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
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Cover image
Collage of symbolic representations of the four pillars of human security: military or traditional security, environmental security, socioeconomic security and (public) health security.
Author: Sabina and Alexander Lautensach

About *Journal of Human Security*

Aims & Scope

We are committed to a multidisciplinary approach to security analysis. Our associates contribute expertise from such diverse areas as political anthropology, international relations, environmental science, ethics, health care, psychology, economics, and engineering.

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The Journal of Human Security endeavours to:

- Provide a forum for researchers to foster interdisciplinary inquiry in broad human security issues such as track two diplomacy, ethnic conflict, terrorism, religious extremism, human rights, demographic change, population health, human ecology, sustainable economics and related areas;
- Inform readers about upcoming events, ongoing and new research projects, trends and discussions, newly published monographs, and available scholarships;
- Encourage a multidisciplinary approach to issues that have traditionally been viewed as mostly unidisciplinary;
- Maintain an appeal to a wide readership with both high academic standards and close relevance to practice;
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Journal of Human Security

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Editorial

Editorial for Journal of Human Security Volume 10

Sabina W. Lautensach [1, 2, 3]

[1] *Editor-in-Chief* of the Journal of Human Security, Librello, Basel, Switzerland
[2] Human Security Institute, Canada
[3] University of Northern British Columbia, Terrace, BC, V8G 4A2, Canada; E-Mail: salaut@gmail.com

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela's death on 5 December 2013 and his funeral ten days later were taken as an occasion in the global media to discuss the merits of political leadership for human security, with occasional comments on its pitfalls. This particular leader is not the most politically safe object of discussion, as, for a long time, he openly advocated civil disobedience and resistance, initially of the non-violent kind, but later becoming violent. Predictably, the local hegemon reacted with great brutality and sweeping measures to the resistance of the ANC, policies that shocked many in the western world. This reaction by the government and its supporters and the counterreaction it incited amounted, in the long run, to little more than a vast reduction in human security for most citizens of South Africa, lasting until the ANC's victory and Mr Mandela's ascendance to the presidency in 1994.

Mr Mandela's example illustrates how responsible leaders of political resistance movements must assess the centres of power without any illusions about the innate legitimacy of sovereign governments. They must navigate carefully among the institutions of power, their directives, laws, and enforcement agencies, always seeking maximum damage to the holders of power and minimal harm to the rest of the citizenry. If they lose sight of that balance, they cease to be responsible moral leaders. This ethical principle clashes vehemently with common conventions about the inviolability of the rule of law, the taken-for-granted legitimacy of state authority, and the currently fashionable glorification of the no-holds-barred 'war against terrorism'. The convention holds that the state

is the only institution powerful enough—and morally legitimised—to counter anarchic movements and the threat to human security such movements supposedly pose. Yet the ethics of civil resistance clearly holds the moral high ground in cases where the hegemon has abandoned procedural justice and widely violates human rights in his (precedents are mostly male) increasingly desperate efforts to preserve the power imbalance on which his position depends.

In our recently published textbook on human security [1] we enclosed a discussion section entitled "What if the Law is Wrong?"—What course of action, based on what ethical platform, can rescue human security in such a situation? The examples of apartheid South Africa, Nazi Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, and numerous other horrific precedents remind us that the moral stance of the law abiding citizen loses its normative eminence under those conditions. Instead, virtue is exemplified by the counter-hegemonic activist, from the common German citizens who hid Jewish refugees in their attics all the way to people like Nelson Mandela. In the ensuing struggle, 'terrorism' becomes an obligatory strategic instrument on either side in the eyes of the other. And yet, if the revolution is successful, the ultimate blame goes entirely to the former hegemon, and the leadership qualities evident in the victorious revolutionary are elevated to the highest ideals of human endeavour. Though his victory is not an essential requirement (witness Che Guevara), as a martyr, his heroic reputation tends to be less universal and less officially shared. In contrast, the leaders of autocratic states,

whether they were violently deposed or peacefully died in office or retirement, end up being judged more harshly by posterity. No-one, I hope, would think of advertising a Pinochet or Battista as a model leader to students.

The upshot is that leadership is by no means an absolute ideal, contrary to the many educational programs and mission statements that brandish its virtues unconditionally. Likewise, respect for the dominant authority—state-mediated, corporate, religious, or otherwise organised—is not an unconditional virtue. I feel this obvious truth requires restating because the differences between 'good' and 'bad' leadership, morally legitimate laws and those that perpetuate injustice, government by the people and government by plutocrats, are blurred by the corporate media and entertainment industries to the extent that raises some concerns about the effects of their message in the consciousness of future generations. This is why the Mandelas of history are so eminently important: they are the counterexamples; they show us what true leadership should and could be, and that bad leaders are worth fighting against. The absence of good leadership gives rise to business-as-usual scenarios that range from the noxious (when highly educated Saudi women rely on their chauffeurs and do not think twice about injustice) to the horrific (when entire communities lynch homosexual men in Uganda). And its presence visibly elevates human security from a descriptive parameter to a normative criterion of moral excellence—the criterion that distinguishes good leadership. Witness its status as a popular ideal in present-day South Africa.

Counter-hegemonic leadership, of course, attracts formidable risks. During the second week of February 2013 a mullah in Yemen spoke out publicly against Al Qaida. A day later, when he and two other members of his congregation were meeting with two Al Qaida members to discuss the issue, all five were incinerated by a US drone attack. Which side their families are rooting for now seems predictable. The risks are obvious with other numerous examples of counter-hegemonic leadership—the wikileakers and whistle-blowers, the FEMEN women in front of the Saudi embassy in Davos, the Pussyriot activists in Moscow. Not even the boycott of the mainstream media can obfuscate the idealistic accomplishments, personal risks, and excellent leadership shown in these examples.

In contrast, the primary reason for the absence of leadership is its attractiveness to the multitudes of the risk averse. This gives rise to the phenomenon of immoral consensus, where ordinary people conform with views and practices that clearly contradict their own values. Immoral consensus sometimes goes as far as making people refrain from showing support for leaders who dare protest its injustice, even within the private circles of friends and families, and even making a show of disparaging and ridiculing those leaders in public. The phenomenon was and is particularly evident with examples of unconventional moral leadership shown by abolitionists of slavery, suffragettes demanding the vote for women, animal welfare activists protesting abuses in the food and cosmetics industry, and protectors of the last stands of old growth forests. Who has not heard of the disparaging labels of nigger lovers, tomboys, treehuggers, and worse? The absence of good leadership and immoral consensus is what preserves the conversational buoyancy of such despicable labels.

The examples of absent leadership that I find personally most vexing are those that result in the abject failure of governance. At the municipal level such failure is evident in my home town in the lack of any community-owned recycling operation. At the regional level it is commonly evident in the sell-out of precious natural resources to overseas corporate takers at prices that reflect neither their cultural value nor the ecological costs of their extraction. At the national level it is evident, for example, in the failure of governments to enact adequate protection of consumers against harmful food products and additives, against the interests of their corporate suppliers. Early in 2010 the New Zealand Labour Party, egged on by the Green Party, proposed a bill prohibiting the supply of junk food at schools. The ruling Conservatives defeated this bill stating that it would interfere with free choice —an ideal they have little respect for when it comes to choices of GE-free food, of recreational drugs or the choice to end one's life. The government refused to take the lead on proactive health care, an undisputed human security good.

At the global level the absence of responsible leadership seems quite the rule. The global trafficking in arms, drugs and people can be effectively combatted only through initiatives based on counter-hegemonic leadership. Restraining the emission of greenhouse gases and other pollutants, fairly distributing scarce resources, testing and restriction of drugs and household chemicals, preventing human rights violations all represent examples of human security regimes that would best be facilitated by responsible global leadership. Such leadership is also counter-hegemonic because it threatens powerful entrenched interests. Its absence presents as the intuitive explanation why those projects are not making adequate progress. Counterexamples where such leadership makes a wealth of difference, as in the case of Captain Paul Watson and his Sea Shepherds fighting ecocide and cruel exploitation of the world's oceans, occur rarely but shine brightly as examples of how much better a place this world could be if we had more responsible leadership.

The failure of responsible global governance sometimes takes grotesque proportions. Negotiations continue among representatives of Norway, Denmark, Canada, the US and Russia to align their maritime boundaries according to the topology of continental shelves in the Arctic ocean. At stake are vast deposits

of minerals and hydrocarbons. We are mystified by the excitement about more fossil fuel deposits. They cannot burn them, can they? Or rather, if they do get burned it makes no difference who does the burning. This example illustrates how the absence of responsible leadership leads to a failure of governance, to the detriment of all.

I salute all those of our colleagues around the world and their students who are practising unflagging leadership in the aforementioned positive ways, and I hope with all my heart that ultimately their causes will carry the day.

Have a peaceful and happy New Year 2014!

Best wishes,
Sabina W. Lautensach

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The Praxis of Social Enterprise and Human Security: An Applied Research Agenda

Malcolm D. Brown

School of Arts & Communication, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Queensland, Australia;
E-Mail: Malcolm.Brown@usq.edu.au; Tel.: +61 746311062; Fax: +61 746311063

Abstract: The growth of social enterprise within development NGO work might lead one to suspect it has been irredeemably corrupted by neo-liberal capitalism. However, using the tools of capitalism is not the same as subscribing to the values of capitalism. This paper is situated at the intersection of five fields: human security, international development, social enterprise, social franchising, and left-wing anti-capitalist thought. It examines the relevance of social enterprise to human security and to development, the relationship between social enterprise and the anti-capitalist values of the left, and it then focuses on social franchising—a subset of social enterprise that highlights the importance of cooperation—suggesting that it may be a useful methodology for NGOs carrying out educational work in parts of the developing world. It synthesises and extends ideas that I have presented elsewhere [1-3], it draws on ethnographic fieldwork on the Thai-Burma border, and it puts forward an agenda for further applied research that is rooted in a sociological analysis of civil society and contributes to the human security paradigm.

Keywords: anti-capitalism; human security; international development; left-wing thought; praxis; social enterprise; social franchising

1. Human Security and Social Enterprise

There is no commonly agreed definition of social enterprise, but I provisionally define it as a practice which is motivated by the objective of solving social and/or environmental problems, but which uses the tools of capitalism, especially trade, to do so. To begin refining this definition, it is appropriate to identify three distinct social enterprise paradigms, each of which instantiates a broad set of values and, consequently, a particular conceptualisation of the field and its practices: the American approach, which emphasises the role of the entrepreneur; the European approach, which views social enterprise as an evolution of the cooperative; and the Asian approach, the social business paradigm, which is rooted in the work of

Muhammad Yunus. The Asian paradigm is noteworthy, because it constitutes an approach to development which has emerged from the developing world itself.

The contributions of Muhammad Yunus and Amartya Sen are especially notable in bridging the fields of social enterprise and human security. Both have contributed to academic discourse and practice within these fields. Yunus's development of microcredit has had a practical impact on the lives of poor people around the world, and has contributed to their human security by improving their economic security; he has also contributed significantly to the theory of social business and social enterprise (e.g. [4]). In Sen's case, not only has he contributed directly to the field of human security as an academic, but he has also contributed to United Nations discourses of human security, human rights, and development. What is more, there is an 'Asianness' to their work that is both appreciable and significant, as it is a developing-world discourse of development and, by extension, of human security.

Yunus's impetus came from observing the lives of the rural poor in Bangladesh, and his model was initially conceptualised as a local response to local circumstances. Yet, it has been applied not only in the developing world, but also to situations of poverty in the United States, continental Europe, Scotland, and Japan, among others ([4] pp. vii–xxiv, 160–162). Similarly, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy show that Sen's central contributions to the social sciences were made in response to the development needs of the South Asian subcontinent:

> Sen's theoretical revolution, in the technical language of 'functionings' and 'capabilities', was in tandem with the practical dictates of Mahbub ul-Haq, the Pakistani planner associated with the foundation of the UNDP Human Development Approach, who posed a simple statement that the purpose of all public policies is to increase people's choices. In his 'Development as Freedom', Sen elaborated on why and how freedom is at the same time the main goal and the main means to achieve development ([5] p. 20).

Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy locate their own perspective within an experience of the developing world and its relations with the West:

> …the collaboration brought together one Iranian woman who had been educated in American universities and had worked in the UN before moving to teaching, and an Indian woman steeped in the tradition of activism that, fortunately, does not escape the faith of intellectuals in India ([5] p. 5).

Using the language of 'the South' and 'the North' (broadly equivalent to the 'developing' and 'developed' or 'Westernized' countries of the world), they point to 'the collective experience…of mistrust…with concepts that came from international organizations, which to the South, were often seen as institutions led by powerful Northern nations. Whether it was democracy, human rights and now human security, the discourses smacked of power in the construction of the terms' ([5] p. 4). This does seem like an appreciably Southern paradigm, which elucidates the 'Northernness' of some others.

This is especially apparent when they discuss the notion of 'humanitarian intervention', a particular use of the concept of human security in international politics which has extended the just war theory to one that legitimises war when it is prosecuted for reasons, or pretexts, of human security ([5] pp. 196ff). The lack of intervention in Rwanda in 1994, and the actual intervention in Kosovo in 1999, have both been debated extensively. The Rwandan case has been used to justify subsequent interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya, for example, although Chomsky has argued that the intervention in Kosovo 'greatly accelerated slaughter and dispossession' ([6] p. 81). Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy observe that 'incidents of selective humanitarian intervention have made much of the South, especially Civil Society, cynical of the concept to the extent of rejecting it' ([5] p. 198). They cite Walden Bello as an example:

> …most of us, at least most of us in the global South, recoil at Washington's use of the humanitarian logic to invade Iraq. Most of us would say that even as we condemn any regime's violations of human rights, systematic violation of those rights does not constitute grounds for the violation of national sovereignty through invasion or destabilization. Getting rid of a repressive regime or a dictator is the responsibility of the citizens of a country [7].

Although none of this is conclusive, it is at least suggestive of a distinctively Southern human security paradigm, albeit one that is incomplete, and that has gained limited acceptance in the developing world. The existence of such a paradigm may or may not be interesting in itself, but it is significant in that it allows its proponents to criticise the tendency of some in the South to reject human security in its entirety as a tool of Western neo-imperialism. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy say that 'the advent of human security should be seen, instead, as the triumph of the South to put development concerns into global security discussions', because 'a human security approach for the South would allow it to shed international light on the concerns of underdevelopment and individual dignity at a time when state-based interests are increasingly being used in the global war against terrorism' ([5] p. 35). And for Mahbub ul-Haq, human security paradigms create the potential for a 'new partnership between the North and the South based on justice not, on charity; on an equitable sharing of global market opportunities, not on aid; on two-way compacts, not one-way transfers; on mutual cooperation, not on unilateral conditionality or confrontation' ([8] p. 5). It is

my contention that Yunus's social business paradigm is an extension of this distinctly Southern human security paradigm, because it is rooted in an empirical observation of Southern conditions, and premised on an equal intellectual dialogue between North and South.

2. Social Business

Yunus distinguishes social business—his preferred term—quite sharply from other phenomena within the social economy ([4] pp. 3–12), which includes social enterprise and social entrepreneurship, cooperatives, corporate social responsibility, social franchising, and some practices of donor-based charity and philanthropy. However, they also have much in common, and Yunus's discussion of social business is a good starting point because of its clarity and applicability.

