men that his interpretation of the Koran (called the JIS Protocol) was the true version [10]. Members of JIS were also recruited outside prison walls. Prospective JIS members outside prison were instructed to blend into society by marrying, getting a job, dressing casually and needed to acquire two pistols with silencers and learn how to make bombs [33]. These men were later instructed to attack government agencies and military stations throughout the US [10,33].

Another case is Jamal 'el Chino' Ahmidan who embraced jihadist principles while serving time and is the mastermind behind the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Richard Reid, known as the 'shoe bomber', who attempted to blow up an American Airline flight between Paris and Miami in 2001, also converted to Islam while serving time for a string of muggings [7,34].

3. Vulnerability

When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for the individual to go through physical and emotional trauma that can make them more vulnerable to

recruitment. For example, in the beginning when an individual is placed in jail, acute and chronic stress factors can give rise to physical problems (e.g. sleep disorders, loss of appetite, etc.) which can make the prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this moment recruiters can enter into contact with the new prisoner and evaluate their vulnerability and likeliness to conform to their extremist group [35]. It is also common for incarcerated individuals to undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states of discontentment-excitement (hate, anger, doubt) and states of discontent-relation (humiliation, fear, sadness) [35]. This unbalanced emotional state is ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate the minds of the impressionable.

There are also instances where an incarcerated individual can lose their grip on their individual identity. This is most prominent in foreigners who are incarcerated in another country and do not speak the language [35]. For instance, in the UK, the proportion of foreign national prisoners has increased steadily over the past decade. In the 1990s the foreign population accounted for around 8% of the total population and this increased to 13% by 2012 [29]. Many of these foreign prisoners have little knowledge of the country, let alone the culture of the country, and to top it off many do not speak the language (having lived, worked and/or socialised in their immigrant communities) [10], thus making the individual more susceptible and vulnerable to extremist groups.

One theory that can help us understand prisoner vulnerability is the Transformative Learning Theory (TLT) developed in the 1990s by Jack Mezirow. This is a framework for understanding how change (learning) occurs in individuals—more specifically, how adults learn and adapt to new environments [36,37]. In this instance we are using it to understand the behavioural changes prisoners undergo while in prison and how this learning transformation makes them more vulnerable to radical extremists.

When an individual goes through some sort of crisis (known as the transformative trigger), the individual uses pre-existing habits to make sense of the event [36]. However, when the individual cannot make sense of the situation and resorting back to their habitual ways fails to help them manage the event this becomes known as a 'distortion'. As a result, the individual reacts to the meaning distortion by exploring new experiences and undergoing critical reflection (e.g. turning to religion for guidance) [36]. These new perspectives help the individual cope with the new environment by helping create new behaviours, roles, and relationships [36,38]. Overall, this transformation allows individuals to manage their new environment, adapt to a new daily routine and ultimately help an individual learn how to get past a crisis [36]. However, going through a crisis can make the individual easier to persuade and even more open

to manipulation and brainwashing [35], thus making them very susceptible to extremist recruitment.

TLT can help shed light on the process and precursors of prison radicalisation. Individual radicalisation is not only associated with particular socio-political contexts (e.g. prison) and personal characteristics, but is also a combination of reflection, knowledge acquisition and identity reassessment [37,39]. As individuals begin to develop self-doubt or experience confusion over identity or intense personal debate, eventually a point is reached whereby the individual comes to the realisation that their old identity no longer exists and a new one must be established [37]. Therefore, when radicalised individuals socialise and are validated by other 'like-minded' individuals, their transformation is reinforced and the new identity is strengthened [37]. Ultimately, those individuals who become violent, radicalised inmates not only justify their actions but such actions are also expected among the greater group of radicals.

Hamm [7] interviewed intelligence officials in Florida and California in December 2007 and found that Florida prisoners were vulnerable to radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. One official stated: "radicalized prisoners are very aware that people (authorities) are interested in radicalized prisoners. They are very careful who they talk to in prison." The official also noted that most inmates are radicalised by other radical inmates and not by outside influence [7].

Overall, the majority of studies have focused on demographic variables to look at the vulnerability of individuals, mainly because they are much easier to access than other variables [40]. However, many empirical studies show that psychographic variables, such as attitudes, emotions, preconceptions, and motivations, seem to matter most regarding the success rate [41].

4. Models of Recruitment

Recruitment plays a significant role in any terrorist organisation. Individuals can use their expertise to spot, assess, and encourage potential recruits to follow the same path [11]. There are four different models of recruitment: *the net*, *the funnel*, *the infection* and *the seed crystal* [40].

The net pattern occurs when the target population is equally engaged; for example, all members are given the same book to read or are invited to a meeting (see Figure 1a). In this instance, the target audience is viewed as homogeneous and the group can be approached with a single undifferentiated pitch [40]. *The funnel* pattern occurs when a recruiter takes an incremental approach (characterised by milestones) when he or she believes the target or focal segment population is a prime target (see Figure 1b). This process requires an individual to have the

right motivation and undergo a significant transformation in identity. Therefore an individual starts at one end of the process and is transformed into a dedicated group member at the other end [40]. *The infection* pattern occurs when a trusted agent is inserted into the target population to rally potential recruits through direct personal appeals (see Figure 1c). Infection is likely to be successful where most members are not extremists; this allows the infiltrator to be able to convert selected members who are dissatisfied [40]. Finally, *the seed crystal* pattern occurs when the target is very difficult to access and is very remote:

This may be compared to lowering the temperature of a glass until the water inside it cools and then ice crystals form as the seeds of a complete freeze ([40], p. 79; see Figure 1d).

In terms of al-Qaida, this approach may be the most successful in populations where open recruitment is difficult, such as prisons.

The four different models of recruitment as proposed by Gerwehr and Daley, 2006 ([40], pp. 73–89) are shown in Figure 1.

5. Social Movement Theory and Recruitment

One of the most promising theoretical frameworks applied to understanding radicalisation is Social Movement Theory (SMT). Although SMT has been used in social science for the past few decades, its application to understanding radicalisation is in its infancy. Della Porta [42] was one of the first terrorism researchers to use the SMT concepts in her study of violent and extremist Italian and German militants. Della Porta [42] found that militant radicals were bound together by personal ties and by their shared activist experiences and participating radicals acted as a self-reinforcing mechanism to drive radical activists to become increasingly more radical.

Zald and McCarthy [43] define social movement as: "A set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (p. 2). The idea behind this theory is that "movements arose from irrational processes of collective behaviour occurring under strained environmental conditions (what sociologists would call Strain Theory), producing a mass sentiment of discontent. Individuals would 'join' a movement because they passively succumbed to these overwhelming social forces" ([44], p. 17). According to SMT, members recruit others on a rational basis in order to be effective and efficient. These recruiters seek to identify individuals who are likely to agree to participate and who are seen to be potential individuals who can further their cause [44,45].




Figure 1. The four different models of recruitment as proposed by Gerwehr and Daley ([40], pp. 73–89): a) The Net; b) The Funnel; c) The Infection; d) The Seed Crystal.

Brady et al. [45] explain the process of recruitment as one of 'rational prospecting', meaning that recruiters follow a strategy for seeking out individual prospects that demonstrate the greatest 'participation potential', and have conceptualised the process as having two stages: 1) using information to find prospects; and 2) getting to 'yes' which is outlined in Figure 2.

In the first stage, the recruiter seeks information regarding the target individual (such as past activities the individual has been involved in). Also, the recruiter assesses whether or not the individual has characteristics (such as political interests or concerns about political politics) that might predispose them to take part in their extremist activities [45-47]. Overall, a recruiter wants as much information as possible regarding the potential recruit, especially involving the individual's political engagement [45]. However, this information is not easily accessible; the amount of information obtained will depend on the relationship developed between the recruiter and the recruit.




Figure 2. Process of recruitment.

In the second stage the recruiter needs to get a positive result (i.e. the individual recruit accepts and becomes an active member). In order to successfully achieve this, the recruiter may entice the recruit with various gratifications or incentives [45]. This is particularly true when the recruiter has control over punishments and rewards because the more power the recruiter appears to have the more likely it is that the recruit will join the cause [45]. In addition, having a relationship (preferably a close relationship) will help leverage the cause, unlike approaching a complete stranger. Prisoner radicalisation often operates like street gangs where prison gangs are generally drawn along racial and ethnic lines. Prisoners prior to incarceration who are affiliated with a certain gang may therefore naturally gravitate towards similar gang organisations in prison where members have each others' backs [2,48]. Prison gangs know that prisons have limited resources and as a result they flourish within prisons despite the best efforts of corrections officials—and extremist gangs are no exception [49].