Yunus identifies seven principles of social business, which, in his words, are 'key characteristics', 'the core of social business', 'a touchstone and a constant reminder of the values that are at the heart of the social business idea' ([4] pp. 2–3). They also define, loosely, the spirit of social enterprise and of the social economy more broadly, including social franchising, which I shall discuss later. They are:

1. The business objective is to overcome poverty, or one or more problems (such as education, health, technology access, and environment) that threaten people and society—not to maximise profit.
2. The company will attain financial and economic sustainability.
3. Investors get back only their investment amount. No dividend is given beyond the return of the original investment.
4. When the investment amount is paid back, profit stays with the company for expansion and improvement.
5. The company will be environmentally conscious.
6. The workforce gets market wage with better-than-standard working conditions.
7. Do it with joy!!! ([4] p. 3)

Of course, we could not realistically use these seven principles as a simple checklist to determine whether an entity is a social business or not, not least because there are potential conflicts and contradictions between them, especially when social and economic gains become contingent on ecological impoverishment. Furthermore, social business and other phenomena within the social economy are more like different dialects of the same language than different languages. These seven principles reflect the spirit or essential baseline motivations of social business, social enterprise, and other entities within the social economy or third sector, and they apply to all three paradigms that were mentioned at the beginning of this article.

What they point to is an ethos of using the tools of capitalism to solve the human security and environmental problems that have been created and exacerbated most damagingly by capitalism. Even if this is unrealistic, using the tools of capitalism is certainly not the same as subscribing to the values of capitalism. To the extent that social business can be classed as capitalism, it is capitalism with a triple bottom line—people, planet, and profit—with the important proviso that profit itself is a tool, not an end in itself. The search for profit is not the driving force of social business. Social business (at least Type 1 social business [9]) can rather be described as involving business-like management of resources to achieve a social objective. Yunus argues that 'a complete break from the for-profit attitude' is essential to social business ([4] p. 16, added emphasis), though I would also like to emphasise a break from the competitive ethos of capitalism. On that note, Yunus states that a cooperative can be a social business when it is owned by poor people ([4] p. 8)—a Type 2 social business [10]—and it can be further observed that ownership by the poor has always been an intrinsic feature of the cooperative movement, from Robert Owen in industrial-revolution New Lanark to the Fair Trade movement in developing countries and international trade today. Grameen Bank, the micro-credit organisation founded in Bangladesh by Yunus himself, has since its foundation been a cooperative as much as it has been a social business.

Importantly, Yunus points out that it is relational networks that have allowed social business and microcredit to exist. Not only do social norms and cooperative ownership ensure a high repayment rate on microloans—far higher than is normal for commercial banks in the West—but the development of civil society has also gone hand in hand with the economic empowerment of the poor. Yunus states:

> In the early years of Grameen Bank, strong cultural norms in Bangladesh made it hard for us to attract female borrowers…. Over time, we solved these problems by creating a new, alternative culture for village ladies. We taught thousands to read and write, starting with their names—an incredibly empowering experience for them. Thousands more discovered the power of a shared community with other Grameen borrowers who supported one another. They learned to enjoy coming to the Grameen bank centres for weekly meetings at which they would sing songs, engage in simple exercises, and share stories about their families and the small businesses they had created ([4] pp. 65–66).

Mark Munoz, in his book on international social entrepreneurship, makes a similar point: social entrepreneurs and social enterprises need to build relationships, form alliances and partnerships (especially at a local level), and collaborate with others ([11] pp. 48–49, 70–71, 86). This is partly because social enterprises and social businesses have a mission to change society, and this mission is compromised if they keep

the secrets of their success to themselves. It is also because cooperation sometimes makes good business sense. An important area of the social economy is that of social franchising, which will be discussed later, and this is an area in which networks are of fundamental importance, because the success of any franchise operation—social or otherwise—is largely down to its ability to plug franchisees into a network of intellectual property and sociability (see [11] p. 85, [12]), in order to provide a relatively secure income. In this area, there is a congruence of ends and means: it makes good business sense to cooperate with those who might otherwise be regarded as competitors, and cooperation is crucial to the mission of a social enterprise.

3. The Left and Social Enterprise

The growth of social enterprise may be a second best to a genuinely left-wing, transformative, radical, socialistic process. Social enterprise has appealed to the right, and to centre-left social democrats, because it emphasises self-help, telling the poor that they should, and can, pull themselves up by their bootstraps. Unsurprisingly, this engenders suspicion on the left. There is a view in left-wing circles that capitalism is beyond redemption and cannot be reformed, that the overthrow of capitalism is what is needed if people's lives are really to be improved, that capitalism needs to be replaced with socialism, and before it can be so replaced it needs to be destroyed.

Whether or not this is indeed the case is beyond the scope of this paper, but there is a danger here of turning left-wing anti-capitalist thought into the opium of the people. We may await the messianic advent of a socialistic order, and even work to hasten the day, but we know it is not going to happen soon. This may be frustrating for many people, but for the poorest people of the world, who cannot patiently await this messianic age, it is quite literally a matter of life and death. Their human security needs to be enhanced, their poverty needs to be alleviated, their real freedoms—to use Sen's language [13]—need to be expanded, and their lives need to be improved. And for them, these things need to be done today. It is an urgent human security imperative.

So the left can—and indeed must—be comfortable with social enterprise, if not for the same reasons as the right and centre-left. Social enterprise is a movement that seeks to make a difference, alleviate poverty, reduce exploitation, empower the poor, promote solidarity, and build community. It seeks a more just allocation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange. These are objectives that reflect the values of all shades of left-wing thought, from nineteenth-century Marxism to present-day environmentalism. Yunus's seven principles embody these values and objectives, apart from the first part of objective 6, which refers to the paying of market wages. This is, admittedly, an important caveat, but in these principles we see an attack on surplus value, on alienation, on the naked cash nexus, and on the unsustainable expansion of capitalism [14]. If the objectives of social enterprise have appealed to the right, this should be regarded as a victory for the left, because the centre ground has been shifted. It should not dilute the left's commitment to those same objectives.

Left-wing anti-capitalist thought and social enterprise have shared objectives because they share the same roots. They share a family resemblance because they share a family tree. Their common roots are in civil society, voluntary cooperation, and, more recently, in local socialism. Let us briefly examine these in turn.

Firstly, civil society is frequently defined as a 'third sector' of society, after the market and the state, but it is less than satisfactory to define it in terms of what it is not. Michael Waltzer defines civil society as 'the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology—that fill this space' ([15] p. 7). It has already been observed in this paper that such relational networks are crucial to the success of social enterprise, including within the sphere of development.

Secondly, and more precisely, the civil society in which social enterprise has its roots is the sphere of voluntary cooperation. Voluntary cooperation plays an important role in the history of socialism, from its origins to the present day, in the form of mutualism, for example, and the cooperative movement, which has already been mentioned. More recently, however, the right has claimed the sphere of voluntary activity for itself. The left needs to reclaim this sphere. The values of the left are the values of the French Revolution—liberty, equality, and fraternity—but the casual observer could today be forgiven for thinking that right wingers believe in liberty, left wingers believe in equality, and centrists believe in fraternity. Yet these values are intertwined, and a left-wing political focus on social enterprise may help to reclaim the sphere of voluntary cooperation, and make its expansion a matter of political consensus.

Thirdly, local solutions to local problems has often been a central characteristic of social enterprise. In the UK, this was initially driven by left-wing local councils who were highly resistant to the agenda of the Thatcher government. According to Jim Chandler:

> Although politically a passing phase, local socialism has left a valuable legacy. Economic development was put on the menu of central local authority functions…. Sheffield established the first council sub-committee dedicated to economic redevelopment, while the GLC (Greater London Council) under (Ken) Livingstone created a Greater London Enterprise Board to preferentially fund cooperative business start-ups ([16] p. 249).

Rory Ridley-Duff and Mike Bull observe 'that well-established social enterprise networks (in London, Liverpool and Manchester) surfaced where there were strong community development networks during the 1980s' ([17] p. 46). Once again, we see that left-wing anti-capitalist praxis—in the form of local socialism—belongs to the same family tree as social enterprise.

These three points have an important theoretical consequence, which is important enough to flag briefly. In her introduction to the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society, Fania Oz-Salzberger states:

> It is difficult to see the moment in time when Ferguson claims that society became 'civil'. In the most important sense, it always was....
> The foundations of civil society...are communal bonds and public virtue, which are older than property. Ferguson would not subscribe to Rousseau's famous dictum, in his Discours sur l'inégalité (1755), that the first appropriator of land was 'the real founder of civil society' ([18] p. xviii).

In other words, it would be better to regard civil society—including the social economy—as the 'first sector', rather than follow the conventional ordering of the economy (first sector), the state (second sector), and civil society (third sector) [19]. The state and the economy are the 'superstructure' (to use a word that Marx borrowed from Ferguson) of civil society. They are the sphere of competition for power and economic capital. The social economy—social business, social enterprise, social entrepreneurship, cooperatives, etc.—is part of the infrastructure. It is the sphere of co-operation, not competition, leading to the accumulation of social capital and the enhancement of human security.

4. Social Franchising: The State of the Art and Proposals for Future Research

We now turn to social franchising, which is a subset of social enterprise. Commercial franchising is a form of capitalism that demands an unusually high degree of cooperation between people who might otherwise be competitors, and, as has already been pointed out, cooperation is also intrinsic to social enterprise. So the cooperation that is a part of civil society is especially relevant to social franchising, which is why I treat it as a case study in all of the fields that intersect in this paper.

As well as the practice-based resources on social franchising [20], there is a small but growing academic literature on the subject. It was defined by Dominic Montagu as early as 2002 as 'a franchise system, usually run by a non-governmental organization, which uses the structure of a commercial franchise to achieve social goals' ([21] p. 129). There is an annotated bibliography ('scoping review') on the subject published in the UK [22], and the concept is occasionally mentioned in the more general academic literature on social enterprise and social business (including by Yunus and Munoz). While (perhaps ironically) the concept has not been standardised in detail, and Montagu's definition is open to multiple interpretations, it is a way of using a specific tool of capitalism to address specific social problems.

Social franchising is particularly important to NGO work in healthcare, and has been applied in education in India, Brazil, and South Africa. It allows small NGOs to tap into the benefits of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship, notably their financial sustainability, with donations or investments being recycled rather than spent. As with commercial franchising, social franchising builds a collaborative framework for small/medium NGOs to learn lessons from each other, avoid mistakes that have already been made, and achieve economies of scale while retaining the benefits of being small and responsive to community need and participation. Therefore, small NGOs, working together, can have a greater impact due to better deployment of available resources. Social franchising draws on commercial franchising expertise, and provides the advantages of a common brand, including quality assurance for small and large donors. Craig Dearden-Phillips points out that social franchising is particularly suitable for three types of social enterprises: those that are easily replicable, those where a well-known brand matters, and those that need to reach 'critical mass' to succeed ([23] pp. 142–143, 148). These criteria all apply to educational programs run by small-medium NGOs in Southeast Asia, and it is to that subject that we now turn.

A great deal of primary education for refugee children in Southeast Asia, for example on the Thai-Burma border, is provided by small-medium NGOs, though this is impossible to quantify with any precision for various reasons, not least the unknown numbers of refugees and stateless persons of all ages. There are, however, projects aimed at rectifying this. Another reason is the frequent movement of refugees and their families, and this, combined with the absence of a common curriculum in NGO-run schools, creates difficulties for poor refugee children in obtaining a consistent education in which each level of learning is built on a prior level [24]. This is a shortcoming that social franchising can help to address, because standardisation—of pedagogy, curriculum, materials, governance—is an inherent part of social franchising. Informal social franchising has already enabled some NGOs to lower the cost of their educational work, e.g. between 2004 and 2012 Khom Loy Development in Mae Sot, Thailand, lowered the cost of opening a new classroom from US$3,000 to under $500, and they aim to reduce the cost still further, to $200 per classroom.

Standards of teaching in NGO schools are very uneven. Raising standards and building capacity among teachers and volunteers requires inter alia: cost effective, sound, replicable methodologies and models; knowledge sharing networks and communities of practice; communication technology in some cases;

and strategic standardisation of pedagogy, curricula, materials, and governance. It is important to balance standardisation with cultural relevance and local negotiation, and this is something that social franchising is able to reflect, also thereby contributing to cultural safety (see [25]). In my own fieldwork experience, teachers in NGO schools are often from the same ethnic group as the pupils. This, it seems to me, constitutes good practice in terms of cultural safety, because such teachers are less likely 'to blame the victims of historical processes for their current plights' ([25] p. 18). In Winston Mak's words: 'social franchising allows residents to retain local democratic control of community services' [26].

Montessori schooling has shown some strengths in this regard; however, this needs to be evaluated further and compared with other educational systems. Within the context applied research on social franchising in NGO education in Southeast Asia, such a comparative evaluation would have as its purpose the development of robust, replicable social franchise methodologies that enable relevant NGOs to deliver quality 'good practice' primary education to the poorest children. More precisely, this would involve the examination of actual work in social franchising, and in commercial educational franchising in the West, it would develop best practice principles for social franchising in educational NGO work, and identify in partnership with local communities and NGOs ways in which social franchising can be expanded to help achieve the millennium development goal of universal primary education. It would have the practical benefit of focusing resource deployment away from foundational program development, and towards delivery. I will expand on this shortly.

This would constitute an extension of my own research on NGO cooperation [1,3], a topic that has been identified by the Australian government as important to development. This research has been of interest to some NGOs in Northern Thailand (Blood Foundation, Fortune, other members of the Fang Valley Development Network, and Bring The Elephant Home). It has described different levels (or dimensions) of cooperation between small NGOs: national (through a peak body like the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC)), local, as part of a network of formal and informal relationships, and within a single NGO that operates as a cooperative. A franchise network is not based on voluntary cooperation to the same degree, but it is another dimension of NGO cooperation, and it has the potential to enhance NGO cooperation within Southeast Asian nation states and internationally within the region (a goal of the CCC).

Research on social franchising in educational NGO work would have significant economic, environmental, social, and human security benefits. Educational attainment levels are directly linked both to economic development, and, more importantly, to beneficial social outcomes. Development in Western countries has been strongly linked to the development of national education systems and free, compulsory education. In a knowledge economy, investments in education pay off in higher quality, more knowledge-intensive jobs, as illustrated by India's increasing competitiveness in the global economy, together with a growing middle class that is highly oriented towards progress. Similar evolutions are under way in many African nations, such as Nigeria and Kenya. Wider access to education has profound social effects, including lower birth rates and greater gender equity.

Research on social franchising in educational NGO work would have significant economic, environmental, social, and human security benefits. Educational attainment levels are directly linked both to economic development, and, more importantly, to beneficial social outcomes. Development in Western countries has been strongly linked to the development of national education systems and free, compulsory education. In a knowledge economy, investments in education pay off in higher quality, more knowledge-intensive jobs, as illustrated by India's increasing competitiveness in the global economy, together with a growing middle class that is highly oriented towards progress. Similar evolutions are underway in many African nations, such as Nigeria and Kenya. Wider access to education has profound social effects, including lower birth rates and greater gender equity.