Hamm [7] worked with the US Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII), a program to prevent potential acts of terrorism by inmates in the US. The CII accessed 2,088 state and local correctional facilities in the US and Hamm [7] found that radicalisation is developed on the prison gang model and prisoner radicalisation cannot be separated from the prison gang problem. Gang members were seen to be crossing racial lines, joining forces to create larger groups and some crossovers involved supremacists joining militant Islamic groups [7].

"Broadly defined, prison gangs are an 'organization' which operates within the prison system as a self-perpetuating criminally oriented entity, consisting of a select group of inmates who have established an organized chain of command and are governed by an established code of conduct" ([50], p. 371). Many prison gangs use intimidation and violence which is usually directed at outsiders to control their prison environment [51].

Another study by Ungerer [48] interviewed 33 men convicted on charges of terrorism by the Indonesian courts in 2010. One man interviewed (Sonhadi) explained that terrorist convicts would band together and form something akin to a 'shadow government' in prison: "They often pool their available resources to ask for better cells, better food and other small luxuries. They'd also run small businesses in prison, from selling top-up cards for mobile phones to setting up food stalls selling rice, cooking oil and sugar" ([48], p. 12). There is also prestige associated with terrorist convicts and many convicts regard them with respect because of their willingness to lay down their lives for religion [48]. A number of men interviewed also stated that they have elevated status in society after serving time [48]. It is not known if this is a broadly accepted practice across all non-western prisons, but it was evident in Ungerer's 2011 research on the radicalisation of inmates within the Indonesian prison system.

6. Process of Radicalisation

Some researchers reject the notion that radicalisation can be understood by a sequence of fixed stages (e.g. Sageman [52]) while others view radicalisation as an orderly series of stages with terrorism being the final destination [29]. In 2007, the Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department (NYPD) published a study, *Radicalization in the West: The home-grown threat*, which outlines a simplified radicalisation model. In this report it identifies that 'jihadist' ideology is the key driver of radicalisation and suggests four stages to explain the process of radicalisation: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadisation stages [19,29]. These four stages are described as a 'funnel' through which ordinary individuals' religious beliefs become progressively more radical and this once ordinary individual becomes a terrorist [29].

The first stage, pre-radicalisation, occurs when individuals are placed in environments that allow them to be receptive to extremism [2]. This can be driven by either intrinsic or extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic motivation could be the result of a personal crisis/trauma, experiences of discrimination and/or alienation [2,53], or individuals may feel frustration and dissatisfaction with their current religious faith leading them to change their belief system [11]. On the other hand, extrinsic motivations could be any

external factor (e.g. economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, or social deprivation) that may negatively affect an individual's attitude and belief towards those implicated; leading to a change of faith as the answer to the perception of deprivation they are experiencing [11].

The second stage, self-identification, occurs when the individual identifies him/herself with a particular extremist cause and essentially changes his/her religious beliefs or behaviours. These individuals begin to construct a new character based on religion and support for radicalised ideologies [11]. Also, certain types of experiences, including the amount of exposure to Islamic radicalism (e.g. jihadist videos), are more likely to drive the convert from a conversion to jihad. Guidance from supervisors and encouragement to socialise with other 'like-minded' individuals reinforces their new sense of identity and commitment [14]. Therefore, overseas travel can have a significant impact on the acceleration of the radicalisation process [11]. Overall, the individual's needs and wants are increasingly removed and replaced by those of the collective [14].

The third stage, indoctrination, furthers this mindset and readiness for action [14]. It occurs once a convert has accepted the radical ideology but may be unsure or unfamiliar with how to participate. Part of this stage is becoming an active participant. This involves small-group and individual participation that allows the recruit to know and recognise his/her potential as a jihadist. What is critical in this stage is the knowledge, skills, and leadership of senior figures. This is a highly volatile and emotional stage for recruits [14]. Confidence increases over time and the individual's mind becomes saturated with radical ideologies. The only solution to their problems is to stand up for what they believe in through violent action [11].

The final stage, *jihadisation*, is engaging directly in terrorist activities (which can be violent or non-violent) and is always done with the intention of inflicting damage to the enemy: "During this stage, role identification can be so strong as to completely erase a sense of individualisation, thereby preventing the possibility of the individual acting in their own self interests by leaving the group" ([14]. p. 40). It is important to note that these stages are not chronological and individuals can skip stages, reaching more violent actions quicker [53]. It also means that individuals may stop the process and may not be fully radicalised; conversely, even if they are fully radicalised they will not necessarily carry out a terrorist attack [29]: "Commitment is constantly calibrated and re-calibrated. Some drop out along the way. A component of our counter-recruiting strategy must be to always offer a safe way back from the edge" ([23], p. 4).

Silber and Bhatt's [29] model represents radicalisation as key transition points along a time

course beginning with ordinary-life individuals and moving down a path where these individuals have direct involvement in terrorist activities [13]. However, this model lacks a full understanding of psychological, organisational, and social processes that lead people into radicalisation and their continuation towards committing acts of terrorism [13].

7. Concluding Remarks

Radicalisation is a modern social phenomenon and has displayed a substantial presence and complexity as an emergent concept among disciplines [14]. Yet there are still major problems surrounding the concept of radicalisation, for instance defining the concept of radicalisation and terrorism, collecting empirical data, and building integrative theory [54].

There are many conclusions to be drawn from this literature review. First, in order for experts and scholars to gain a better understanding of the concept of radicalisation a generic definition needs to be established. From the literature provided above, it seems that within the definition of radicalisation there needs to be some reference to 'extreme movement activity', that radicalisation is a 'process' over time, and that 'not all radicals' or radical thoughts lead to terrorist actions. Achieving clarity in defining the concept of radicalisation and using appropriate guidance from existing theories (such as SMT) will help provide a platform for moving forward.

Second, it is important to acknowledge that each one of us can potentially have opinions that others would consider radical. This does not mean that individuals, with criminals being no exception, with radical thoughts are setting themselves up for committing acts of terrorism. In reality, radicals and radical ideas can play a positive role in communities. For example many historical figures were considered radical, such as Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela and Gandhi. Even some violent radicals have been seen to be acting in the name of the cause and that their actions were just, such as the nineteenth century American abolitionist, John Brown, who used violent acts to fight slavery [55,56].

Third, radicals and individuals who undergo the radicalisation process are different from ordinary criminals. Hoffman [57] points out that both terrorists and criminals employ violence to attain specific goals; however, terrorists are motivated by ideological, religious, or political gain, whereas criminals are largely driven by material gain. Hoffman [57] also suggests that terrorists believe they are fighting for a cause. Finally, terrorists seek to impact and influence a wider audience, while criminals do not generally seek to disseminate terror to the general public [58]. Individuals who contemplate committing terrorist acts (such as killing citizens) do so because they believe that these actions are feasible and just [37]. However, not all radicalisation is negative nor does it lead to

violence. For example, radical Islamic Puritanism involves seeking greater religious purity (e.g. the individual returns to a 'pure Islam') and separating themselves from the influences of Western society [18]. However, when making a distinctive difference between individuals who accept radical ideas and individuals who actively participate in violent behaviour, there can be some blurring between individuals since not all individuals who radicalise end up participating in violent behaviour [37].

Fourth, a prisoner's vulnerability to radicalisation does not end after release from prison. Many individuals who leave prison lack basic support (e.g. financial, emotional, or familial support) and where support does exist, it is often provided by community and religious groups. This gives extremist groups the opportunity to disguise the organisation as a legitimate support group where ties with former prisoners can be maintained. One extremist group, al-Haramain, maintained a database containing information (including names, release dates and the addresses to which the individuals would be released) on over 15,000 prisoners who were classified as vulnerable to the group's message [58,59].

Fifth, it is important to acknowledge the ongoing debate that surrounds two questions: 1) Where is the most appropriate place to contain terrorists? and 2) What is the most effective way of doing so? [12]. Researchers have suggested two possible strategies for incarcerating prisoners: isolation or concentration. The isolation method separates terrorists from each other [5]. Neumann [5] indicated that this is the most effective way to deter terrorists from ideologies because their communication is hindered and interaction with other terrorists has stopped. It also makes it very difficult for terrorists to organise future attacks because of the high level of security. The second method is concentration, where all terrorists are imprisoned in the one facility and specialised resources (e.g. staff in the field of linguistics or de-radicalisation training teams) are employed [12]. From a resource perspective concentration is beneficial as high security resources are only needed in a few locations [12]. However, it can have problematic consequences. For example, many jihad extremist groups are made up of small, loosely affiliated cells and teams. It is therefore possible that if such individuals are concentrated their loose networks could consolidate into a more cohesive and organised form [12]. Overall, academics in the field of terrorism (see [2,5,7,10]) agree that we may be facilitating radicalism by integrating converted Islamic extremists with criminals.

Finally, even though radicalisation does not always result in violence, it is important to establish effective methods to minimise 'the minority' of radicals who have the potential to become violence. Some may argue that only a small percentage of radicals actually partake in extreme violence. However, it is important

to remember that the goal is to minimise violence, regardless of how big or small the potential threat may appear to be.

Scholars have suggested that the root cause of prison radicalisation is related to overcrowding of maximum security prisons, with few rehabilitative programmes, and a shortage of chaplains to provide religious guidance [7]. These root causes should be explored in conjunction with topics such as inmate subculture, extremist interpretations of religious doctrines and how they lead to hatred and violence,

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and the vulnerability of inmates to radicalism. Future studies should also recognise and take into consideration that radicalisation is a process that occurs over time and that these stages are not sequential and the speed in which an individual goes through these stages can vary significantly depending on individual circumstances. Ultimately, this phenomenon needs to be explored more fully so we can enhance our understanding and provide effective solutions to minimise radicalisation in prisons [1,12].

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The United States and the Arab Spring

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Abstract: This article reveals, by studying correlative relationships between US regime support and regime properties, that the US foreign policy in the Middle East has traditionally helped governments to limit the political participation of Islamists, communists, enemies of Israel and populations that could be hostile to the US oil interests. This way the US economic and strategic security interests have contributed to human insecurity in the region. With the exception of the last interest, the US has relaxed its support for repression of the above-mentioned groups. This seems to be one of the international factors that made the Arab Spring possible.

Keywords: autocracy; democracy; human security; Middle East; sovereignty; United States

1. Introduction

Human security of individuals depends on many things, not just on political systems. Yet, restrictions to political participation, lack of openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and especially the lack of constraints on the chief executive's policies and actions all predict authoritarian violence, which is definitely a threat to human security. According to Rudolph Rummel, more than six times more people were killed by their governments than by all the wars combined during the 20th century [1]. In this sense, the fall of brutal autocrats during the Arab Spring constituted progress for human security.

Human security and the change of a repressive government can be brought about in many ways. In the Arab Spring ordinary people took center stage. At

the same time, political discourse on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), let alone the discourses giving legitimacy to international military interventions in the name of democracy, also highlight the role of international state actors in the promotion, and destruction of human security. Recently up to 60% of people killed in wars were killed by wars (Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan) that were justified by references to human security, democracy and human rights (calculated by the author on the basis of best estimates for 2011, the last year of the data published yet [2]). This is why it is still relevant to ask how states really influence each other and what human security implications this influence could really have. This article will focus on these questions in the context of the Arab Spring and argues that the ending of the US support of authoritarian suppression of the

political participation of Islamists and anti-Israel movements in the Arab world could have affected the downfall of autocracy in several Arab countries. Furthermore, this article argues that greater openness provided by WikiLeaks about this change in the US policy possibly triggered this change.

2. Earlier Studies and the Argument of This Study

The successful toppling of autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya (and Yemen) has often been attributed to the popular motives of opposing despots. The failure to bring about development (legitimacy by means of performance) has been pointed to by several scholars [3–8]. Filipe Campante and Davin Chor and Katerina Dalacoura specify the argument by showing that grievances, especially that of unemployment, held by well-educated people foreshadow problems for autocrats [9,10]. According to Samuel Huntington "The higher the level of education of the unemployed,...the more extreme the destabilizing behavior which results" [11]. In addition to unemployment, economic policies that discriminate against the well-educated middle class have been associated with the success of change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya [12].

Nonetheless, grievances that motivate and initiate revolts can also be purely political. Abrams applied the logic of relative deprivation to political grievances by explaining the appraisals of the Middle East as a response to the increasingly violent repression of the non-violent political opposition and also to the reversal of the modest beginnings of early democratic signs [11].

Some explanations emphasize the resources and opportunities of the potential rebels. This article will focus exactly on the modalities of democratic revolt. People are able to topple autocratic regimes, only when the autocrat fails to keep his/her order intact [13] and this condition is partly dependent on whether or not the opposition has the resources, the education and the time for mounting such a challenge [9,14]. The availability of new communication media with Facebook, text messaging etc. have been considered to have been among the facilitators of change in the Middle East [4,14–17]. In contrast, an ideational emancipation, the ability to imagine democratic models that are not copied from American textbooks on political science, has also been seen as a necessary condition to the process of democratization [18]. Finally, a successful challenging of the rulers also required the political awakening of the young people [15,16,18], and the political (rather than militant) mobilization of religious groups. The wisdom of Przeworsky [19] about the impact on perceptions of the feasibility of democratic revolution in democratizing regions was also utilized in the analyses of the opportunities available for the toppling of autocrats in the Middle East [20].

3. External Action...and Inaction

Opportunities for a democratic change are not always created domestically. External political influence and intervention in domestic power battles is another factor that affects the opportunities of peoples who might have other motives for toppling their respective autocratic regimes. On the one hand, much attention has recently been paid to international efforts to help the opposition topple their despots. Vali Nasr, for example, criticizes Obama's administration for rejecting the initiatives of the State Department for greater activism in support of democracy. Instead, he claims, the White House is "in a retreat" from the region [21]. At the same time these efforts at democratization often end up as imperialism that does not serve the human security in dictatorships [22]. This article will focus precisely on those inputs into those opportunities that topple autocrats that emanate from the political interventions into the domestic power struggles of democratizing states made by the big powers. Seven out of the ten most spectacular changes towards democracy that occurred after the First World War were at least partly influenced by international manipulation of the military power balance of the affected country [23]. However, in most cases the change was related to the ending of support for an autocrat by a foreign power. In Latin America, the US support of autocrats ended with the human rights campaign of President Jimmy Carter, and with the anti-drug warfare of President Ronald Reagan and what followed was a wave of democratization throughout the region. The wave of democratization in Eastern Europe, again, was made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its support for the communist autocrats. The ending of the Soviet intervention for the communist autocrats in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia resulted in the democratization of half of the ten countries that had experienced the most profound democratization after the First World War [23].

4. Can It Be the WikiLeaks?

The question related to foreign impacts is, whether there was a foreign power that withdrew its support from the autocrats. If such support from a power existed in the Middle East, it had to be from the US since only the American influence can have had such a decisive role in the shaping of polities in the region. A thesis that this was the case has already been presented. Ruthie Blum surprisingly accuses the US for abandoning its autocratic allies and thus making available space for anti-Israeli Islamists to take over [24]. In contrast, other scholars have been more critical of the US with its support for autocrats in the past, and more recently they have been critical of the US policy that has not supported the democratic movements sufficiently [21], and these scholars are

now pleased to have seen the autocrats overthrown. The thesis of the Arab Spring being influenced by the refusal of the US to support its old allies was well presented by the advocacy group of the main whistleblower, WikiLeaks. This organization allegedly leaked the information about the unwillingness of the US to continue its support for President Ben Ali in Tunis:

"The US campaign of unwavering public support for President Ali led to a widespread belief among the Tunisian people that it would be very difficult to dislodge the autocratic regime from power. This view was shattered when leaked (WikiLeaks) cables exposed the US government's private assessment: that the US would not support the regime in the event of a popular uprising. While extreme economic hardship and popular discontent with (human) rights abuses had already set the stage for an uprising, this new information played a critical role in transforming the landscape of political possibilities in Tunisia. The Tunisian people finally realized that, contrary to the US government's public relations efforts, they weren't really up against the full force of the world's superpower" [25,26].

Could it be that the main international push for democratization in the Middle East came as a negative act? The negative act, or non-action in this case was the refusal of the US to continue support for Ben Ali against his democratic challengers. In Egypt the US abandoned President Hosni Mubarak, who until the turmoil had received financial support matched only by the US support for Israel. In Libya the United States participated in a military operation involving the heavy bombing of Muammar Gaddafi's troops. In contrast, during President George W. Bush's regime, the country solicited Libyan support in the war on terror, tried to persuade Gaddafi to accept intelligence sharing arrangements and hoped to add Libya to the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership [27]: a venture that was undoubtedly aimed against some of the individuals in the current Libyan government. It is not within the scope of this article to prove that the US policy towards some of its Middle Eastern allies, especially in the war against terror, has dramatically changed. Instead, this is taken as a given. Such a change is considered to be a subject that this article will not analyze. In addition, no proof for the argument that the sudden inaction of the US regarding support of its autocratic allies was one of the reasons for the emergence of the opportunity for the Arab Spring will be provided either. Instead the topic that this article will focus on, is the question of whether the former US policy indeed contributed to the durability of Middle East autocracy.