The development of social franchise methodologies could deliver significant benefit to NGOs and optimisation of their resources in the following ways: training other organisations; benchmarking, selection and evaluation of franchisees to ensure delivery quality, integrity, mission-focus, and standards; and the development of long-term strategies to ensure financial viability and security (which can otherwise be threatened by changing donor priorities). Such research would also contribute to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of universal primary education. The MDGs come with measurable indicators; however, refugees and stateless peoples often slip through the net because their numbers are unknown and their existence is not always recognised. This research agenda addresses some of the Istanbul Principles and Siem Reap Consensus on CSO Development Effectiveness, including human rights (the right to education), gender equity, transparency and accountability, and sustainable change with an engaged private sector. Furthermore, it would turn these into long-term human security benefits through the sustainability that is a part of social enterprise, and through in-country capacity building.

Thus, the equal dialogue between North and South that is an intrinsic foundation of Yunus's social business paradigm (and of Sen's capabilities approach) is instantiated in a participatory approach to development and capacity building. Furthermore, the approach outlined here synthesises the Asian and the European paradigms of social enterprise. Consequently, if further

research in this field is to make a significant contribution to human security, it must involve collaboration between researchers from the global North and the global South, and the process of capacity building must extend well beyond primary education and into research itself.

5. Conclusion

In short, this is a paper about praxis, the unity of theory and practice. The theoretical critique of global capitalism, which is a foundation of left-wing politics, is unified with the practice of social enterprise, and, more specifically, of social franchising within a development context. Not only is social franchising a subset of social enterprise; it also instantiates the ethos of cooperation that is constitutive of civil society. Social franchising in a development context—such as educational NGO work in Southeast Asia—is something that can be promoted in neo-liberal terms, and carried out by people with neo-liberal beliefs and a neo-liberal agenda. Nevertheless, its methodology—summarised in Yunus's seven principles—and its raison d'être of social justice mean that, in concrete terms, this is a field in which research and practice can also be supported by academics and practitioners who have a more left-wing political orientation. The expansion of civil society, cooperation, social franchising, and social enterprise more generally, can become a matter of political consensus, and a contributor to human security [27].

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Journal of
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Book Review

Human Security in World Affairs: A Pedagogical, Multi-disciplinary Approach

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Human Security in World Affairs: Problems and Opportunities
Alexander K. Lautensach, Sabina W. Lautensach (eds.)
Caesarpress: 2013
504 pp.; ISBN: 978-3-902890-00-9

The end of the Cold War and the ever increasing interconnectivity in our globalised world have resulted in much debate in academia, in politics, and elsewhere about the progress of human security. The debate is no longer limited to the fundamentals of human biological and physiological needs such as air, food and shelter, or to basic safety issues such as protection, security, law and order, and stability. Over the last decade, proponents of the human security thesis have aimed for an even wider conceptualisation of what this term is supposed to mean. The idea of human security is now seen to relate not just to individuals, groups or states but to entire regions, and even globally. It refers not only to the human condition of individual or group responsibility, but to the all-encompassing social and political environment that make it possible for humanity to survive and to have a life at least mostly free from want and fear.

Alexander and Sabina Lautensach (editors) write that their book is primarily intended for students and for teaching, and that a pedagogical approach was prioritised rather than a reproduction in the standard format of an academic monograph (p. XVII). Throughout, they aim for a diverse, multi-/trans-disciplinary

approach in term of content and presentation from contributors, with potential student outcomes focused on flexibility and a broad spectrum knowledge and understanding of human security. To these ends they have been very successful. This hefty tome, almost encyclopaedic in its scope and depth, needs to be approached by students in a certain way. That is, students will benefit from some directed guidance regarding approach and methodology in order to successfully navigate through the many detailed concepts, theories and practicalities contained in the book. This is clearly provided in the preface where the editors spend quite some time outlining the rationale of the book in a simple and easy to understand way that will be particularly useful for students and other engaged readers. The Synopsis and list of Learning Outcomes & Big Ideas at the beginning of each chapter, as well as the Summary Points and Extra Activities & Further Research at the end are further useful tools to consolidate learning and direct the student to other associated research.

The book has two broadly overlapping sections. The first part of these, Chapters 1 to 13, presents, analyses and discusses problems and challenges, while the second part, Chapters 14 to 19, is more focused on possible solutions. The overlap is less so in the former and more so in the latter. A distinction in approaches between the two sections is not immediately obvious but it is there, and the book has a logical progression from general to more specific throughout.

The book begins with a comprehensive Introduction by the editors that could almost have been a separate chapter presented with all the others. The introduction provides a useful context for the discussion

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of human security, but some of this could have been incorporated into Chapter 2, "Why Human Security Needs our Attention", which is co-authored by one of the editors. This would leave room in the introduction for a useful and more detailed description of what the long list of chapters in the book are about. The chapter descriptions in the introduction are sometimes just one or two line statements, for example, "The complex challenges of international development aid are discussed in Chapter 13" (p. XXXIV) and "Chapter 17 addresses the reduction of armed conflict, and in Chapter 18 strategies for peace building are discussed" (p. XXXV). Each chapter in the content area does have a solid synopsis and introduction, but it would be useful for readers to have a condensed version of what each chapter—or perhaps couple of chapters—contains.

A particular challenge for proponents of the human security ethos is to focus analysis and argument in such a way that does not overly dilute its central thesis. There is a danger of the discourse ending up with human security being related to everything, everywhere, all the time and about anything even remotely associated with the human condition and experience. The book does tackle a very broad range of human security related issues, from religion, war, terrorism, various political orders, and globalization through to environmental decay, resource scarcity, a 'war against nature', governance at local, regional and global levels, social constructivism, health…the list goes on. The editors frequently remind the reader early in the book that their approach and the author's contributions are wide-ranging and deliberately multi-/ trans-disciplinary, something which they certainly achieved. Throughout the book, the editors have managed to very successfully bring together this large collection of disparate approaches to the subject of human security in a meaningful way.

Chapters 1 to 4 help to contextualise the notion of human security. Chapter 1, "Human Security Foundation Documents and Related Sources" would perhaps be better placed after Chapter 2, "Why Human Security Needs our Attention". For readers to be convinced that human security is important they need to know why it is important in the first place. The importance of human security is concisely and comprehensively articulated in Chapter 2. Chapter 4, "Threats to Human Security—An Overview" is the stand-out chapter in this part of the book, providing a succinct outline of human security. Chapters 5 through to Chapter 13 then provide the reader with a broad swathe of useful topics such as security challenges facing individuals and groups within states; human security and international law; environment and access to resources concerns; transnational crime; governance and ideological imperatives. Most of the chapters integrate very well with the central theme of the book, although Chapter 8 "Globalization Processes" would benefit from some clearer linkage to the core human security thesis.

Chapters 14 through to Chapter 20 present further challenges to human security and incorporate many interesting approaches, outcomes and possible solutions to the topics presented. This is where the book stamps its authority in human security analysis and argument, and it is what the engaged reader will find the most interesting and enjoyable to read. This is not to say that the earlier part of the book is lacking in some way, but the second half has a more directed attention to a bottom-line approach regarding options and possible solutions.

The greatest strength of the book is in its extensive critical analysis and discussion in each of the chapters. The book is very ambitious in its scope and depth as it focuses on a wide range of theoretical, empirical and practical challenges that the human security paradigm poses. While there could be some minor rearrangement of a couple of the early chapters and a little more directed chapter information in the introduction, these observations do not detract from the very detailed and useful content of the book as a whole. This is currently the best generalist text book on the market regarding human security. The scope, breath and depth of the topics covered in the book, and the way that the editors have managed the hugely difficult task of organising the chapters into a coherent and meaningful manner, make this an outstanding text book for university undergraduates and post-graduate learners. While the editors say that this is the reading audience the book is aimed at, I consider that the book will also have a strong appeal for a much wider readership outside academia.

John Janzekovic

Lectures in Politics, International Relations, International Justice and Human rights, University of the Sunshine Coast, Maroochydore, Queensland, Australia; E-Mail: jjanzek1@usc.edu.au

Journal of
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Research Article

Fragile States, Infectious Disease and Health Security: The Case for Timor-Leste

John M. Quinn [1,*], Nelson Martins [2,**], Mateus Cunha [3], Michiyo Higuchi [4], Dan Murphy [5] and Vladimir Bencko [1]

[1] Prague Center for Global Health, Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, First Faculty of Medicine, Charles University in Prague, Studnickova 7, 12800 Prague 2, Czech Republic; E-Mail: john.quinn@lf1.cuni.cz (JMQ), vladimir.bencko@lf1.cuni.cz (VB)

[2] Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Universidade Nacional Timor-Leste, Dili, Timor-Leste; School of Public Health and Community Medicine, Level 2, Samuels Building, The University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia; E-mail: lalatak61@hotmail.com
** Former Minister of Health for the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2007–2012

[3] Ministry of Health, Dili, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste; E-Mail: cunha2009ph@gmail.com

[4] Department of Public Health and Health Systems, Nagoya University School of Medicine, 466–8550 Aichi, Japan; E-mail: m.m.higuchi@med.nagoya-u.ac.jp

[5] Medical Director, Bairo Pite Clinic, Dili, Timor-Leste; E-mail: drdanmurphy@yahoo.com

* Corresponding Author: E-Mail: john.quinn@lf1.cuni.cz; Tel.: +420 608246032; Tel.2: +1 6307479081

Abstract: Timor-Leste is a very young and developing nation state. Endemic infectious disease and weakened health security coupled with its growing and inclusive public institutions keep Timor-Leste fragile and in transition on the spectrum of state stability. The objective here is to systematically review Timor-Leste's state and public health successes, showing how a fragile state can consistently improve its status on the continuum of stability and improve health security for the population. The case study follows a state case study approach, together with a disease burden review and a basic description of the health portrait in relation to Timor-Leste's fragile state status. Disease burden and health security are directly proportional to state stability and indirectly proportional to state failure. Timor-Leste is a clear example of how public health can feed into increased state stability. Our discussion attempts to describe how the weak and fragile island nation of Timor-Leste can continue on its current path of transition to state stability by increasing health security for its citizens. We surmise that this can be realized when public policy focuses on primary healthcare access, inclusive state institutions, basic hygiene and preventative vaccination programs. Based on our review, the core findings indicate that by

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increasing health security, a positive feedback loop of state stability follows. The use of Timor-Leste as a case study better describes the connection between public health and health security; and state stability, development and inclusive state institutions that promote health security.

1. Background: Fragile and Failed States in the Global Public Health Context

The broad, and relatively new concepts found in interdisciplinary literature on the global public health debate, of health security, human security, economic security, sustainable development and fragile and failed states remain elusive. 'Sustainable' means to be upheld and maintained at a certain level. A sustainable model in healthcare is one that receives input, possibly from the state and other stakeholders, provides a service and standard of care and is ready and able to continually provide that service in a cycle system with inputs, outputs and health security offered to a certain level for patients or end-users. There are no universally agreed-upon definitions; these concepts are hotly debated, inconsistent, disputed and pose difficulty in offering accurate descriptions for discussion across disciplines. For the purposes of this paper and in order to remain within the framework of the current global public health debate, we define health security as the access to essential health services and protection from environmental and behavioral risks that diminish public health [1,2]. This definition frames health security as an aspect of human security, which includes core features such as freedom from want, "and access to life saving clinical and public health interventions" [3].

Plainly, health and human security converge in definitions as the adequate access to healthcare resources. This is grounded in community-based primary healthcare and basic hygiene access, and emphasizes the protection of populations against external and internal threats of conflict and the threat of structural violence. Health and human security protect against oppressive state regimes, failing state systems and failing extractive state institutions; protect against infectious disease and pandemics; and in general provide the most basic in public health and collective security. Structural violence is the set of systemic sociopolitical, economic, legal, religious and cultural norms that harm, disadvantage and limit individuals, groups and societies from reaching their full potential [4,5]. Structural violence is often embedded in long-standing ubiquitous social structures, normalized by exclusive state institutions [6].

The relationship between health security and state stability is directionally proportional—as health security increases across a population and state, the stability of the state is bolstered, even if only temporarily, and this feeds into a positive feedback loop to further strengthen the state's institutional capacity and stability, which must be embedded in inclusive state institutions for its citizens. What we see when looking into the recent past of Timor-Leste is an improvement in its health security, even if only slightly, against other states in the region, although it is still highly dependent upon aid and external support. This is leading to state stability in a positive feedback loop gaining traction to further strengthen the state's stability and subsequent health security. This relationship is represented pictorially in Table 1.

This paper concludes that the state is the final de facto vassal to offer inclusive institutions that can engender an environment of health security. Corrupt states with corrupt and exclusive state institutions reduce health and human security and may isolate subgroups in the community and society. The private and philanthropic sectors do not offer a sustainable and equitable solution to provide basic healthcare programming and infrastructure; however, a stable state with inclusive democratic practices for its population can offer health security.

Health security has evolved over time, so it encompasses many entities that make up the present nexus of health and security. The United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the European Union (EU) approach a health security definition within specific areas: emerging diseases; global infectious diseases; deliberate release of chemical and biological materials; violence, conflict, and humanitarian emergencies; natural disasters and environmental change; and radioactive accidents [7–9]. Environmental degradation may pose the largest threat to health security at present and in the future and is a cross-cutting theme throughout global human, food, economic and health security.

Global infectious diseases are those that are transmissible and communicable between people due to the presence and growth of a pathogen; examples being bacteria, fungi, parasites or a virus that causes an infection [10]. Communicable diseases differ from non-communicable diseases (NCD), which are not transmissible from person-to-person via any vector or pathogen; they are far more numerous and are related to the environment, social behavior and eco-

nomics. Due to poorly understood economic stressors and other unidentified factors, NCDs are breaking out in the least developed and developing nations, where communicable disease incidence and prevalence previously dominated the risk profile. It is true that infectious and communicable disease is truly global, given the porous nature of state borders and the increasing movement of people globally. Infectious disease is no longer limited to the tropics and cardiovascular disease, once encountered only in the developed world, is no longer unseen in developing nation states; it is its own epidemic.

Examples of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) include hypertension, obesity, diabetes, and cancer (although some cancer/malignancies are found to be caused or otherwise contributed to by viral strains), among many others. NCDs are not the focus of this case study as the direct link with state fragility or failure is not as clear. With this, it is understood that the incidence of trauma and trauma-related injuries and death, classified as non-communicable disease, is indeed higher in regions and states characterized by fragility and instability. Trauma-related morbidity and mortality might be significant in fragile and failed states, and may influence health security and subsequent state stability over time. There are many factors that may contribute to trauma morbidity such as the age of the population, health and safety standards and practices, state infrastructure, violence, access to munitions, gender-based intuitional violence, and many other factors. However, this paper focuses on infectious diseases, basic public health structure and institutions, and the link between these factors and state stability.

The present literature does not offer a clear causal link between infectious disease and state fragility or failure, and increased infectious disease does not necessarily lead to violence or state collapse ([11] p. 208). Provision adequate health security by a state to its population is the first line of defense against public health emergencies and is a core component in providing human security at the most basic levels—this holds true even though global policymakers and public health professionals do not always agree on accepted definitions.

Furthermore, food security and poverty in general are also aspects of health and human security. Food security encompasses adequate access to food, food markets and sustainable agriculture, including environmental sustainability. Poverty is loosely defined as having limited or no financial capital, no access to capital or equitable finance, and no access to adequate and equitable work; the consequence of which is to lose human, food and health security as a result of these deficiencies [12]. Food security is obtained when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life, as well as adequate water and sanitation [13]. Food security is a complex sustainable development issue. It is linked to health security through malnutrition, human growth and development, the immune system and disease susceptibility, but it is also linked to sustainable economic development, environmental integrity, equitable trade and finance.

Sustainable development is the equitable and democratic progress that focuses on increasing living standards and positive growth, is consistent, is evenly spread across communities and populations, and does not rapidly diminish natural resources, human capital or otherwise cause creative destruction on the short or long term [14–16]. Sustainable development is not just a humanitarian concern; healthy populations are an essential aspect of economic development and global order and stability.

Economic security is the collective concern for the economic well being between states and their populations; mankind has a common concern for the economic well-being of states and the belief that economic insecurity breeds state and individual instability, conflict and violence. Economic security in the context of public policy and global health is the ability of a nation state to follow its choice of policies in order to develop the national economy and globally compete as desired [17,18]. At a personal level, economic security is understood as having access to work, financial resources or enough income to support a consistent standard of living, and includes financial solvency, future access to work and cash-flow.

Labelling a state as 'fragile' or 'failed' risks excluding it from the international community by suggesting it is no longer able to appropriately receive or process money, aid or goods from donors. Using this method, states are not branded as 'failed' or 'stable', but rather are placed on a continuum of stability. At the bottom of the scale are fragile states in danger of failure, whereas near the middle of the scale are those which are developing towards stability. Towards the top of the scale are the states which are the most stable—for now.

State fragility and potential failure must be put in context on the spectrum of state fragility, taking into account multiple matrices of data for comparison and analysis, and understanding that each state has a myriad of complex variables to overcome. State fragility and failure must be put in context and assessed using quantitative or semi-quantitative measures that permit comparison between countries. This enables us to assess the vulnerabilities of each country. Data indicators used to measure state fragility and failure in the main instrument of this research paper are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Indicators used to measure state fragility and state failure as listed in the US Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2012.

Social	Economic	Political and Military
Demographic pressure, natural disasters and environmental degradation	Uneven economic development	State legitimacy
	Slum population	Corruption
Disease and public health	Access to improved services	Government effectiveness
Food scarcity, malnutrition	Poverty and economic decline	Political participation
Mortality	Government debt	Drug trade and illicit economy
Refugees and internally displaced persons	Unemployment, youth employment	Protests and demonstrations
Group grievances	Purchasing power, inflation	Public services
Human flight and brain drain		Water, sanitation, basic infrastructure and energy
		Quality of healthcare
		Human rights and rule of law
		Civil liberties and political freedoms
		Human trafficking
		Incarceration, torture and executions
		Security apparatus
		Internal conflict, riots and protests
		Rebel activity, military coups, bombings
		Factionalized elites
		External intervention
		Foreign assistance, peacekeeper presence
		Foreign military intervention
		UN presence
		Sanctions
		State credit rating

Table 1 is not exhaustive and highlights only the core components of the present research and analysis ranking state fragility and failure; many indicators are still contested and under debate throughout the literature.

However, common features of fragile and failed states are that they are wrought in crisis and may exhibit geographical, physical and fundamental economic constraints, internal strife, gross management flaws, overgrown greed and despotism, handicapping nepotism, debilitating external attack and lack of health for their people [19,20]. When nation-states are consumed by violence, they cease to deliver basic human or health security, or any level of public health; these governments lose credibility, and the state becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens [21,22]. Furthermore, fragile states experience a slow disappearance of state insti-

tutions and a breakdown of rule of law, which leads to a deteriorating health security situation [14,23,24]. Economic strife and human conflict threaten health security and lead to an increase in infectious disease, physical trauma, malnourishment and mental health disorders [15,25–28].

To sum up, the combination of deteriorating health, human, food and economic security contribute to the situation of fragile states [29]. This paper is a qualitative review of a country case study and the strength of its state institutions and public health successes, which demonstrate how a fragile state can improve and stabilize in a post-conflict setting through health security.

2. Objective

To describe infectious disease and health security in

Timor-Leste and juxtapose it to state stability status, as ranked on the Failed States Index (FSI). Timor-Leste has experienced significant institutional and state successes. These successes have led to direct public health successes in a positive feedback loop, engendering more state stability. Institutional and program successes in public health that have improved state stability are described.

Regionally, as China and the United States vie for power and influence throughout the Pacific Region, smaller states such as Timor-Leste are greatly influenced by private and public state and non-state actors levying for control of violence and power, as well as regional authority. When left untreated, state fragility can threaten health security, collective growth, stability and regional order. If public health policy is not further addressed in Timor-Leste in order to continue growth and strengthening of public institutions and public health infrastructure, the many gains of stability may be lost and fragility of the state may worsen or fail.

3. Methods

We will carry out a state case study and review and qualitatively describe the disease burden and basic health security portrait, and then place these elements within the continuum of state stability, fragility or failure. This will bedone by taking a systemic approach and critically evaluating data from the Ministry of Health in Timor-Leste, with a direct input from the former Minster of Health, the Immunization Program leadership in Timor-Leste, two qualitative regional health assessments (which occurred in February and May 2011), other Timorese health experts, a review of the literature and data published by the UN, WHO, UNICEF, and the Fund for Peace's.

Failed States Index (FSI), the main research instrument used.

The literature review will include infectious diseases endemic to Timor-Leste, new and present challenges and state successes through institutions in post-conflict countries after 1945. Finally, a basic review of recent social, political and economic events will be made, in order to place recent state success within their context and to provide a framework of state stability and public health infrastructure through primary healthcare access programs. In turn, this will allow the proposal of a state stability policy for future successes and improved health security.

3.1. Failed State Index (FSI)

The Fund for Peace publishes the annual Failed States Index (FSI). The Index assesses all countries in terms of the pressures they experience and, ultimately, their aggregate susceptibility to state failure. There are multiple metrics that are based upon key social, political and economic indicators that make up this index (see Table 1). The FSI then ranks countries using

a Composite Score (CSxxx), where a higher score indicates a state's greater inclination towards failure. There are many indices that track fragility and state failure, but the Fund for Peace's FSI offers a mainstream, accepted and inclusive set of metrics based on a sound methodology. Those states which experience drastic food and other commodity price fluctuations, economic distortion and disparity in social, health or political areas, or food riots and public health crises top the FSI list. The entire top third of the states listed on the Failed States Index are either fragile or near failure and are experiencing conflict, war, fragile post-conflict status or, at the very least, political and socioeconomic unrest and violence. The FSI does not predict state failure but rather describes state fragility.

It must be noted that the FSI is controversial and some opponents lament that describing state fragility or failure is nothing but an academic exercise of futility when dealing with state security and development in complex situations and in a complex global arena—even more so when dealing with public health. The data used is indeed open source, some from direct government sources and possibly not sound or otherwise questionable in reporting, while others are from NGOs and may be inconsistent in nature. However, the key indicators of external pressure and capacity realities in governance found within the FSI are directly related to health security for their citizens, overall potential for state stability, and the potential for an improving health security situation.

4. Results

4.1. Timor-Leste—The Recent Past

As public health programs and institutional stability increases, state stability increases; as public health institutions weaken and, consequently, public health indicators decrease, state stability decreases.

Timor-Leste is a relatively small tropical island state just north of Australia and attached to Indonesia, with a remote and detached Oecussa region bound by Indonesia to the south and east, and the sea to the west. The effects of Indonesian rule on Timor-Leste were vast and multifaceted, and are still today being debated in social science circles. While it is true, that there were many failings across ethnic and religious groups, and in terms of state institutions, this does not fall within the scope of the present paper. However, the use of violence by the Indonesian state and lack of access to state institutions, especially in the public health sector, for Christian Timorese are not quantifiable for the time of Indonesian rule and systemic violence. Access to public health infrastructure during Indonesian rule was near non-existent throughout rural Timor and only available to the politically connected and wealthy in the regional capital, Dili. In the post-2002 health system, confidence remained rather low as access has been plagued by

violence and ongoing infrastructure impediments, with aid and the humanitarian sector helping unevenly with some institutional shortcomings. It is difficult to assess and appraise public confidence in the healthcare system and confidence across religious and ethnic minorities for the transition period from 2002 to 2011. However, the death rate reduction and access to primary prevention schemes found in the data table below do provide evidence of improved institutional capacity and overall public health improvement for the population.

The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) was formed and tried to push out an invading Indonesia in the 1970's. The US and Soviet Union did little to abate the Indonesian take-over and the Secretary of State at the time, Henry Kissinger, discussed East Timor and did not protest the Indonesian President Suharto in reference to the strategic Indonesian invasion and takeover in 1974 [30]. In late 1975, the UN Security Council called on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor and to summarily stop all acts of war and killing.

There was a prolonged war on the island until a UN-, Portuguese- and Indonesian-backed referendum on independence was held in 1999. A majority of Timorese voted for independence, which was answered with violence and conflict, and forced over 300,000 into West Timor as Internal Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and refugees [31]. During the violence, the entire infra-structure, roads, homes, agricultural irrigation, water supply systems, schools, hospitals, markets and nearly 100% of the country's electrical grid were summarily destroyed. The destruction of 70% of the country's infrastructure in 1999 has severely undermined Timor-Leste's economic growth and health security. In Autumn 1999, an Australian-led peacekeeping mission, the Inter-national Force for East Timor (INTERFET), was deployed in the country and brought the violence to an end.

Timor-Leste joined the United Nations in 2002, became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2005 and is presently an applicant to the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) itself. The building of democratic institutions is growing and development and stability are spreading organically. There is a well-structured policy of reconciliation and forgiveness for the atrocities committed (the Com-mission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation; Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação, CAVR). Significant progress has been made in re-unifying the country after multiple acts of violence threatened to destabilize it, although concerns remain about overall accountability and gender discrimination moving forward.

For example, in early 2006, approximately 700 mili-tary personnel petitioned President Gusmao to ad-dress complaints of discrimination, which flared into more street violence. There were additional deaths, widespread destruction of property, and the continued displacement of thousands of Dili residents, as well as a decrease in health security; almost 10% of the country's population became IDPs. In most complex emergencies, public health intervention focuses on the immediate health needs, not underlying conditions and systemic issues [32]. This is best illustrated by the gender based violence and maternal and ante-natal care, which was lacking during the crisis. At the time, there was reduced coordination, and a lack of public health dialogue and of advocacy around sen-sitive reproductive health issues—the need to strengthen neglected areas and the inclusion of all components of sexual and reproductive health provides a foundation to respond to crises [33,34]. At this stage, health security was at significant risk and health infrastructure was decaying substantially; the fragile state of Timor-Leste was teetering on state failure.

Before such failure occurred, the Government of Timor-Leste asked the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal to send security forces to stabilize the country. In late summer 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1704, creating the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Its mandate included assisting with the restoration of stability, rebuilding the insti-tutions comprising the security sector, supporting the Government of Timor-Leste in conducting presidential and parliamentary elections, and achieving account-ability for the crimes against humanity and other atrocities committed in 1999 [35,36].

This mandate included a major policing unit with shared influence and successIn early spring 2011, UNMIT completed its handover of executive policing authority back to the Timorese, effectively declaring Timor-Leste's security apparatus' stable and capable of maintaining rule of law to an international stan-dard. Despite significant global pessimism about UN-backed institutions and bureaucracy, the case can made here that the fragile, near failed state of Timor-Leste is a fledgling still moving forward with inter-nationally recognized and UN-backed institutions, which have focused government support and have produced stable outcomes. Resuscitating fragile and failed states starts with the prevention of collapse and restructuring or supporting weak-but-still-growing in-stitutions. In Timor-Leste the efforts made by the Timorese and supported by the UN and coalition countries have worked, and have met or exceeded expectations. Similar positive trends of development in public health infrastructure and can enable further quantified gains to feed into a positive feedback loop and stabilize, and can lead to broader health security and more firmly root state stability.

Timor-Leste is not presently in a lasting state of social unrest or violent conflict. However, its post-conflict status and elements of fragility, combined with only a budding democratic infrastructure, are at risk of being pushed towards failure if further investment is not made to secure health security for its citizens. Timor-Leste ($FSI_{2012} = 28$; $CS_{92.7}$) differs from its land

neighbor Indonesia (FSI$_{2012}$ = 63; CS$_{80.6}$), nearby Papua New Guinea (FSI$_{2012}$ = 54; CS$_{83.7}$) or the Philippines (FSI$_{2012}$ = 56; CS$_{83.2}$) greatly. Globally, Timor-Leste is ranked before Nepal (FSI$_{2012}$ = 27; CS$_{93}$) and after Bangladesh (FSI$_{2012}$ = 29; CS$_{92.2}$) (see Table 2 for regional comparisons). FSI methodologies have evolved since its inception in 2005, yet the core 12 social, economic and political indicators (each split into an average of 14 sub-indicators) have remained the same and quantify these areas. The FSI does help describe the public health situation on the ground in Timor-Leste and does so quantitatively.

Table 2. Country Rankings and Composite scores for 2012 [22].

Country	Failed States Index Rank (the lower the value, the more fragile the state)	Failed States Index Composite Score (CSxxx) (higher values denote increased state fragility)
Timor-Leste (East Timor)	28	92.7
Indonesia	63	80.6
Papua New Guinea	54	83.7
Solomon Islands	47	85.6
Philippines	56	83.2
China	76	78.3
Malaysia	110	68.5
Brunei	123	64.1
Singapore	157	35.6
Australia	165	29.2
New Zealand	171	25.6

With a population of roughly 1.2 million, half the adult population illiterate, a third of the population urbanized in the capital Dili, GDP per capita of less than $1000 and a median age of 22 years, the recipe for social and economic instability is clear and the necessity of improvements in public health is policy evident.

Public health leadership, primary healthcare access, vaccination and immunization program compliance and overall inclusive institutional capacity building are still in a state of fragile growth in Timor-Leste. Preventable disease through vaccination programs and basic public health and hygiene measures such as clean water, toilets, access to night-time mosquito nets or repellents, health educational programs, electricity, and affordable primary healthcare access can help ensure health security and can stabilize fragile states. In the case of Timor-Leste, these basic health measures and indicators of health security have been improving since cessation of its recent violent past. However, in order to completely resuscitate this fledgling state and put on a sustainable trajectory of permanency, continued support of inclusive state institutions and primary healthcare prevention programs must be pursued diligently, both by the state and in aid programming schemes.

The health and social demographics in Timor-Leste define its public health portrait. A majority of the population identify as Roman Catholic, greatly influencing maternal and child health in terms of contraception practices and cultural acceptance. Language choices for healthcare literature, education and public health campaigns (promoting, for example, seatbelts, water hygiene and medication compliance) are difficult as Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia, English, Tetum and other natives languages are all spoken with varying fluency by different communities [26]. This linguistic diversity is a challenge to public health teams that work throughout the country, including the Ministry of Health, and makes it difficult for any formal and unified health guidelines to be disseminated throughout the districts.