Thus, the main question this article tries to answer is whether or not it is true that former US support of regimes in the Middle East supported autocrats more

than it did democrats. If the answer to this controversial question is no, then it will not be possible to say that the ending of such support contributed to the toppling of autocrats. Only if the overall balance of US interference and intervention in domestic affairs of the Middle East tilts in favor of autocracy, can US inaction be said actually to have helped to oust the dictators. This is why this article focuses on the question of what the overall balance of US support to domestic forces was: Was the support of the US in general in favor of democrats or dictators?

5. Quantitative Design

In order to answer this challenging research question, it is necessary for the analysis to go beyond gut feelings and qualitative analysis that aim at quantitative conclusions. It is known that there are cases where the US has supported democratic regimes and there are cases where the US has supported autocrats. Of these claims there are no doubts. Nevertheless, the crucial question is which pattern is the rule and which is the exception with regard to US interaction with the countries of the Middle East. In addition to revealing incidents and support and opposition of different types of regimes, one needs to reveal how often the US influence supported autocrats, and how often it supported democrats. This can be done by correlating data on polities with data on US military support and political support for regimes. The Polity IV dataset will be used for the data on polities. This database is the most used data on polities among specialists of comparative study of democratization. The definitions and operationalizations of the variables that will be used in this article will be discussed as and when these variables are introduced. The data on US support have been derived from historical analyses that will not be discussed here. However, for the sake of transparency, the coding of Middle East countries to various contemporaneous categories of US support during the years after the Second World War are shown in Appendixes 1 and 2 of this article.

Previously, I examined the relationship between changes in polities and changes in the qualities and quantities of US support [28]. My conclusions suggested that the US has generally rewarded changes towards autocracy whereas it has punished democratization. Examination of the events reveal that this was because the processes of democratization have often been spearheaded by groups who are either against Israel, against the US economic interests (mainly oil-related), or are geopolitically problematic as Islamists or socialists [28]. However, this time I wish to establish whether US support for regimes has been important for the stability of autocrats per se (and whether the ending of such support can be a crucial reason for the Arab

Spring). It is also important to analyze how support and autocracy correlate, i.e. what is the overall balance of US influence with regards to autocracy in the Middle East. Thus, the hypothesis of this study is that it is possible that the ending of US support for autocrats facilitated the Arab Spring because the overall influence of the US regional power previously was in support of autocracy.

The temporal focus of this examination begins from the beginning of independence of the Middle East countries and also after the US became hegemonic over the region, i.e. after the Second World War. This analysis period ends at the end of the year 2010, the last year of Polity IV at the time of writing this article. Using the year 2010 as the last year of the analysis also reveals the policy of the US before the beginning of the Arab Spring. For this reason, the decision for using the year 2010 as the last year for analyzing the research question, is academically robust.

In my quantitative analysis I will reveal two sets of results, one dataset in which Turkey is treated as a Middle East nation, and the other in which Turkey is not treated as a member of the region. Iran is another borderline state. Yet it is more often than not included in the region of the Middle East and this is why I will also consider it as a Middle Eastern power in my analysis. After all, in political terms Iran is a most central actor in Middle East politics, and its experience of US influence is crucial in the construction of the political reality of power in the Middle East region. Iran, as one of the members of the "axis of evil" and the group of "tyrannies", has been central to the US argument for the need to interfere in domestic policies in order "to rescue populations". The focus is on Muslim countries, as this is the cultural and geographic area where the Arab Spring took place. Lebanon has not been dominated by Muslim regimes even though currently Muslims constitute a majority of about 60% of the population. Lebanon is naturally included in the Muslim Middle East area due to its integral affiliation within the group of the Middle East states. Since the study leaves out the examination of Israel (since the focus is on Muslim countries), there is an inherent bias against US policies of support for democracy: Israel is a democracy (within its core territory), and the US tends to support Israeli governments.

6. US Support for Democracy...and Autocratic Violence

Democracy in this article can be defined as the following essential interdependent elements: openness and competitiveness in executive recruitment, and competitive and regulated political participation. Autocracy, in this article, is defined by the lack of competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the lack of openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the lack

of constraints on the chief executive's policies and actions. Both the Democracy and the Autocracy indicator used here are an additive 11-point scale (0–10). These definitions follow the operationalizations of the Polity dataset [29,30]. It is important to note that autocracy and democracy are not mutually exclusive: a country that allows a lot of popular participation, but rules without constraints can be relatively autocratic at the same time as being relatively democratic. The US military relationship means US military aid or concessional sales of military hardware for regimes that enable them to maintain law and order. The US general assistance to the regime means political support for the regime in the form of economic aid, diplomatic support or positive publicity for the regime. The coding of political and military support can be accessed in Appendixes 1 and 2.

7. US Support in the Middle East Including Turkey

Before going into correlative analysis one should make a methodological reservation here. To assess the significance of correlations one should focus on observations that are independent of each other. However, if the country is a democracy this year it is likely to have been a democracy the year before and it is likely to be a democracy the following year. The same is true for US support. Yet, correlations are relevant regardless of the interdependence between observations of each country over time as we are interested in whether US influence is currently helping autocrats or democrats, rather than in whether there is a systematic causal relationship between autocracy and US support. Even if it can be predicted that if the US supports one autocratic regime this year, then this regime will still be autocratic and that the US will still support it the following year, support over the years for a particular autocrat does affect the US's overall balance of support between democrats and autocrats.

There is a very weak but highly significant correlation (0.111**, sign. 0.000, N = 1054) between US general support (non-military support) for regimes and democracy. However, such a correlation is missing between democracy and US military support for regimes. However, there is a stronger and more significant correlation between US general help to a regime and the regime's authoritarian character, which is more crucial for human security (0.171**, sign. 0.000, N = 1054). Thus in general, US general support has a highly significant, albeit weak, negative correlation with overall polity quality (−0.165**, sign. 0.000, N = 1054), which indicates that over the study period the US supported autocracies more than democracies. Furthermore, US military support and authoritarianism were highly significant, even when they were weakly correlated (0.114**, sign. 0.000, N = 1055). The US then, weakly supports popular participation, but it supports harsh measures taken by the

authorities and thereby supports human insecurity more. Furthermore, it seems that US support has targeted regimes with some competitive participation, but where the security apparatus of the regimes restrict the openness of participation. Before going on to a more detailed analysis of the profiles of polities that US support for regimes favor, let us look at the archetypal regime that the US supports or opposes.

A typical US-supported country with democracy score of 1 was Tunisia before the Arab Spring, whereas a typical country opposed by the US with a democracy score 0, was the Sudan.

The first observation of these data is that the mean scores for democracy in the Middle East area are very low (clearly below the global averages) whereas the level of autocracy is high (way above global averages).

The second observation, before making the comparison between supported and opposed regimes, is that it seems that neutral countries that are neither supported nor opposed by the US, perform slightly better in terms of their development of democracy. This is clearer the closer we come to the present. Neutral regimes tend to be countries that are relatively smaller in importance for global energy production and/or are situated in less strategic locations. Competition between the global great powers has not served the human security of peoples of economically or strategically important countries very well.

The third observation that can be made about the contents of Table 1 is that the data confirm the result of the correlation analysis. The US supports both participatory and authoritarian regimes. The countries that the US opposes tend to be less authoritarian and thus the better at protecting their own people from authoritarian violence. Moreover, neutral countries score better than those countries that the US supports. Morocco (1992–1997) after its constitutional reform of 1992 and its slow democratic progress is a typical US-supported autocracy (with an autocracy score 7). Sudan at the beginning of the new millennium (2002–2004) is a typical US-opposed country, with an autocracy score of 6. Two typical neutral countries with an autocracy score of 6 were Egypt during the last years of Anwar Sadat and Oman before the discovery of oil in the mid-1960s. These relevant periods occurred before the development of US relations and the intensification of authoritarianism with these two countries.

Table 1. Mean democracy, authoritarianism and US general support scores in the Middle East, 1946–2010.

	Mean level of Democracy	Mean level of Autocracy
US opposes	0.30	6.41
US does not support or oppose	1.29	6.38
US supports	1.06	6.94

The same pattern applies to US military support. The US tends to support more democratic but also more autocratic regimes than it opposes. The differences between militarily supported countries and those that get no military support are smaller than in the case of general support. Consequently, it seems that US military support is even less selective than US general support when one looks at the general indicators of democracy and authoritarianism. However, once we look at democracy and autocracy profiles we will realize that this is not the case, after all.

8. US Support in the Middle East Not Including Turkey

Even though US support for autocracy is more systematic than its support for democracy, the difference between the two is not great. However, if we take a narrower geographical look at the Middle East area (Table 2) and assume that the regional rationale of support for the NATO ally, Turkey, derives from European rather than Middle Eastern realities, the picture of US policies in the Middle East gets darker.

Suddenly, the difference in democratic credentials between US-supported and US-opposed regimes disappears. Moreover, a typical US-supported polity has an autocracy score of eight whereas a typical opposed or neutral country has a score of six. The picture with military support is even worse (Table 3). An average Middle East country receiving US military assistance is clearly less democratic and much more authoritarian than a country that is not involved in military cooperation with the US.

9. The Difference between President Bush and President Obama

After the end of the Cold War and especially after the War on Terror had begun, the discourse on humanitarian intervention gained political capital, and thus respect for national sovereignty declined. This does not, however, mean that the consistency of US support for human security is greater once there is a greater need to pursue policies that compromise state sovereignty. Furthermore, the priorities of the War on Terror also required continued support for pro-US autocracies such as Saudi Arabia. An examination of the presidency of the George W. Bush period (Table 4) reveals how counter-terrorism affected US support to the Middle East regimes. By way of contrast I will add the figures during the first two years of the presidency of Barack Obama in parenthesis.

Clearly, the region has become less autocratic. Since the comparison here is between countries that the US supports and the ones US opposes, the general development towards democracy, especially during the past few years does not affect the conclusion about how the US supports democracy and autocracy.

Table 2. Mean democracy, autocracy and US general support scores in the Middle East (excl. Turkey), 1946–2010.

	Democracy	Autocracy
US opposes	0.30	6.41
US does not support or oppose	1.26	6.41
US supports	0.35	7.61

Table 3. Mean democracy, autocracy and US military support scores in the Middle East (excl. Turkey), 1946–2010.

	Democracy	Autocracy
No military support	0.72	6.63
Military support	0.31	7.80

Table 4. Mean democracy, autocracy and US general support scores in the Middle East, for the G. W. Bush and (B. Obama) presidencies.

	Democracy	Autocracy
Enemies	0.75 (0.17)	5.34 (5.83)
Neutral	2.67 (4.00)	5.00 (4.00)
Allies	1.07 (1.33)	6.05 (5.63)

The general democratization happened before the US policy changed as, during the term of President Bush, the countries supported by the US still were clearly more autocratic than those the US treated with suspicion and hostility. The trend in US support did not change before the change over to the Obama presidency. During the Bush presidency the United States still supported regimes that governed with slightly greater democracy than it opposed. Nonetheless, the US also supported slightly more authoritarian regimes than that it opposed. The margin between the democracy scores of those supported and those opposed diminished, whereas the margin between autocracy scores of US friends and foes slightly widened during the George W. Bush presidency. US support scores for the George W. Bush era became even less supportive of citizens when measured by support for democracy and autocracy. If Turkey is excluded from the analysis, the difference between the times before and during President G. W. Bush is substantial. Then the US clearly opposes more democratic regimes than it supports (Table 5).

However, the Obama presidency is different. The preference for autocrats virtually no longer exists in the Obama presidency.

The presidency of George W. Bush was disastrous for US legitimacy as a supporter of democracy in the Middle East when US policy is interrogated from the perspective of military support (Table 6). Regardless of whether or not we count Turkey as a Middle Eastern power, the G. W. Bush era supported more regimes with a worse democracy score and a higher level of autocracy compared to regimes the US did not support. If one looks at Table 6 on the Middle East without Turkey the

picture is grim.

As the figures in parentheses for the first years of President Obama show, US policy towards democracy is fluid. It seems that the autocratic bias has not changed in US military relationships (Table 6), whereas for US general support the bias towards supporting autocratic regimes has disappeared (Tables 4 and 5). The Obama administration's policy did give different signals to the Arabs who disapproved of or opposed their autocratic leaders.

10. Profiles of Democracy and Autocracy

If we then move from the blunt variables of democracy and autocracy scores towards variables that detail polities, we can illuminate some of the hidden interests and drivers behind US support or opposition. US supportive relationship for a Middle East regime is correlatively associated with high levels of regulation of chief executive recruitment. Furthermore, US support was not given to countries with a long history of military coups (even if the US has backed a few of them itself). Regulation of the recruitment of the chief executive of a country does not imply either democracy or authoritarianism, but stability. Hereditary succession can be as regulated as institutionalized elections. The correlation between US support and the degree of regulation of chief executive recruitment is the highest and most significant association in this study. This association is also a characteristic of the target country's polity regardless of whether we look at general support (0.451**, sign. 0.000, N = 1054) or military cooperation (0.386**, sign. 0.000, N = 1055). Regulation of executive recruitment was an even more vital criterion under President G. W. Bush's tenure as president. Clearly US support strives for stability rather than democracy or the well-being of citizens of the Middle East countries. This seems explicable, given the economic and strategic interests the US faces in the Middle East. This emphasis is often central to US definitions and objectives of its Middle Eastern strategy: "The United States has pursued a foreign policy that seeks stability in a region with abundant energy reserves but which has volatile interstate relationships" [31]. Furthermore, US strategic interests in an area that neighbored the Soviet Union required that a military relationship had to have some stability. US support is also very significantly correlated with the duration of regimes, which in turn, are associated with the predictability of developments and the stability of the situation. For example, the emphasis on stability in US relations with Egypt and Tunisia continued until the very end of President George W. Bush's stint as president. The assessment at the end of 2010 was that the US could no longer go against people who yearned for democracy and wanted to oust President Ben Ali. This revelation was disclosed by WikiLeaks in January 2011 and it was an indication of a priority change in US foreign policy in favor of giving at least some room for human rights and human security, even if this meant compromising the "stability-interests" of the US.

Table 5. Mean democracy, autocracy and US general support scores in the Middle East (excl. Turkey), G.W. Bush and (B. Obama) Presidencies.

	Democracy	Autocracy
Enemies	0.75 (0.17)	5.34 (5.83)
Neutral	2.67 (4.00)	5.00 (4.00)
Allies	0.54 (0.80)	6.43 (6.00)

Table 6. Mean democracy, autocracy and US military support scores in the Middle East (excl. Turkey), G. W. Bush and (Obama) Presidencies.

	Democracy	Autocracy
No military relations	1.14 (1.58)	5.16 (5.08)
Military relations	0.49 (0.78)	6.63 (6.09)

Despite the poor democracy record of the US supported regimes, the level of competitiveness in executive recruitment and the level of competitiveness in political participation in Middle East states on the one hand and US military support on the other are clearly correlated (competitiveness of executive recruitment: 0.241**, sign. 0.000, N = 1055; competitiveness of political participation: 0.160**, sign. 0.000, N = 1055) and with general support on the other hand (competitiveness of executive recruitment: 0.267**, sign. 0.000, N = 1054; competitiveness of political participation: 0.128**, sign. 0.000, N=1054) are significantly, albeit very weakly, correlated. Clearly the centrality of democratic competition in the American policy can be seen.

Although competitive regimes are supported, US support is correlated with constraints on the openness of this competition. Executive recruitment and political participation might be competitive, but not all can participate in this competition. The openness of the executive recruitment concept has the strongest negative correlation with US support, both general and military (general support: -0.336**, sign. 0.000, N = 1054; military support: -0.254**, sign. 0.000, N = 1055). An examination of the autocracies that the US has supported and opposed reveals what kind of restrictions to democratic participation the US supports. Recruitment and political participation are not open as Communists, Islamists and people who would be harmful to US political interests in terms of policy towards oil, are often excluded from the political process.

The problem of the lack of openness is also understandable from the point of view of US strategic and economic interests. Even when the US is ideologically committed to supporting competitive political systems, it cannot allow ideological expressions that harm its oil interests or strategic priorities within the Middle East. However, when emphasizing abstract strategic security interests, the

US has traditionally contributed to human insecurity inside Middle Eastern autocracies.

11. US Support and Democracy and Human Rights: Extreme Cases

The rationales of US support for elements of autocracy namely: the bias towards autocratic stability and the imposition of restrictions on political participation and the competition for executive positions against Islamists, Israel-haters, Communists and opponents of US oil interests, can also be examined by looking at the extreme cases of US support for autocrats and its opposition to democrats. If we list regimes that the United States has supported and put them in the order of their autocracy score from the most to the least autocratic regimes, at the top of the list we would get the extreme cases that the US should not have supported if it were interested in the promotion of human security. This is what I have done in Table 7: the cut-off point is the autocracy score 10, which is the highest level of autocracy in the Polity data. All the regimes listed below belong to that category.

I now order the data for countries the US opposed in the order of their autocracy scores, starting from the least autocratic countries, in Table 8.

Table 7. Most autocratic regimes that US has supported.

Country	Regime years	Autocracy score
Iran	1953–1978	10
Jordan	1974–1983	10
Saudi Arabia	1946–2010	10
Kuwait	1976–1989	10
Bahrain	1971–1992	10
Qatar	1985–2010	10
Oman	1973–1990	10

Table 8. Least autocratic regimes that the US has opposed.