The necessary conditions for a state to reverse its course and achieve stability—the recognition and legitimacy of the transitional administration and executive branch, social cohesion within the state, the small size of the country, and coordination facilitated by a high level of consensus among all actors, are all readily observed in Timor-Leste [37]. The public health and epidemiological profile of the country influences the health security situation and is better described by highlighting the gains made in state stability.

4.2. Timor-Leste's Public Health Infrastructure

While public health and health security deteriorated and most of the population relied heavily on humanitarian-based health services backed by the Australian led peace force, scattered volunteer doctors, and a community clinic, state stability faltered (Timor-Leste FSI historical data: (FSI$_{2007}$ = 20; CS$_{94.9}$)[i] (FSI$_{2008}$ = 25; CS$_{93.8}$), (FSI$_{2009}$ = 20; CS$_{97.2}$), (FSI$_{2010}$ = 18; CS$_{98.2}$),

(FSI$_{2011}$ = 23; CS$_{94.9}$) [22]). There was a significant climb of 10 ranking points (from 18 to 28, while aggregate values slid from 98.2 to 92.7) between 2010 and 2012 (FSI$_{2010}$ = 18; CS$_{98.2}$ and FSI$_{2012}$ = 28; CS$_{92.7}$). This may be in part due to the 'State Legitimacy' score improving as the first anti-corruption minister took office, as well as a reduction in the crime rate, which was reported to have dropped by 20% in 2011, and the third round of free and fair elections, which were completed in summer 2012 without major violence.

The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) supported a transition from humanitarian-based healthcare services towards an indigenous and sustainable infrastructure, which had varying success. In 2005, the Cuban Government offered to train 1000 medical doctors, open a faculty of medicine, and send roughly 200 medical doctors (including specialists) to work in rural- and sub-district community health centers and hospitals. In 2010, the first returning Timorese doctors educated in Cuba were armed with medical knowledge but scant medical mentors, whose role was also to offer sustainability, while the Cuban doctors sent to rural districts sometimes found life and medical practice for wages in the capital, outside the government program, to be a more attractive option.

There are scattered foreign surgeons and other medical specialists found scattered throughout Dili, however, an inadequate number remain in the health system regularly or consistently to help improve health security to a sustainable level. There is no reliable data on the number of doctors per capita, but some estimates gauge that there is one physician for every 10,000 people. The requirement for well-trained, adequate and consistent medical staff, from general and specialist surgeons to family practice physicians, to ensure human security is significant.

This major healthcare workforce deficiency has partially been answered by the establishment of a Faculty of Medicine in 2005; a Faculty of Public Health in 2004; a School of Nursing and School of Midwifery in 2008; and the recent establishment of a Cabinet of Health Research and Development (CHRD), the first health research institute in Timor-Leste [38]. The CHRD seeks to further assist the use of public health research data to inform decision makers and to develop and enhance ethical, sustainable and consistent public health policy. The Ministry of Health has also provided more than 2,000 scholarships for undergraduate and post-graduate students, including 20 medical specialists who are to complete their medical training in Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and Fiji. The opening of these ministerial-lead and government-backed programs and educational institutions are a great example of how fragile states can develop and stabilize, moving away from failure with the establishment of public health initiatives, underscored by government institutions and private partnerships, which help build capacity and create a better environment for improved health security.

Clinics, both public and private and regardless of specialization, constantly receive patients with a range of problems; among others, newborns and infants suffering from preventable and treatable Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS), Miliary Tuberculosis, Tuberculosis in the bone (Pott's Disease), chronic anemic states in children and mothers, unknown tumors and neoplasia, disfiguring physical trauma, mental health and many other preventable or otherwise treatable illnesses. The disease burden poses a liability for the healthcare infrastructure. In post-conflict states, mental health and psychosocial trauma are omnipresent, yet Timor-Leste lacks capacity for mental health services [39]. Timor-Leste lacks a focused and all inclusive mental health campaign to promote mental health, reduce the cultural taboos of mental illness, and offer those who are suffering from mental health illnesses adequate resources for effective diagnosis and treatment.

4.3. Food Security and Malnourishment

Malnourishment is food insecurity to the point where one cannot grow, function or develop normally. Malnourishment can also take the form of overconsumption of food, leading to the NCD of obesity and many other health conditions. Prone to drought, flooding, and natural disaster, the risk to Timor-Leste's food security is exacerbated by poor infrastructure and high rates of poverty [22]. Food security can greatly affect child and maternal health as social and cultural factors influence resource allocation among children and consequently affect their health in rural Timor-Leste [40]. Adequate access to vitamin A and nutritious food that promotes growth and human development is still a challenge for some, with 37% of the population lacking adequate access.

However, in the FSI, Timor-Leste's Demographic Pressures score dropped slightly as the opening of a food plant in 2010 as part of in a joint venture with the World Food Programme (WFP) increased local food capacity; nevertheless, 43% of the population are reported to be food insecure [22,41]. This is coupled with a US$5.6 million grant provided by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) providing to improve food security for poor maize growing households; the project aims to improve food security for communities which experience a 'hungry season' of up to three months without sufficient food stores [42].

Food security and health security are directly proportional. Timor-Leste still relies on international assistance for many sectors, including efforts to feed its population, and is unlikely to become self-reliant in the near future, as only roughly 10% of its area is arable land and it has an inadequate agricultural infrastructure. Food security will greatly affect health security in urban and rural Timor-Leste, and state

stability will be influenced by food security or in-security. The need for continued support for sustainable agriculture programs and development of the agricultural sector will increase food security and state stability [43]. Conflict engenders predictable health indicator patterns and Timor-Leste is no exception. Selected health indicators relating to basic hygiene and food security characteristics are found in Table 3.

Table 3. Selected Health Indicators: Timor-Leste.

Indicator	Prevalence	Comment
Prevalence of Child Malnutrition (Percentage of under-5 year olds uderweight) (2005–2011) [44]	43.7%	The percentage of children under the age of five whose weight for his/her age is more than two standard deviations below the WHO Child Growth Standards median
Population Undernourished (Percentage of Total Population) (2006–2008) [45]	31%	Undernourished Population: individuals whose food intake is chronically insufficient to meet their minimum energy requirements
Population With Sustainable Access to Improved Sanitation (2010) [44]	69%	The percentage of the population with access to adequate excreta disposal facilities, such as a connection to a sewer or septic tank system, a pour-flush latrine, a simple pit latrine or a ventilated improved pit latrine (considered adequate if it is private or shared and not public, and can effectively prevent human, animal and insect contact with excreta. Improved sanitation includes connection to public sewers, connection to septic systems, pour-flush latrines, simple pit latrines, and ventilated improved pit latrines. Not considered as improved sanitation are service or bucket latrines (where excreta is manually removed), public latrines, and open latrines [46].
Population With Sustainable Access to an Improved Water Source (2010)	69%	The percentage of the population with sustainable access to an improved water source (household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collection). Unimproved water sources are unprotected wells, unprotected springs, vendor-provided water, bottled water (unless water for other uses is available from an improved source), and tanker truck-provided water [46]
Vitamin A Supplementation Coverage Rate (Full Coverage) (2009) [47]	45%	The percentage of children reached with two doses of vitamin A supplementation. Vitamin A is an essential nutrient for the proper functioning of the immune system and the healthy growth and development of children. Insufficient intake of vitamin A in children can dramatically increase the risk of death, blindness, and illness, especially from measles and diarrhoea.
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) estimated [48]	36.78 deaths per 1,000 live births	This is in contrast to an estimated (IMR) = 70–95 per 1000 live births in 2002 [49]

4.4. Emergency Medical Services: Risks and Barriers to Health Security

Basic road infrastructure is significantly deficient throughout the country. There is no rail transport, and buses and ad hoc bus transportation is expensive and dangerous. This negatively affects basic public health logistics such as cold-chain management for vaccines and medicines, mobile health teams and emergency response in disasters. Few drivers adhere to safe

driving practices; a public health seat belt campaign has not yet been securely embraced and many regions and villages have a single unsafe road where children play and village work may be performed connecting them with the rest of the country. It is not yet adequately quantified in the literature, but road traffic accidents and trauma from a lack of implemention of safety standards are anecdotally endemic.

Despite the presence of five major district hospitals equipped with four core specialists, a nurse anesthetist, and despite having some 65 multifunction ambulances based at community health centers in the sub-districts, consistent and comprehensive emergency medical services do not exist and multiple trauma patients must often be transported by their own means to Dili for treatment. Access to consistent and adequate fuel and vehicle maintenance is a major barrier for the ambulance service. Definitive medical treatment and tertiary care for multisystem trauma patients does not exist in Dili and petition must be made for patients to be medically evacuated abroad to receive definitive care. A community-based emergency medical services system implementation with tertiary care services offered in the capital would offer emergency medical services in a sustainable fashion. Poor transport, unsafe practices and access to adequate emergency medical services are all barriers not only to primary healthcare access but to health security in general.

The Burden of Disease in Timor-Leste, a breakdown of infectious and communicable diseases. Infectious and communicable disease is getting worse for much of the resource poor and developing world. This can be observed by looking at health indicators and economic progress across states, taking into special consideration the impact of the global financial crisis. Developing nations may lack finance and systems to effectively address the behavioral, environmental and health systems factors related to health security, which determine the burden of communicable diseases [50]. Timor-Leste faces a severe threat and increased health risk from endemic infectious disease, inadequate hygiene access, and, consequently, decreasing health security and increased state fragility. Its tropical location, isolated population, and diverse ecosystems make it a haven for tropical disease, climate change-related health issues, and barriers to health security. Timor-Leste is highly vulnerable to natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, landslides and erosion, resulting from the combination of heavy monsoon rain, steep topography and widespread deforestation; these factors also contribute to infectious disease risk. Climate change and environmental degradation also contribute to the disease burden.

Mycobacterium tuberculosis is a pathogen, which causes tuberculosis and is a threat to health security throughout Asia. Due to the resource-poor nature of health services in Timor-Leste, the quantitative disease burden of tuberculosis is impossible to determine on a country-wide basis. Despite the post-conflict national Tuberculosis Control Program [51], infection rates, a lack of medicine, and poor treatment compliance mean that the disease continues to devastate communities [52]. Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) is becoming more common and affects a large proportion of the pediatric population, despite a vaccine program; past estimates (diagnoses?) of MDR-TB are a level of at 1.6% among the newly diagnosed and 14.5% among those previously treated [53]. Mycobacterium leprae, the pathogen that causes leprosy, a neglected tropical disease afflicting humans since time immemorial, was eliminated as a public health concern in 2010; with a reported prevalence of the disease of 0.83 per 10,000 inhabitants in comparison to 0.75 per 10,000 in the year 2000. If all actors and partners do not stay committed, this threat could return. In Timor-Leste, tuberculosis easily affects pediatric patients under the age of five years and threatens health security and quality of life, and causes death.

Approximately one third of the total population may be infected with tuberculosis. Those that have tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS infection are at the highest risk of disease complications and death. The disease burden of tuberculosis together with HIV/AIDS cannot yet be quantified for Timor-Leste, as disease prevalence is only available as an estimate. Present estimates range from a 0.2% to 1.5% HIV infection rate, compared with a rate of 0% in 2000; the first diagnosis of a patient as HIV positive was reported in 2003. A massive increase in sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and human pappilomma virus (HPV) may be rising amongst the younger population, with social and demographic shift in the population.

Endemic Malaria, resistant to conventional choloquine treatment and prophylaxis, is also seen throughout Timor-Leste. Malaria is a major global health problem, often exacerbated by political instability, conflict and forced migration. It thrives in fragile and failed states [54]. The cost of prophylaxis is prohibitive for the majority of the population, (foreign-based workers and private sector workers excluded) Use of bed nets at night (when the female mosquito is most actively seeking a blood meal) is still well below 50% among at-risk groups. Endemic Japanese Encephalitis is seen in many districts as the vaccine is costly Poor access leaves many with central nervous system morbidity for life once infected, should they survive it.

Dengue fever and viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) are endemic. Dengue fever is a most pressing public health issue for Timor-Leste. Almost all other neighboring countries have experienced a fatal outbreak of the disease, but Timor-Leste has experienced recurrent outbreaks with devastating effects in 2005, 2010 and 2012. Dengue fever, carried by the Aedes aegypti mosquito, has high mortality rates in the

pediatric and geriatric populations. It cannot be cured and treatment is only directed at the symptoms. Prevention of Dengue fever can only be carried out through avoiding the mosquito bite and vector control —there is no vaccine.

Schistosomiasis (Bilharzia) has a global prevalence of roughly 200 million, with 600 million people who swim or work in infected waters at risk. Its prevalence in Timor-Leste has been poorly quantified. This blood fluke infects through the skin and can cause symptoms tanging from a constant itch to multiple system organ failure and death. With environmental degradation and changes to water supply and rivers caused by climate change, leptospirosis incidents of may be rising in the area around Dili and other urban centers. In the event of flash floods, landslides, earthquakes or a tsunami, water borne illnesses increase.

Anemia caused by chronic disease, parasitic infections and malnutrition is possibly at epidemic levels. Many parasitic infections lead to anemia, as do states of malnutrition. Severe anemia can cause death, while in chronic forms it can lead to impaired growth and cognition for the developing brain, and in pregnant women anemia can lead to low birth weight and maternal death [25]. The combination of long-standing anemia, inflammation, and target organ damage causes growth retardation, under-nutrition, and cognitive delays in children, adversely affecting personal, economic and social growth [25].

Leptosporsis is a zoonosis from rats, dogs, livestock and rodents that urinate into water supplies around urban dwellings; it enters the body from infected water supplies through cuts, abrasions, or the eyes or mouth. Leptospiriss can be self-limiting, causing only fever and flu-like illness, but it can also lead to significant disability and multiple organ failure if not diagnosed or treated properly, the best treatment being prevention from exposure [55].

Soil-related Helminth infections (Acariasis, Trich-uriasis and Hookworm infections) debilitate many children and leave them socially ostracized and chronically anemic through poor hygiene and lack of prevention or educational resources [56]. Lymphatic filariasis (elephantiasis) causes social ostracization and dysmorphic effects from unnatural swelling of the lymph nodes. This disease is not terribly common in Timor-Leste but many residents are at risk for contracting it through mosquito bites and treatment remains expensive and out-of-reach for rural populations without adequate access to primary healthcare services. If economic opportunity continues to decline in the rural periphery and the Timorese continue to ascend upon the capital Dili in search of work, urban areas may exceed capacity and contribute to the spread of disease. Also, in the event of further social and political strife, incidences of the disease could greatly increase.

Typhoid, treatable with a vaccine widely available in the developed world, is prevalent in Timor-Leste,

although under-diagnosed and under-treated. Rabies, from a variety of rabid animals (dogs, cats, bats, etc.) living amongst rural populations is a severe risk to health once patients become exposed through a bite or scratch. Prophylaxis for rabies exists in the form of pre- and post-exposure vaccines, but is very costly and requires significant compliance with painful inoculations and, in the case of post-exposure treatment, prompt medical treatment is mandatory for success. Upon exposure to rabies through saliva (ie. an animal bite), prompt treatment before the virus reaches the peripheral nerve can stop the disease from spreading. However, with poor road infrastructure, no remote medical clinics or the lack of pharmaceutical cold chain management to maintain safe and viable vaccines, this is not possible for much of the at-risk population.