Country	Regime years	Autocracy score
Sudan	1967–1968	1
Iran	1997–2003	1
Lebanon	2005	1
Yemen North	1967–1972	3
Yemen	2005	3
Sudan	2005–2010	4
Iran	1951–1952	4
Iraq	1958–1967	5
Yemen South	1969	5
Sudan	2002–2004	6
Iraq	1982–1996; 2004–2010	6

Many of the regimes (of Table 8) demonized in the Western media are nowhere near as autocratic as all of the US allies of Table 7. In fact every one of the regimes listed, including the currently much maligned Iranian and Sudanese governments, is less autocratic than the average Muslim regime that the US supports in the Middle East. Not even the two most autocratic regimes that US has opposed in the past, Saddam Hussein's Iraq or the socialist, pro-Soviet regime of Algeria of the mid-1960s ever had an autocracy score of 10.

Each of the US-supported regimes that had an autocracy score 10 were major oil producers, and all of them have or have had a stable but ruthless political system. The US is addicted to oil, and it sells out its principles of human security to get what it needs, as any addict would.

It seems from Table 8 that the US has opposed relatively less-autocratic countries when a) their popular will went against the crucial interests of US energy policies (Iran 1951–1952 being the best example), and US global missions against communism (South Yemen 1969) or against Islamic terrorism (Iran, 1997–2008, Sudan 2002–2008), or b) when their relations with the US were severed by them having a negative stand on Israel (Sudan 1967–1968). The pursuance of such opposition has often occurred in ways that undermine the principle of human security.

If we look at the countries for which Barack Obama's regime relaxed its rule of supporting stable regimes, and allowed people to topple their leaders, we can see that these countries were not crucially important oil producers. Their respective democratic oppositions were moderately Islamist and they did oppose Israel, but the Arab Spring in these countries never threatened the US oil interests. It seems that Obama could tolerate human security progress even in countries that were likely to turn Islamist and anti-Israel. However, the US war on terror was not to be compromised, and thus popular pressures were not allowed to hamper US operations in Yemen. In addition, popular preferences were still suppressed in those US allied countries in which the promotion of such preferences could have helped the geopolitical interests of Iran (such as in Iraq and Bahrain). However, US resolve was most unyielding in the countries in which the US energy interests were threatened (Bahrain and Saudi Arabia). Whether the new energy solutions that will reduce US energy dependence on the Middle East will affect this driver for the support of stable but autocratic regimes of oil producing nations remains to be seen.

12. Conclusions and Discussion

Comparison of polity profiles of regimes that the United States either supports or opposes in addition to an analysis of the extreme cases of US support and

opposition seem to produce the same conclusions. The main conclusions of this study support the view which can be summarized as follows:

1. In general, the United States has supported more autocratic regimes than it has opposed. In this sense US support of regimes seems to have contributed to human insecurity.
2. In general the US military relationship facilitated autocratic governments, i.e. governments whose polity allows for a more brutal oppression of their people than those regimes for which the US eschews such a military relationship.
3. The US supports seven regimes with the highest autocracy score of 10: i.e. regimes that are more autocratic than the most autocratic regimes that the US has opposed.
4. Many of the countries that the US has been most passionate in opposing, i.e. those countries that the US policy most frequently denies the normal diplomatic rights to which all sovereign nations are due, are relatively democratic and much less autocratic than the countries the US supports in general.

The polity profiles of the regimes that the US either supports or opposes in the Middle East provide important explanations as to why the balance of US influence in domestic policies in the Middle East countries favors autocratic governments. The analysis above corroborates the findings based on the observation of polity changes and the qualitative analysis published by Marwan Bishara and myself [28,32]. According to Bishara, support for autocrats is because the US sees the Middle East through the prism of oil, Israel, and terrorism, and that all of these viewpoints are impediments to the US commitment to pursuing democracy, human rights and freedom [32]. The US preferred the controlled chief executive recruitment in Middle East countries, especially in those countries where there was a risk of communists (during the cold war), Islamists (during the War on Terror), or haters of Israel taking over. The US also supported the durability of these polities, especially in oil producing countries. Clearly, all of these factors are decisive in what lies behind the traditional US support for autocrats in the Middle East.

The oil and gas-related interests for supporting autocrats can be understood easily by integrating this observation with the literature of political economy. Oil is important to the US strategically, whereas oil interests also affect the behavior of the US towards Middle East states due to the influence wielded by the oil companies.

Oil is a strategic commodity and a necessity of modern industry, thus access to oil-based energy has long been crucial for the strategic and economic interests of the United States. In addition to it being a necessity for American prosperity, it has been

instrumental in the setting of strategic goals, including the ability of the US to promote democracy in the world. This paradox between US economic interests with regards to oil and the wider espoused US global strategic goal of democracy was made very explicit in the previous US president's (George W. Bush) analysis of US policies on the Middle East [31]. This dichotomous linkage between strategy and support for oil autocrats explains the approach of the US in limiting popular expression in favor of Islamism (or Iran), and communism.

In addition to global interests, energy influences US policies about protecting the investments of American oil companies in Middle Eastern oil. Oil exploration requires a huge investment before it starts producing any profits and after this initial investment the assets of the investors are fixed and immobile and therefore at the mercy of any change in policy. Consequently, it is clear that the investor is keen on rules that enable the continuation of the business. According to Hirschman [33], this creates a situation where the investor is left with the strategy of trying to influence the host country: leaving the country is not an option. When the investment is crucial to national interest, it is likely that the logic of power forces the country of the investor to pursue strategies that aim at controlling the polity of the host country. It does so to ameliorate the vulnerability of strategically important investments. The strong support given by the United States to friendly dictators (regimes listed in Table 7), the American preference for controlled chief executive recruitment in host countries, the support for the continuity of favorable polities in oil countries testify to this logic of immobile, fixed assets that explain the interventions of US interests in securing access to oil in the Middle East.

In addition to vital pressing economic motives, US policy has to adjust regional approaches to global priorities and this necessarily implies compromises to optimal regional strategies. Amaney A. Jamal has claimed in his book entitled: *Of Empires and Citizens* that "democracy may not suit the strategic interests of the United States" in the Arab world [34]. The global conflicts against global communist dictators and terrorism have sometimes meant that a Middle East government's softness on communism or on terror had to be punished or prevented or nullified by subversive means, even when governments were relatively democratic. Furthermore, as seen in Table 8, some of the pro-Soviet regimes (South Yemen and Sudan at the end of the 1960s, Iran 1951–1952) and even more often some of the religiously oriented governments that have had a sympathetic attitude towards some of the organizations that the US categorizes as terrorist (Lebanon 1985, Iran in the 2000s, and Sudan today) are somewhat less autocratic in general than other regimes in the Middle East. These regimes cannot win US support, as this support, even if positive for human security in the

Middle East, could hamper the American global fight against the forces of autocracy. Meanwhile, governments with few democratic credentials can get a favorable reception from the United States if they have a favorable attitude towards the US and its global allies.

A lesser, but still important intervening interest that explains America's occasional support for repression, is the US's support for the power, security and welfare of Israel. Whether this support is due to the Second World War's great narrative, which partly legitimizes US leadership in the world, or to the extensive domestic power of the American Jewish community [35], or to something else cannot be concluded on the basis of this study. However, what can be said on the basis of the analysis above is that the US has had to help autocrats stay in power to support the strategic goal of helping Israel. The case of marginalizing the democratically elected Hamas in Palestine, instead of trying to isolate it from the radicals involved in civilian targeting, is a good example of this. The subversive punishment of the Sudan in the mid-1960s and the refusal to endorse Iran's democratic development in the 1980s and in the 1990s were partly related to the upholding of this partisan support. Iran, obviously, did not become a perfect democracy after its theocratic revolution while the human security situation in the country has deteriorated during the recent years. Yet, according to Polity data, the country became one of the most democratic and least autocratic countries in the Middle East, and held that position even during President Bush's campaign against tyrants (Iranian leaders included).

Although claims that US democracy support is corrupted by oil interests, strategic interests of resisting Islamism (and Iran), the will of the US to defend Israel are not new; these strategic interests, as causal factors, had not been tested systematically before this study. This is why there still are analyses that assume, as a given, that the US influence overall is in favor of democracy against totalitarian autocrats, and that the question is just whether the US is doing enough to support democracy [21,36]. This study together with my study of US reactions to changes of polities [28] clearly show that the inaction of the US in the Muslim Middle East during the Arab Spring would be more beneficial for human security than any traditional US action. Thus we should not take it for granted that the democratic superpower necessarily has a positive effect on democracy in the Middle East. The opposite is established here. The analysis above suggests that the US has already done too much and that it is a blessing for the human security and democracy of the region that Barack Obama's US administration is currently in retreat or less resolute in supporting its autocratic Middle Eastern allies. Thus, the most likely conclusion is that it has been US inaction rather than US action that contributed to Arab Spring.