Amebic dysentery is also poorly diagnosed in many medical laboratories, but is very prevalent in Timor. Giardia lamblia, the parasite that causes bloating and diarrhea, is also very common and debilitates many people each year. The disease burden in post conflict and fragile states is significant, and Timor-Leste is no exception. Public health infrastructure and solid, focused governmental policy can alleviate and prevent many of these illnesses through renewed vaccination and immunization efforts, basic health services, and the promotion of hygiene practices.

4.5. Present Challenges for Health Policy in Timor-Leste

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates that only 71% of children under five with suspected pneumonia are taken to an appropriate healthcare provider at; of this population it is estimated that only 45% would receive antibiotic treatment of any kind. Globally, pneumonia, and other respiratory infections and diseases are a major contributor to pediatric illness and fatality. UNICEF also estimates that only 63% of children under five years old with diarrhea received oral rehydration therapy and continued feeding in 2010. Diarrhea and the dehydration associated with it are the number one causes of death in the developing world and can lead to chronic malnourishment, growth and development abnormalities, and an overall lack of health security for children. In Timor-Leste, the risk of pediatric diarrhea and complications such as acute dehydration and death are significant.

In order to address of the growing disease burden, and to increase the access to health services of communities living in the rural and remote areas, the Ministry of Health instituted the Servisu Integradu da Saúde Communitária (Integrated Community Health Services or SISCa) project. Dr. Nelson, Minister of Health from 2007 to 2012, called upon District and Sub-District Administrators, Suco Chiefs and Councils, Aldeia Chiefs, Youth Organizations, Women's Net-

works and NGOs working within the country for support. Collaboration within government-backed public health programs offered by the SUSCa engenders partnership and disease prevention. However, the gains made will be lost if continued inclusive institutional investment in human and financial capital with clear and sustainable targets and outcomes are not further outlined.

4.6. Primary Prevention: Vaccination Catastrophe

The SISCa program provides disease prevention, early treatment and, anecdotally, increases health security. However, disease prevention through vaccination, such as those available for polio and measles, is rarely seen in Timor-Leste. Poor vaccine compliance and/or access to viable vaccines contribute to this epidemic of increasing incidence of preventable illness. These barriers to care, which exacerbate risk factors, lead to a vaccination catastrophe. Primary prevention in the form of vaccination saves lives, reduces disease burden and morbidity, and can eliminate disease when carried out as a sustainable and consistent process.

The World Health Organization (WHO) Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI), realised in collaboration with the UNICEF, the Ministry of Health, and aid agencies in Timor-Leste, focuses on vaccination coverage for children under the age of five against measles, tetanus, diphtheria, polio, tuberculosis and pertussis. Despite significant investment in cold chain management, training, educational resources for parents, and mechanisms to guarantee vaccination compliance and coverage for children, data from UNICEF suggest that only between 66 and 72% of this population have currently received these basic vaccinations. Less than 46% of reporting districts have achieved more than 80% coverage of the third effective dose of the diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus vaccine [57].

When the herd immunity, the total immunity of a population, drops below 90%, the risk of disease outbreak increases logarithmically. Some patients in the population are too sick, immune-compromised or are allergic to be administered the vaccine but a herd immunity of 90% can protect these otherwise exposed members, as well as at-risk children. The risk of infectious diseases which are totally preventable through vaccine quickly leads to an outbreak when herd immunity is consistently low and more children are at risk of coming into contact with preventable diseases which they are not immunized against.

Table 4 illustrates the risk of preventable infectious disease in Timor-Leste for the vulnerable population of under five year olds. The acute need for a re-focus on primary healthcare and primary prevention through vaccination and immunization against preventable illnesses is highlighted here. Preventable illness and infectious disease threaten state stability in Timor-Leste by threatening health security.

Table 4. Immunization and Health data: Timor-Leste pediatric population [49,58–60].

Immunization 2010, 1-year-old children immunized against: TB corresponding vaccines: BCG	71%
Immunization 2010, 1-year-old children immunized against: DPT corresponding vaccines: DPT1	75%
Immunization 2011, 1-year-old children immunized against: DPT corresponding vaccines: DPT3 (up to the third dose of vaccine booster)	67%
Immunization 2010, 1-year-old children immunized against: Polio corresponding vaccines: Polio3	72%
Immunization 2010, 1-year-old children immunized against: Measles corresponding vaccines: Measles	66%
Immunization 2010, % newborns protected against tetanus	81%

With this, the comprehensive multi-year plan for immunization, scheduled to be carried out from 2009–2013, aims to reach national immunization coverage targets which have been established by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC's Board of Directors approved the Government of Timor-Leste's threshold program proposal in May 2010 and work started in 2011 in the form of the Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Program for Immunization (MCC-TPI). Timor-Leste's MCC-TPI, administered by United States Agency for International Development (USAID), is assisting the Ministry of Health in its efforts to increase nationally the coverage of the third and final diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT3) vaccine, as well as measles immunization rates (these would increase herd immunity). This project's goal is to achieve a combined national average of 81.5% coverage for DPT3 and total measles coverage in children below one year of age by 2013. A complementary goal for MCHIP is to strengthen the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) to ensure program sustainability.

5. Discussion

Timor-Leste has shifted from being a fragile state on the verge of failure to one on a path of sustainable stability. By improving its public health infrastructure,

programming and health security rooted in disease prevention and primary healthcare access, both health security and state stability will improve. Timor-Leste's public health leadership has helped to establish a programme which must receive continuous support and development to succeed.

As external actors continue to depart from the UN lead mission in 2012, local capacity at all levels must continue to meet the daily challenges and be ever more inclusive, sustainable and broad in scope. A focused developmental approach through public-private partnership and transparency helps build capacity in fragile state settings and engenders state building [61–63].

Humanitarian aid and development are in a state of paradigm shift, with one force pushing for the growth of new sources of aid and loans from middle income countries, private capital and charitable organizations, while the other focuses on the rights of individuals and advocacy of at-risk populations and communities; Timor-Leste can no longer rely on outside aid for public health support and its future state stability prospects. Humanitarianism may even be in a weak state as the global financial crisis has challenged the paradigm of donor financial support and subsequent operations; sustainability is not integrated into this old model of aid. There are aid organizations that focus on little more than maintaining budgets, offering antiquated solutions to complex issues, and keeping projects in a steady state, but not actually fixing any systemic problems [64]. By encouraging inclusive institutional support at the public health level, general capacity building and self-directed growth which reduces the risk of failure, it is possible that a wholly sustainable public health model can engender health security and help solidify state stability by moving away from external non-state and unilateral organization support.

Unilateral actors such as the United States (US) and European Union (EU), as well as multilateral actors like the UN, Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank will be tested with one of the 21st century's largest challenges: development within fragile and failed states. US-based assistance focuses on bolstering stability by strengthening the foundations of good governance, accelerating economic growth, improving the health of citizens, and supporting the professionalization of security forces such developmental support is a good method, but guidance but must be temporary and sustainable.

5.1. Networks

"Goodbye conflict, hello development," may be the introduction to the citizens guide to the 2012 budget for Timor-Leste, but many regional challenges remain for the country itself; this is outlined by the fledgling economic and health security of its citizens. In 2010 the G7+ was formed by fragile and failed states in order to create a collective voice and platform to address their particular needs. The G7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development, the main objective of which is to share experiences and learn from one another, as well as to advocate reforms to the way the international community engages in conflict-affected states [65].

The G7+ promotes democracy, strong institutions and good governance. This is a 'rock-bottom' help network for countries that live with the threat of failure. The Chair of this state support group is Timor-Leste's Finance Minister, Emilia Pires, and the focus is on clearly identifying the needs of the these fragile nation-states in order to maintain and develop sustainable policies and inclusive institutions that focus on stability for their citizens.

The G7+ is a state-level support group which draws upon public-private donors and actors and aims to create focused policies which engender stability by ending and preventing conflict. Aid effectiveness is a main priority of the G7+, with peace and state building as core components. The direct link between Timor-Leste's leadership role in the G7+ and its public health outcomes will not be seen for a decade or more. However, the concept of building strong institutional capacities in state health infrastructure, and the direct and indirect benefits of this capacity growth, is seen in the public health advancements in post-2002 Timor-Leste discussed throughout this paper. The rising presence and leadership of Timor-Leste in the G7+ is a clear example of how improvements in public health have lead to sustainable state stability.

5.2. Present State Challenges

The elections in mid-March, June and July 2012 were defining moments in the stability of Timor-Leste and for the idea of fragile states stabilizing with the focused backing of inclusive institutions, rule of law, governance and the democratic electoral process. This socio-political transformation in Timor-Leste is seen in safe and fair elections, and will be underscored by political power and wealth being redistributed amongst a variety of competing societal interests [66].

However, political will and democratic process are not the only actors in the direction of state stability. Timor-Leste has received oil and gas revenues from major projects in the Joint Petroleum Development Area that it shares with Australia. The Petroleum Fund is a government-backed program aiming to ensure the sustainable use of oil revenues over the long term. Assets have grown from $6.9 billion in 2010, $8.3 billion in 2011 and reached over $10 billion in 2012 [67]. This steady financial growth has greatly influenced the state's 'Poverty and Decline' level on the FSI matrix and can help improve health security when spent wisely on inclusive policy. It is up to the

democratically elected government of Timor-Leste to allocate its financial resources in a way that will engender human and health security for its citizens. Economic development and growth in foreign direct investment is significant and can offer sustainable and inclusive state stability.

This paper does not set out to break down and assess the budgetary strategy of Timor-Leste. However, year-on-year, and with the help of oil-resource and foreign direct investment funds and aid, Timor-Leste has been able to slowly build a budding infrastructure and pay its healthcare staff to work and become trained in this once war-ravaged country. The Strategic Development Plan has helped pave the way for an investment strategy that focuses strongly on major infrastructure, skills, and structural gaps, which may generate a sustainable private sector and reduce poverty [68].

Despite this economic growth being relatively consistent, this developing economy based on the US dollar is still dependent on government spending and assistance from international donors. Due to significant human capital shortages, not only in healthcare, but also in engineering, legal and other sectors, private sector development is slow to mature, public health-related infrastructure (particularly in terms of power and water) remains wanting, the judicial system is incomplete, and an equal access marketplace or overall business environment remains to be seen. The transition from state fragility to stability is still tenuous and much remains to be done.

6. Conclusion

The FSI will not predict future human conflict or state failure but it can better describe state fragility and help focus attention on fragile and failing states for immediate aid and intervention in an effort to prevent state catastrophe. Fragile states have a diminished ability to provide basic services and offer no sustainable means of health security to their citizens. The continued strengthening of government accountability and transparency, and re-focusing on the public health sector are key components of public policy promoting stability. An extremely young state, Timor-Leste has struggled to maintain unity in government while fighting greater structural weaknesses, including corruption, political polarization, and dependence on foreign aid. The G7+ offers a platform for fragile and failed states to promote stability through organically constructed institutions and public policy.

Increasing health security will continue to guide

Timor-Leste from fragile to stable statehood. A reinforced public health policy of primary healthcare access, immunizations and increased overall vaccination coverage for the under five-year-old population may increase health security significantly. Timor-Leste clearly illustrates the link between public health institutions and health security and state stability and development. Lessons learned from Timor-Leste's still complex transition from a post-conflict state to a successful nation can provide international leadership an example of which it should take note. Endemic infectious disease, decreased health security and weak but growing public institutions keep Timor-Leste fragile, while new investment and economic prospects, when handled properly and with efficient and appropriate public health policy, may engender state stability and may help to avoid state failure. Health Security is directly linked to state security. Public health policy must be implemented in order to prop up its fledgling public health sector and still growing democratic institutions. Increasing health security through public health can push Timor-Leste out of fragility and engender sustainable economic growth, development and consequently true statehood.

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

Author Contributions

JQ and NM wrote the first draft of the manuscript. MC offered data and data confirmation from the Ministry of Health. VB, DM and MH supported data, organization, methodology and contributed to revising subsequent drafts. All authors approved the final version.

Disclosures

John Quinn performed a two-phase heath assessment of Timor-Leste in 2011 and presented his findings and solutions to the Minister of Health in May 2011. There are no commercial disclosures or statements to release.

Nelson Martins served as Minister of Health for Timor-Leste from 2007 to 2012, the comments and contributions made within this paper are his own and do not necessarily reflect government or ministerial policy, past, present or future.

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Appendix 1. List of Abbreviations

CAVR	Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation)
Csxxx	composite score of the Failed States Index
EC	European Commission
ESA	Agricultural Development Economics Division
EU	European Union
FSIxxxx	Failed States Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations
USAID	United States Aid and International Development
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Program
UN	United Nations

A Case for Cohabitative Security: The Philippine and Malaysian Experience

Michael I. Magcamit

College of Arts, Political Science, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand;
E-Mail: michael.magcamit@pg.canterbury.ac.nz; Tel.: +64 3642987 ext. 6053

Abstract: This article attempts to explore and analyse the evidence for cohabiting the human security concept into the national security frameworks of ASEAN countries. Using the Philippines and Malaysia as case studies, the article determines the extent to which public officials and policymakers have redefined and reenvisioned national security by incorporating non-traditional, people-centered elements of human security. The word 'cohabitation' refers to national governments' efforts to amalgamate statist and humanist dimensions of security when articulating and implementing their national security rhetoric and agenda. It argues that human security naturally complements state security, and vice versa. As such, human security and state security co-exist in a constructive manner that enhances the overall level of national security. In other words, they are mutually constitutive rather than mutually corrosive. Both cases underscore a two-pronged assumption. First, the meaning and provision of national security can neither be eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated without considerations for 'below the state' actors and issues. And second, the eminent status vis-à-vis power of the state in providing national security can neither be trivialized nor undermined.

Keywords: Cohabitative Security; Human Security; Malaysia; National Security; Philippines

1. Introduction

Twenty years after the official debut of human security in academic and policymaking circles in 1994, the concept continues to be a source of important debates directed at the progressive re-imagination of national security. In Southeast Asia, however, the concept has had very limited influence in the govern-ments' formulation and implementation of their respective national security rhetoric and agenda [1–3]. This is largely due to the conflicting views on what should be considered as a threat between the state and various non-state actors within these societies. At the heart of this conflict between statist and humanist advocates of national security is the shared belief among Southeast Asian leaders in the ASEAN Way [1–3].

For the region's top officials, the ASEAN Way is deemed the most appropriate style of diplomacy as it underlines the value of traditional notions of sovereignty and non-interference in conducting interstate relations [4]. While the Western method of diplomacy is driven by binding agreements through the adoption of legalistic procedures and formalistic solutions, the ASEAN approach operates through non-binding, invisible ground rules of informality, inclusivity and consensus [4]. Different labels have been used by various observers to describe the ASEAN Way such as 'organizational minimalism', 'soft regionalism', 'soft dialogue', and 'thin institutionalism' ([4] pp. 14–27). Such a preference for 'sports shirt diplomacy' over 'business shirt diplomacy' has naturally limited the practical application of human security in rethinking national security in the Southeast Asia ([4] pp. 14–27).

Against this backdrop, this article attempts to explore the evidence for the 'cohabitation' of human security concept within the national security framework of ASEAN countries in the twenty-first century. It specifically examines the Philippines and Malaysia's experiences with cohabiting state-centric and people-centered dimensions of national security. The word cohabitation in this context refers to the national government's attempt at amalgamating statist and humanist elements of security when articulating and executing its national security policies. The goal is to determine the extent to which policymakers have defined national security based on the cohabitation between state-centric and people-centered dimensions of national security. Cohabitative security, therefore, refers to the approach being employed by the Philippine and Malaysian governments in cohabiting human security into their national security frameworks.

The article argues that human security naturally complements state security, and vice versa. As such, human security and state security co-exist in a constructive manner that enhances the overall level of national security. On the one hand, state security does not automatically negate human security nor compete with individuals and communities; on the other, human security does not necessarily threaten state security nor compete against state actors and agencies. The reason for this is that human security and state security are mutually constitutive rather than mutually corrosive. This is particularly relevant in the context of the increasing, albeit gradual, recognition among ASEAN governments that human security is an essential dimension and necessary precondition for national stability and security. Such a scenario implies that the divisive dichotomy between these two security dimensions is hardly insurmountable. Ironically, it is the insecurity felt by individuals and states, rather than security that is transforming ASEAN's traditional normative terrain into a region cognisant of the value of cohabiting humanist and statist components of national security.

Moreover, by examining governments' efforts toward cohabitative security, the article argues that the inherent bias against states can be mitigated, enabling mutual trust to develop between the artificially divided state and non-state agents of national security. It highlights the areas where states, even if only to some extent, have practically contributed to the advancement of the human security agenda. This is not to defend or legitimize the shortcomings of states with respect to human security, but rather, to reopen the channel through which productive dialogues between governments and citizens can take place. The notion of cohabitative security does not provide a panacea to long-standing conceptual problems of national security. Nevertheless, it offers an alternative tool for reassessing governments' successes and failures in terms of incorporating individuals and societies in their respective national security discourses.

In advancing these arguments, the article examines the Philippines and Malaysia's experiences with cohabitative security and attempts to answer the following questions. First, who or what is the primary referent object in the Philippines and Malaysia's twenty-first century national rhetoric and agenda? Second, what are the main issues that threaten these primary security referent objects? And third, how do the Philippine and Malaysian governments, both past and present, address these threats? Have they been successful? Why or why not?

The article is divided into four sections. Section two examines the current composition of the Philippines' national security framework by identifying its main components and analyzing the most critical issues that threaten its primary security referent object—development space. It argues that against the backdrop of structural poverty and institutionalized inequality generated by a deeply-entrenched oligarchic system, the main referent object of Philippine national security is its diminishing development space. Development space refers specifically to the capacity of the Philippine government to independently and effectively pursue its economic development goals and objectives against these constraints. It analyses the limits to the Philippines' development-based national security framework, which in turn, undermine the effectiveness of the country's cohabitative national security, namely: (i) limits to democratization; and (ii) limits to Human Security Act (HSA).

Section three examines the present condition of Malaysia's national security framework by identifying its main components and analyzing the most critical issues that threaten its primary security referent object—diversity space. It argues that against the backdrop of a Bumiputra-centric political economy, developed and controlled by the UMNO-driven Barisan Nasional, the main referent object of Malaysian national security is its shrinking diversity space. Diversity space specifically refers to the capacity of all ethnic groups in Malaysia to participate freely in the country's

political and economic affairs against these constraints. It analyses the limits to Malaysia's diversity-based national security framework, which in turn, undermine the effectiveness of the country's cohabitative national security, namely: (i) limits to ideational security apparatuses; and (ii) limits to material security apparatuses. The Philippines and Malaysia's primary security referent objects—development space and diversity space—represent the non-traditional, people-centred dimension of security as opposed to its traditional, state-centric dimension.

Finally, section four summarizes the main arguments presented based on the analysis of two empirical case studies. It concludes that despite the limitations of the Philippine and Malaysian governments in fully cohabiting the concept of human security into their respective national security frameworks, nonetheless, both countries have illustrated a concrete way of giving entitlement to non-traditional, people-centered elements of security as legitimate referent objects of national security. Both cases underscore a two-pronged hypothesis: (i) that the meaning and provision of national security can neither be eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated without considerations for 'below the state' actors and issues; and (ii)that the eminent status of the state in terms of power in providing national security can neither be trivialized nor undermined. Therefore, rather than downplaying a state-centric concept while highlighting a people-centred model, cohabitative security amalgamates statist and humanist views of national security. This is one way of resolving the 'entitled state/untitled human' dilemma in which the state is typically depicted as an antagonistic force impeding the pursuit of human security.

2. Cohabiting Human Security into the Philippine's National Security Framework

2.1. The Philippines' 'Cohabitative' National Security

The Philippines' 2011–2016 National Security Policy (hereafter, NSP) is a statement of principles designed for the strategic pursuit of the country's national interest defined in terms sovereignty and territorial integrity on the one hand, and people's well-being and institutions on the other [5]. Its primary objectives focus on balancing between 'guns and butter,' through more efficient allocation of the country's limited resources and effective prioritization of internal and external defense. It lays down a fairly comprehensive agenda which incorporates nonmilitary issues and threats encroaching upon the boundaries of the state. In the words of President Benigno Aquino III: 'our quest must not only focus on ensuring the stability of the State and the security of our nation...our ultimate goal must be the safety and well-being of our people' ([5] p. 1).

This holistic approach to national security underscores the need to rethink traditional security which made paramount the military protection of the state from external threats while disregarding issues generating human insecurities. It is part and parcel of the larger security sector transformation (SST) which represents a paradigm shift in security governance by acknowledging the blurring between internal and external threats [6]. The main thrust of the NSP is anchored in Aquino III's 'social contract' with the Filipinos, emphasizing commitments to transformational leadership through empowerment of the people and opportunities to enable the people to escape from the shackles of poverty ([5] p. 6). Aside from its customary role in fortifying the country's juridical borders, the NSP also aims to cultivate an environment conducive to human development, that is, a development-based NSP agenda. Thus, it brings together under one cohesive policy agenda a wide range of security issues, and balances these with its national peace and development perspectives.

The country's desire to serving as a committed and trustworthy member of the international community is, to a large extent, driven by the emergence of non-traditional security threats transcending national borders such as organized transnational crimes, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, pandemics and infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and climate change to name a few [5]. In relation to this, the country also acknowledges the significant impact of globalization on its internal affairs. The NSP document, therefore, promotes the objective of forging strong political alliances with developed countries to further solidify its political presence in the international arena, and secure its economic and defense requirements [5]. The government believes that through diplomatic engagements, nations will cooperate rather than compete with each other [5].

In response to this changing security environment, the government has developed a national security model comprised of seven core elements that amplify national interests, including: socio-political stability, territorial integrity, economic solidarity, ecological balance, cultural cohesiveness, moral-spiritual consensus, and peace and harmony ([5] p. 3). These elements also take into consideration certain psycho-social aspects of national security including the people's customs and beliefs, as well as social characters and norms influencing perception of government-initiated policies and programmes ([5] p. 3). Hence, the government is very optimistic about the potential of its twenty-first century NSP agenda for achieving not only national peace and security, but, more importantly, development and prosperity. Working under a widely popular campaign slogan of Daang Matuwid (the high road), Aquino III's NSP strongly emphasizes the country's diminishing development space, articulating the issue as a national security threat that must be effectively secured ([5] p. 31):

"If the government is able to make good on the promise of taking the high road, the 'Ang Daang

Matuwid', then it must be sure that the people are afforded every opportunity to pursue their individual dreams of a better quality of life—all under the consideration of national security where the welfare and well-being of the people are of primordial consideration."

From the government's perspective, addressing the country's long-standing problems of exacerbated poverty, widening inequality, and other socio-political maladies engendered by limited development space demands complementary policies such as robust public-private partnerships (PPP) on the one hand, and breaking patronage politics influencing decision making in government's programs and projects on the other [5].

Despite its development-based NSP agenda, the government still recognizes the importance of maintaining a credible external defense posture since globalization has not led to complete obsolescence of war as an alternative tool for settling disputes when diplomacy fails. Impaired by its present economic status, however, the country is struggling to assert and defend its position in international society. The government usually finds itself on the losing end when settling disputes with advanced countries, given its small player status in the global arena, both politically and economically. The debate between 'guns and butter' has to be settled in favour of 'butter' given the country's scarce resources. After all, as Aquino III has neatly put it, 'For Filipinos to feel this renewed sense of transformational leadership, they must also see and feel that the Government is for them, with them and serving them' ([5] p. 31).

2.2. Limits to the Philippines' Development-based National Security

Clearly, the Philippine government recognizes economic underdevelopment as a critical threat to national security. The important question that needs to be examined, however, is whether it is genuinely concerned about addressing the country's economic plight or is only paying lip service to the electorally-popular idea of people-centered national security. Despite the government's grand pronouncements about pursing equitable economic development to enhance national security, however, its security blueprint faces two limitations that put enormous challenge to such intention: (i) limits to democratization; and (ii) limits to human security act. The following subsections discuss these limits, which help explain the country's continuously shrinking diversity space, and subsequent failure to fully embed the notion of human security (defined in terms of economic security) into its national security framework.

2.2.1. Limits to Democratization

Based on historical analysis of politico-economic developments in the Philippines, the decision of the American colonial regime to transplant its own brand of representative democracy over an economic arrangement ruled by landed oligarchs enabled the latter to seize authoritative control over what should have been 'democratic' policymaking procedures and institutions [7]. Oligarchs in this context are 'actors who command and control massive concentrations of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position' ([8] p. 6). Accordingly, an oligarch's ultimate goal 'is to secure, maintain, and retain his or her position of extreme wealth and power against all manner of threats' ([8] p. 6). In Aristotle's formulation, democracy is defined as the rule by the poor majority, whereas oligarchy is the rule of the wealthy few [8]. However, democracy and oligarchy 'can coexist indefinitely as long as the unpropertied lower classes do not use their expanded political participation to encroach upon the material power and prerogatives of the wealthiest' ([8] p. 11). In other words, the two systems are compatible for as long as the two realms of power do not clash. So while oligarchy 'rests on the concentration of material power', democracy 'rests on the dispersion of non-material power' ([8] p. 11).

In the case of the Philippines, US officials left aside policies that could have transformed its political system into a more level playing field. The country's domestic political space was insulated from revisionist agendas espoused by various social factions springing from a broad base of political capital [7]. In stark contrast to the Philippine experience, the Japanese consciously shut down the elite's access to political power when they took over Korea, creating a very different political climate for the latter state [9]. The Philippines' government's capacity for independent action, therefore, is effectively curtailed by oligarchic groups attempting to amass public power to preserve vested interests [10–12]. Further, the 'redemocratization' process that took place immediately after the collapse of Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorship only resulted in the reinstallation of the pre-Marcos political order. This led to the re-emergence of elite ascendancy over domestic economy—the sine qua non for Philippine economic underdevelopment ([7] p. 49). Despite the introduction of various democratic institutional reforms, oligarchic forces are still able to manipulate and saturate the bureaucracy, impairing Philippine polity.

The question therefore is, why and how does oligarchic power overcome state power? Throughout Philippine history, several influential families owning huge corporations and vast lands have ruled over the bureaucracy, exploiting the country's public goods and resources that continue to fuel institutionalized corruption. Several infamous terms such as 'anarchy of families', 'booty capitalism', and 'cacique democracy' ([7] p. 50) have been used to describe the country's

pitiful politico-economic construct. The conspicuous incapacity of the government to 'immunize' itself from oligarch manipulation has been at the crux of economic underdevelopment [13–15]. This unique political climate enables the 'top 5.5 % landowning clans to own 44% of arable land and as few as 100 families control all electoral positions on a national level' ([16] p. 13). It is a side-effect of the strategy employed by the US regime to consolidate power throughout the archipelago that the landed elite were allowed to further expand their economic power by means political appointments [7].

When put together, Filipinos' distinctive concepts of family and land give rise to the so-called 'patron-client relationships' which can be used to explain Philippine political economy [17–18]. The patronage system which emphasizes the Filipino culture of 'giving for gratitude' and 'labour for loyalty' explains the existence of an omnipotent elite dominating the country's economy cum politics [19]. In this scenario, both the peasants' and the labourers' interests feed into the landlords' preferences through material and/or personal transactions via colloquial networks [20].

Hence, when the US colonial regime decided to establish political offices for electoral contest, the elite clans consolidated their power in order to give birth to national oligarchy instead of a national government (Anderson 1998). With this newfound power, the ruling elite are now in the position to thwart policies that favour both enemies and competitors. This system of politicking gave rise to what the Filipinos call, trapos or 'dirty' traditional politicians [21–23]. These trapos are responsible for the presence of 'reverse accountability' in Philippine politics by holding individual voters accountable for electing their respective patrons to power in exchange for favours provided in the past or those promised once said politician elected ([7] p. 55). The provision of favours, however, does not always translate to actual votes. In such cases, intimidation and aggression are often employed by political players owning private armies to ensure the delivery of paid votes [24]. The alternate use of benefits and violence for preserving political power and control essentially transforms traditional political aristocracy into some type of warlords [25]. In can be inferred, therefore, that the voters' support for their patrons is largely a function of the latter's 'own interests, rewards for loyalty, and the fear of vengeance' ([26] p. 260).

The nature of Philippine political-economy is referred to as a neo-patrimonial system [10]. A patrimonial state that allows oligarch relations and interests to dominate bureaucratic systems creates a hunting ground for the unrestricted accumulation of personal wealth [27]. Since the rent-seekers emerging from this bureaucratic capitalist system are able to control formal state structures from the outside, the term becomes 'neo-patrimonial' or 'booty capitalism' ([10] pp. 18–21).

The overwhelming oligarchic influence has significantly contributed to the deterioration of economic development in the Philippines since gaining independence from the United States in 1946 [28]. Even the implementations of disastrous economic policies advanced by top government officials were eventually manipulated to protect the interests of Filipino oligarchs. Philippine underdevelopment, therefore, is not just a matter of constantly choosing the wrong policies, but rather the result of conscious efforts by rent-seekers to maintain them for the continuous exploitation of state mechanisms and resources.

A perfect illustration of a 'wrong' policy selection was the espousal of import substitution industrialization (ISI) as the country's primary trade strategy after its official independence from the US [29–30]. In contrast to East Asian countries that launched an export-oriented strategy leading to annual per capita GDP growth of 6%, the Philippines chose to implement ISI and became the worst performing economy in the Eastern half [31]. While the promotion of ISI may indeed have been an honest mistake on the part of Filipino technocrats, the oligarchs' indifference toward the correction of this mistake nevertheless underlined the unintended benefits it created with respect to the their interests. Despite the exacerbated balance of trade and payments problems created by ISI, this policy was maintained not for its effectiveness in resolving the crisis but for its role in opening a wider space for 'oligarch predation' ([7] p. 57). This confounding relationship between local oligarchs and the Philippine government is often referred to as 'rent capitalism' wherein rents are created by the latter to provide the former with a synthetic advantage by imposing restrictions on the free flow of foreign goods and services into the market [32].