What has been shown above is not proof that it was the US inaction that triggered the Arab Spring. It is obvious that other factors were crucial. However, without the traditional weight of US influence in favor of autocracy, the claim of US inaction giving rise to the opportunities in the Arab world for people to oust their autocrats would have been impossible to make. The fact that there seems to be an overall balance of US influence in favor of autocrats and that WikiLeaks revealed the evaporation of US support for Ben Ali makes it plausible that the US was, after all, somehow behind the collapse of brutal autocrats in the Middle East. Whether this was actually the case should be further studied by tracing the motivations of the democratic Arab rebels, their knowledge of and trust in WikiLeaks, whether their facebook, and text messages referred to the new opportunities offered by the US inaction, and whether they talked about the WikiLeaks revelations. Yet, such research would be useless before it can be shown that the US had indeed supported autocracy and that this policy had changed with Obama. This was proven in this study (not that the US was necessarily an influence or that WikiLeaks was the trigger).

The crucial oil states have not lost the support of the US, and thus they have not managed to get rid of their autocratic obstacles to human security. Instead

the US tried to prevent them from moving against autocracy both in Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain. Thus the change in the US attitude towards Islamist and anti-Israel popular movements could be among the explanations of the Arab Spring. Also, this should be further studied by focusing on the differences in the US policies towards oil states and non-oil states. If there were a clear difference between how the US policy developed towards the two categories of states, this could further consolidate the hypothesis that the change in the US attitude towards potentially Islamist non-oil states could have been one of the external conditions of the Arab Spring. In any case, the fact that the US used to support autocrats, and that it stopped this support for autocrats of non-oil states just before the Arab Spring suggests that it is already quite plausible that the US change was one of the causes of the Arab Spring, and that the revelation of this change by WikiLeaks was a trigger for considerable human security upgrade in the region. In any case, greater transparency early on about the US support of autocracy, despite the country's pro-democracy rhetoric, could have increased the political costs involved in this double standard decades ago. This could have generated the international conditions conducive for the Arab Spring even sooner.

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Appendix 1. US general support for the Middle East regimes.

Country	US Support	Neutrality	US Opposition
Algeria	1979–2010		
Bahrain	1971–2010		
Egypt	1946–1952; 1979–2010		
Iran	1953–1978		
Iraq	1980–1988; 2003–2010	1946–1957; 1989	1958–1979; 1990–2002
Jordan	1957–1990; 1992–2010	1946–1956; 1991	
Kuwait	1963–2010		
Lebanon	1946–1958; 1983	1959–1982; 1984–2000; 2005–2010	2001–2005
Libya		1952–1968; 2003–2010	1969–2002
Morocco	1956–2010		
Oman	1973–2010	1946–1972	
Qatar	1985–2010	1971–1984	
Saudi Arabia	1946–2010		
Sudan	1972–1973; 1977–1985	1956–1966; 1986–1988	1967–1971; 1974–1976; 1989–2010
Syria	1949	1946–1948; 1950–1962; 1970–1999	1963–1969; 2000–2010
Tunisia	1959–1984; 1986–1987; 1985; 1988; 1990–1991 1992–2010		
Turkey	1947–2010	1946	
UAE	1971–2010		
Yemen	1990–2004; 2006–2010		2005
Yemen, North	1962–1966; 1979–1990	1946–1961; 1973–1978	1967–1972
Yemen, South		1967–1968	1969–1990

Appendix 2. US military support for the Middle East regimes.

Country	Military Cooperation	No Military Cooperation
Algeria	1992–2010	1946–1991
Bahrain	1971–2010	
Egypt	1979–2010	1946–1978
Iran	1953–1978	1946–1952; 1979–2010
Iraq	1980–1988; 2003–2010	1953–1978
Jordan	1957–2010	1946–1956
Kuwait	1991–2010	1973–1990
Lebanon	1950–1958; 1983	1946–1949; 1959–1982; 1984–2010
Libya		1951–2010
Morocco	1963–2010	1956–1962
Oman	1980–2010	1946–2007
Qatar	1992–2010	1971–1991
Saudi Arabia	1951–2010	1946–1950
Sudan	1972–1973	1956–1971; 1974–2010
Syria	1949; 1991	1946–1948; 1950–1990; 1992–2010
Tunisia		1959–2010
Turkey	1947–2010	1946
UAE	2001–2010	1971–2000
Yemen	2006–2010	1990–2005
Yemen, North	1979–1990	1946–1978
Yemen, South		1967–1990

A Review of "Human Security in World Affairs: Problems and Opportunities"

Published: 4 September 2013

Keywords: challenges and opportunities for human security; environmental security; human security

Human Security in World Affairs: Problems and Opportunities

Alexander K. Lautensach, Sabina W. Lautensach
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While security of our hominid encampments and settlements must have been at or near the top of our species priorities since our evolution some several hundred thousand years ago, awareness of the magnitude of our alterations, interactions and impacts on our world is a very recent event. Even more recent is our collective and growing angst over how our species is to secure some sort of permanence on a planet that is ultimately governed by natural forces and is forever changing.

As an environmental biologist, and one who has been particularly interested and concerned by the rising levels of greenhouse gases and their attendant effects on global changes, and as an educator, I am delighted to see a book such as this. With an ambitious mandate, to probe all major facets of modern human security, Alexander and Sabina Lautensach have brought together their vision and ideas, and along with those of a host of co-authors from around the world, have edited a book that is both comprehensive in scope and understandable for a broad audience. The thoughtful and succinct preface and introduction sections written by the editors are well worth a careful read prior to engaging with the

chapters. These are well written and thought-provoking. The short section on environmental security in the introduction will likely end up as required reading for one or more of my senior undergraduate or graduate classes relating to the environment. It is concise, but also is successful in bridging social and natural sciences—of great importance if we are to make collaborative progress on this issue. In addition, as in all other chapters, learning outcomes, suggested readings and glossaries provide a solid launch pad for further examination.

Chapters 1 and 2 complete the introduction for me. Chapter 1 lays out the history of modern 'human security' from the term's inception in 1990s, to its disaggregation into seven core areas, namely economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political, in the 1995 UN World Summit for Social Development report. While the book is not organized along these seven core areas, subsequent chapters address all of these themes. Listings of foundational documents and other resources appearing in this chapter should be useful for professor and student alike. Chapter 2 answers the all-important question: 'why should we care?'. The linkages between environmental degradation, fossil fuel combustion, and our human population increases are highlighted in the four major findings of the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment.

Chapters 3 through 19 delve into specific aspects of human security that, while not designed to be sequential, are reasonably logical in their flow. For example, Chapter 3 begins with an examination of the influence of perspective on human security, while

Chapter 4 provides a very useful overview of all perceived threats to human security, but with a decidedly strong emphasis on violent conflict. Examinations of international law (humanitarian and criminal) (Chapter 5), those living outside of the 'state' system (Chapter 6) or under hybrid governance systems (Chapter 7) and their impacts on human security are considered in order—making a logical grouping of topics. The chapter on globalization (Chapter 8) might have been introduced earlier, but is a necessary one for this book. Environmental decay is addressed in chapters 9 and 10, providing a thoughtful consideration of the cognitive underpinnings of such things as greed and overconsumption which lead to resource scarcity and anthropogenic degradation of the environment. Ronnie Hawkins (Chapter 11) deconstructs the human war on nature—which she rightfully likens to war on ourselves. Her optimism for the future provides some keys to positive ways forward. The chapter on transnational crime (Chapter 11) might have been better placed next to Chapter 5, but clearly portrays the significance of transnational versus international crime. The next 3 chapters address the importance of local governance (Chapter 13), adequate human rights (Chapter 14) and environmentally conscious governance (Chapter 15). The last chapter resonated with me. Many countries such as my own are founded on 'good governance', yet it seems to me that our governments of today are increasingly mired in politics of yesteryear—unable to meet the definition of good governance today, i.e. giving proper regard to environmental security. The next chapter (16) addresses health security for humans, but as an environmental biologist, I would have liked to have seen discussion of larger questions, to some extent addressed in other chapters. For example, the authors do give a nod to preventative medicine and adequate nutrition, but fail to address the larger problem of the long-term health of our species in the face of things like overpopulation—itsself a product of human healthcare improvements. Chapter 17 makes a strong case for enhancing human security through the advancement and enforcement of international law. Chapter 18 provides a very concise and understandable treatment of peace building, and convincing this reader that it is indeed a necessary condition for human security. Of greater interest to me was Chapter 19 dealing with global environmental governance. While the chapter lacked specifics and global precedents and examples, it did provide an overview of GEG.

The capstone and final chapter of this book (Chapter 20), authored again by the editors, attempts

to weave the disparate threads of the intervening chapters into a cohesive fabric of the overall human security challenge and opportunity. I'm not sure they truly succeed—the problem of our future security, perhaps *the* problem of our species, is as vast and deep as it is complex. Caught up in religious, political, corporate, and economic paradigms or orthodoxies that now appear ill-suited for our long-term survival, it is clear that some fundamental shifts will need to be made. Opportunities exist, although simultaneously meeting the needs of all forms of human security is clearly going to be a tall order. Yet, the editors provide us with some reasonable assumptions and places to begin. I could not agree more that our most pressing and overarching security challenge is our environment, and in particular, our perilous state of environmental overshoot. I also agree that the only rational way forward to solve this overshoot is by decreasing our population growth and size and the inequities of the environmental impact that result. As an educator, I am also in agreement that educational practices and our definitions of modernity and progress need shifting to reflect our current situation. Finally, while I think many could agree with the conclusion that national/local rather than global governance offers the more promising avenue for security policy remediation, I wished that more mention was made of the local levels. In my experience with environmental security at least, local level experimentation with and adaptation of new approaches are often far ahead of that of their nation state.

Ultimately, this book succeeds on so many levels, and if the chapters are considered carefully, a picture should emerge without prompting. What I take great heart in is that scholars the world over are recognizing our species' increasingly perilous situation, and are working so diligently to imagine and create a secure future for our species. We should all be grateful for these efforts, but more importantly, we should take heed and take action, contributing to what is arguably the most important dialogue and undertaking of our time.

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Doing Justice to Human Security: A Textbook in Tune with its Time

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Human Security in World Affairs: Problems and Opportunities

Alexander K. Lautensach, Sabina W. Lautensach (eds.)

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I begin this brief review of this important volume with the confession that I have not personally pursued a teaching style that has employed a self-acclaimed textbook for many, many years, preferring to construct courses around monographs, articles and other visual materials. However, were I provided the opportunity to teach a course at the upper division undergraduate level or early graduate level in the subject of human security, this would certainly be the book I would choose (with the caveat introduced below). Alex and Sabina Lautensach have given careful and thoughtful consideration to every aspect of the text: the preface and introduction, written by the editors, lay out both the logic of the text and frame the subject matter that will locate the reader firmly in the midst of the vast challenges that constitute the issue of human security. They do so by emphasizing both the multiple dimensions along which the issue of human security can be located and the inseparable nature of these as they interact with each other in complex ways. In many respects this strikes me as one of the most important contributions to the text—its steady insistence that human security as a construct is in a discursive state of constant emer-

gence, such that in some important ways all its varied dimensions insistently co-vary. To make such a claim is in itself daunting—to demonstrate its validity and mutual engagements through the complex subject matters of its 20 chapters, is a tour de force. Their conclusion is sufficiently rich to stand alone as an illustrative text in other course materials.

As a text the book is thoughtfully constructed. As indicated, the subject matter chapters are preceded by a preface and introduction that are written in a style that is welcoming to the reader and leave one with a sense of confidence that the overall work promises both purpose and content that will be rewarding. For the student this promise is realized in the structure of the 19 content chapters. Each consists of a summary that appears at the beginning of the chapter followed by a statement of "Learning Outcomes and Big Ideas". This framing device gives on to the overall subject matter of the chapter, conveniently identified by specific enumerated sections. Each chapter concludes with four teaching-oriented subsets: summary points that ably delineate the major issues touched on within the chapter; a listing of extension activities and further research ideas that stimulate the reader/learner to additional activities; a list of terms and definitions that cumulatively build the conceptual vocabulary that is a major "take away" of the volume; and a section on further reading which often contains useful URLs to direct the reader to sites that in their nature will continuously update concepts and materials found within the chapter.

One can only be impressed by the reach of this volume and the impressive credentials of its many

authors. The conventional listing of contributors at the volume's end provides an additional incentive for readers to extend their investigation beyond the volume in hand by putting these authors high on their list of future reading. They include an impressive mix of academic credentials as well as ample "real world" postings in both governmental and NGO sites throughout the world. Perusing this listing one can not help but carry away from it not only the sense of well-earned credentialization of the contributors, but also their commitments to the numerous and varied issues and causes that necessarily make up the "culture" of human security endeavors throughout the world.

Given the inevitable "reality" that to address human security is to "take on" virtually every aspect of human activity on the globe in all time periods, the volume does a remarkable job of selecting areas of concentration that will provide a rapid learning experience for the novice reader (let alone the additional benefits of reach and edification that come to the more experienced reader). This benefit is, I think, best exemplified by the constant iteration of the interactions that exist between human and non-human environmental factors. The direct and indirect interfaces between human settlement activity of all sorts—but especially those of human societies over the past two hundred years—and the natural environment are touched on in nearly every chapter with the result that the reader's previous understanding of key concepts is simultaneously reinforced and expended upon. Phrased another way, the framing with which the volume leads—namely, providing effective understanding of both the reach and limitations of various environments and ecologies throughout the globe—is constantly overlain with rich and complex descriptions and analyses of complex human structures that have grown out of such engagements both as efforts to organize and regulate them, e.g. state structures, extra-state structures, laws, conventions, regulatory processes, as well as those that exist outside the reach of effective human regulation and continue as the sources of human misery and constant threats to human security, e.g. human trafficking, arms dealing, global crime, refugee displacement, health threats, etc. Overall, as a reader I was impressed by the extraordinary range of the conceptual structures provided by the volume as well as the wealth of information provided.

As a university classroom teacher of many decades, I was constantly challenged in reading this volume to think of how it could be effectively used by my students. I am struck by three accommodations one must make to it. First, despite the very original and diligent structural considerations built into each chapter intended to assist the student in grasping the extraordinary range of materials included in the volume, I find the task viewed from the student's perspective daunting. This flows both from the range of the subject matter and the extraordinary detail that

is provided differentially in virtually every chapter. In many respects I would conceive of the book more as a resource volume than a text, certainly at the undergraduate level. Second, I write from a distinctly American university perspective wherein most university undergraduate curricula would not have provided a ready administrative space for a multi-disciplinary subject such as human security: it would most likely be taught either from a social science, biological science or health science perspective. As such the teaching task is considerable to assure that students have the grasp of the theoretical and conceptual materials necessary to ensure full use of the book. To which one needs to add that both the semester and quarter structure of many (most?) courses make this a heavy burden for most undergraduate classes. I hasten to admit that this reflects more negatively on the nature of US undergraduate educational structures than on the inherent value of the book, but as I indicate, it is a significant accommodation one must make were this the context of its use. Thirdly, and following directly from my previous point, in my own teaching this would be an invaluable book at the graduate level, in any number of courses. Within my own frame of reference its use in courses in policy, conflict, globalization, planning and health would be more than welcome.

Given my obvious appreciation of the book and its many virtues, it seems almost gratuitous to focus on what I find as shortcomings. But for my purposes both as a university teacher and researcher, I find several areas in which I would have appreciated either inclusion of an added dimension or greater attention within chapters that occupy these subject frames. One is with the issue of population. Whereas the extraordinary challenges presented by our current population trajectory are touched on in various places (most particularly chapter two), as an overall driver of the human security complex of causes and effects, it seems to be under-emphasized and valued. This is especially true given the precise point we occupy on the population explosion curve. Our students in particular are facing a world of potential transition that is almost without recent precedent. Combining this awareness with a more extended consideration of the dynamics of the global economy into which our students will be entering seems especially relevant. This leads to a second and related concern, which again is touched on in various places, especially those that deal with issues of the state and extra-state status, namely the explosive growth throughout the world of conurbations, sometimes viewed as mega cities. A growing amount of recent scholarship, especially from urbanists and students of globalization suggests that the structural nature of such human aggregations poses new issues and dilemmas for governance and survival. My suggestion is that they need to be included within this admirable catalogue of human security concerns in and of themselves. A third

issue concerns the ubiquitous nature of technological change and its transformations throughout the complete range of knowledge environments. The dominant view of technology throughout the volume tends to be its threats to issues of sustainability between human and non-human ecologies. My view is that the world as we know it is poised at a particular juncture between population, human settlement patterns, governance and belief and the ever more rapidly changing knowledge environment—all part of the collective phenomenon we choose to label globalization despite our ready admission that by this term we mean many, many different things.

But in the overall context of this admirable volume, these can be viewed as perhaps desirable additions to a second edition, rather than as shortcomings that detract from its value. Overall, the volume is an extraordinary achievement and I applaud its publication.

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