U.S. Governor-general William Howard Taft's 'policy of attraction'—originally designed to entice the landlord class into collaboration with the Americans rather than pursuing revolutionary struggles—transformed the economic elite of the Spanish-colonial era into a political-economic elite that continues to dominate domestic politics today ([33] p. 142). And since representative institutions had already emerged prior to the development of a strong republic, patronage-infested political parties had single-handedly squashed government reforms that threatened to curb their power. In the Philippine context, political parties are 'convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up, merged with others, split, reconstituted, regurgitated, resurrected, renamed, repackaged, recycled, refurbished, buffed up or flushed down the toilet anytime' ([34] pp. 4–5). This resulted to further marginalization of the masses who were unable to challenge the deeply-entrenched national oligarchy.

The palpable failure of American colonial regime to renovate the foundations of domestic political power vis-à-vis the imposition of its own brand of representative democracy on top of an unjust economic

edifice, created an environment conducive to oligarch predation by exploiting state institutions and manipulating economic policy formulation [7]. The Philippine government has continued to operate within this context from one administration to another since the country's formal independence. Therefore, implanting a new constitutional framework that replicated a pre-Martial Law system within a relatively unchanged economic arrangement would be futile and counter-intuitive to the prospect of change. In short, neither regime change nor democratization helped in mitigating the oligarch's influence over state affairs, particularly in decisions involving the national economy. As a consequence, a strongly developed Philippine republic is yet to emerge [7].

2.2.2. Limits to Human Security Act

The post-1986 People Power Revolution paved the way for rethinking national security as the security of the people. The perceived divide between people and state is artificial as they both comprise the nation-state [35]. Although the government is gradually progressing toward the integration of human security in its formulation of national security, the environment within which such policy amendments are being configured remains largely unstable and multifaceted. Advancements made toward a humanist view of security strategy are in danger of being undermined by institutional mechanisms with inadequate capacity to effectively combat contemporary security problems. And while Filipino policymakers acknowledge the severity of nontraditional threats trespassing on the country's supposedly sovereign boundaries, the term human security is still nowhere to be found in its official NSP document. This implies that the normative foundations of human security are not consistently implanted when designing a definitive NSP agenda despite references being made regarding the protection of grassroots civil societies [35].

A good example supporting this argument is the passage of the Human Security Act of the Philippines or the Republic Act No. 9372 in February 2007. This Act defined human security as an 'act to secure the state and our people from terrorism' defined as 'sowing and creating conditions of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an un-lawful demand' [36]. In short, the country's HSA is both too narrow and too broad at the same time. On the one hand, it frames human security within the narrow context of terrorism which contradicts the government's holistic approach to national security, as well as the UNDP's comprehensive interpretation of human security [37]. On the other hand, it precludes the fundamental aspects of a terrorist act in favour of broad and vague expressions such as 'widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace' or 'unlawful demand' which also run in contrast to the

definition proposed by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change [38].

While the official discourse of HSA highlights its importance for giving the government's all-out war against terror legal teeth by complementing AFP's strategic operations, however, law enforcement agencies seem to be uncomfortable with its implementation [39]. Such contradiction underlies reservations toward the Act, given its use of misleading semantics. Moreover, human rights groups have strongly opposed the legislation of the HSA arguing that it constitutes the building blocks of martial law. The rights that are at risk of being violated include freedom of expression, association, speech, movement, and due process, among others [40]. The accountability of the Anti-Terrorism Council for human rights violations while carrying out its mandate of fighting against terrorism is not specifically addressed in the said Act, blurring the line between Judiciary and Executive roles [40].

Supporters of the anti-terrorism legislation, on the other hand, point to Section 2 of the Act which highlights the safeguard mechanisms for protecting human rights by upholding basic rights and fundamental liberties as enshrined in the Constitution. They argue that the HSA is crucial for strengthening the country's democratic ideals since 'unlike the secrecy surrounding the pre-HSA extrajudicial killings, the new law makes the prosecution of terrorists a transparent matter that proceeds under the supervision of the Philippine judiciary' ([41] pp. 215–216). Despite such contextualization, the inefficiencies of the country's criminal justice system have not been properly addressed [42]. Understandably, several international organizations, most notably the International Federation for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, are sceptical about the effectiveness of these safeguards, given the government's bad record for policy implementation, and they argue that what the Philippines really needs is not a new and dangerously broad counterterrorism law, but better efforts to make its current justice system work [43].

This age-old dichotomy between the ineffectiveness of the law and the inefficiency of the system is underlined in the report published by the National Council of Churches in the Philippines, which asked, 'How can the State—which stands criticized for tolerating, if not authorizing the gross and systematic violations of human rights—guarantee that, in implementing the HSA, the people's civil and political rights are not trampled upon' ([40] pp. 168–169)? As such, various segments of civil society including the academia and NGOs share the view that RA9372 is in violation of the Philippine Constitution by purporting information designed to mislead the people [40].

Overall, these two limits have significantly undermined the Philippine government's efforts at effectively cohabiting human security (defined in terms of economic security) into its national security

framework. At the root of this insecurity is a deeply-entrenched patronage system controlled by powerful Filipino oligarchy. The pervasiveness of this politico-economic arrangement has resulted to structural poverty and institutionalized inequality that undermines the Philippines' supposedly people-centred national security model. Neoliberal economic policies intended to improve development have been cunningly exploited by oligarchic forces to their uncontested advantage. By systematically obstructing social-equalizing measures that curtail oligarchic wealth, 'national' prosperity is permanently entrapped within the elite strata of the society. The omnipresence of neo-patrimonial culture in the Philippines reinforces a 'bipolar' society wherein a few families enjoy the abundance of wealth at the expense of the majority. Despite the Philippines' co-habitative national security framework underlining equitable and inclusive economic development, the limits to democratization vis-à-vis its Human Security Act, have significantly undermined this end goal.

3. Cohabiting Human Security into Malaysia's National Security Framework

3.1. Malaysia's 'Cohabitave' National Security

Malaysia's national security rhetoric and agenda are a reflection of the government's struggle to transform a former British colonial territory into one cohesive and united nation. Accordingly, Malaysia adopts a fairly comprehensive approach in defining national security by weaving together its military, political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological components [44]. Several material and ideational factors influence Malaysia's conception of national security, including: geography and history; multi-ethnic identity and religious plurality; an aspiration for national unity and integration; and a dream of becoming a developed country and a model Islamic nation [45–46].

As such, Malaysia's national security encompasses both internal and external dimensions. On the one hand, the domestic security being derived from internal peace, law, and order is crucial to the fulfilment of basic needs and demands of its pluralistic society [45–46]. The presence of internal stability and harmony underpin Malaysia's pursuit of national development and progress. Hence, the passage and enactment of legislation considered draconian in some liberal democratic states is deemed necessary by the Malaysian government in order to control its ethnically-diverse population [46–48]. On the other hand, external security focuses on wide-ranging transnational threats engendered by regional and global events including terrorism, maritime piracy, drug cartels, illegal migrant workers, and human trafficking, to name a few [49–51]. Malaysia's pursuit of national security, therefore, implies the notion of strategic survival, both inside and outside its sovereign boundaries.

The conception of Malaysian national security has been largely inspired by the Emergency period between the years 1948 and 1960 [45,52–55]. This period saw the Malayan forces, backed by their British colonizers, fight against the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), a group of Communist insurgents who claimed to be promoting a new democratic socialist Malaya [45,46,52]. In response, the coalition launched its 'hearts and minds' campaign to weaken the social appeal of Communist propaganda and earn the loyalty of those sympathetic to them [45,48, 52,56–57]. This proved to be an effective component of the coalition's anti-Communist strategy as it led to the establishment of a new constitution singed between the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) in 1957 [45–46]. It is worth noting that both signatories are member parties of the ruling BN coalition.

The new constitution recognizes the legality of special preferences and privileged positions being provided to the Malays [45,48,52–58]. Islam has been formally elected as the state religion, while Malay was made as the country's official language. Moreover, the new constitution has granted a fixed quota of posts in the civil service to Malays in addition to their guaranteed traditional land rights. In exchange for accepting these terms under the Constitution, the Chinese have been offered extended rights of citizenship [45–46,59]. As stated in Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution:

> It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia) to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this Article [60].

Thus, the Constitution provides strong legal basis for the provision of exclusive rights and privileges to Malays, locally known as the Bumiputras (literally, sons of the soil) which are not extended to other ethnicities thriving in Malaysia, particularly the Chinese and Indian-Malaysians. Notwithstanding Malays' continued political supremacy and a considerably enhanced economic status, Article 153 remains entrenched in the Constitution. The application of the Malaysian Constitution legitimizes Malay interests even at the expense of all other Malaysian ethnic groups.

The Emergency period served as a sine qua non for legitimizing a national security framework that is both operationally despotic and ideologically centered on addressing the root causes of threats. Malaysia's national security is essentially based on material and ideational constructs designed to secure its ruling dynastic coalition—the Barisan Nasional (BN)—rather than the diversity space necessary for accommodating the political and economic needs of its multiethnic population. In fact, the BN defines itself as a confederation of political parties that subscribe to the objectives of the coalition, as opposed to the objec-

tives of Malaysia's national interest [61].

Combining ideological constructs with a coercive apparatus has been the traditional approach to developing Malaysia's national security rhetoric and agenda since the period of Emergency [46,52,54–55, 62]. Such an approach is designed to secure the BN by suppressing the growth of unorthodox ideas and concepts, while justifying the supremacy of values being cultivated by the ruling coalition. Together, coercive and ideological instruments have played a crucial role in Malaysia's national security, which made paramount the implicit protection of the Malay-dominated coalition at the expense of its diversity space.

3.2. Limits to Malaysia's Diversity-based National Security

In doing so, the UMNO-led BN coalition has vigilantly upheld a paradoxical security framework propelled by its 'hearts and minds' slogan exercised through coercive and repressive legislation [48, 62–63]. Such a paradox presents two critical limits to Malaysia's diversity space that is pivotal to the country's cohabitative national security, namely: (i) limits to ideological security apparatuses, and (ii) limits to material security apparatus. The interplay between these factors substantially undermines the country's capacity for independently formulating and executing political and economic policies vital to its national security. The succeeding subsections discuss these limits which help explain the country's continuously shrinking diversity space, and therefore, its failure at fully embedding the notion of human security (defined in terms of ethnic security) within its national security framework.

3.2.1. Limits to the Ideological Security Apparatus

A central task of the BN's security ideology is the regulation and control of alternative channels for discussing nonconforming opinions [48,62]. A variety of ideological constructs have been put in place to legitimize the suppression of local political opponents and critics, thereby protecting the prevailing Malay-dominated status quo. As Downs ([64] p. 96) argues, these nonmaterial forces represent 'a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society.' In other words, the government systematically regulates the employment of ideologies to promote and preserve the security of the BN coalition, pursued under the pretext of safeguarding the constitutionality of specific Malay rights and privileges that do not apply other ethnic groups.

The coalition's security ideologies serve a two-level function: first, restricting the space available for alternative ideas that question the BN; and second, legitimizing the passage and enactment of coercive instruments vis-à-vis the coalition that exercises them [48,63]. In doing so, they help in securing the preeminent status of the coalition against threats coming from various oppositional groups. The fluidity of ideas, however, implies that the coalition's security ideologies are neither permanent nor fixed but are contingent on specific political and social contexts of the time (48, 62). Hence, there is no overarching idea that dominates Malaysia's security rhetoric. Nevertheless, there is an underlying goal that binds these security ideologies together, that is, winning the hearts and minds of societal actors that threaten Malaysian national security defined in terms of BN security.

These coalition-enhancing ideational forces create a 'cloak for shabby motives and appearances' by legitimizing and giving meaning to its conduct ([65] p. 314). They act as political tools for securing the coalition's hegemony, rather than being mere reflections of the country's national aspirations. The uncertainty and complexity of Malaysian politics in the twenty-first century transforms these ideological constructs into electoral 'chips' necessary for continued survival of the coalition [48,53,62–63,66–68]. Accordingly, the ideational components underpinning Malaysia's national security framework are naturally bent to quash counter-narratives, thereby further shrinking the country's diversity space.

Islam plays a pivotal role in the hearts and minds campaign of the coalition. As a Muslim-dominated federal constitutional monarchy, Malaysia's national security becomes a function of its state-configured Islamic ideology [48,63,69–71]. Its goal is to cement the country's role as a worthy leader of the Muslim world by projecting an image of moderation and tolerance [48,62–63]. Islam must be the people's way of life and the coalition's brand of leadership. It is the very 'visible hand' that runs and controls Malaysia's internal and external affairs, and dictates what the objectives of national security will be. Crafting the country's national security rhetoric and agenda based on the underlying goal of securing the coalition becomes the paramount concern of the ruling BN political elites, particularly for those comprising the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party [48,62–63].

On the one hand, Mahathir's security ideology represents a two-faced Malaysian national security framework by endorsing a non-violent and non-forcible Islamic rhetoric at the international scene, while encouraging coercive and aggressive policies in implementing these teachings at the domestic sphere on the other [48,59,63]. Such an approach to national security effectively aids in the legitimization of the coalition's domestic security machinery which means the perpetuation of the Malay-dominated BN coalition, and therefore, the diminution of Malaysia's diversity space.

At the international level, the Mahathir regime has portrayed Malaysia as the 'model Islamic state' of the post-9/11 world [48,51,55,62–63]. The former PM argued that its government had been successful in fighting terrorism domestically by adding ideological

'sweeteners' to its coercive policies [51,55,62]. Such a claim is typically made in the context of the Emergency, where the defeat of communism is largely viewed as a result of its hearts and minds ideology, emphasizing a moderate and tolerant Islam [45–46,52,54,62].

At the domestic level, however, the opposite is observed. Mahathir's state-sponsored Islam has been propagated with the help of strong coercive legislation, particularly the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960 and its replacement, the Security Offences Special Measures Act (SOSMA) of 2012 [48,54,56, 59,63,72]. This highlights underlying contradictions within Mahathir's ideational panorama—conquering the hearts and minds of a fearful population through the forced imposition of a coalition-made Islam. The implicit goal of eliminating counter-narratives to BN's vision of Malaysian nation-building has been pursued under the banner of counterterrorism (48, 63).

On the other hand, Badawi's security doctrine which he called Islam Hadhari (Civilizational Islam) still reflects Mahathir's aim at securing the coalition, rather than the diversity of its multi-ethnic population [48,63,73–74]. Substance-wise, Islam Hadhari has no significant difference from Mahathir's Asian values [75]. In terms of form, however, Abdullah's ideology takes Mahathir's notion of the 'model Islamic state' to a higher level, by developing a comprehensive doctrine embracing Muslim and non-Muslim audiences alike, both at home and abroad [48,63]. In other words, Malaysia's signature Islam has been transformed into an exportable commodity that reinforces the legitimacy of the BN coalition beyond the country's borders [48,73].

The terms that have been used to develop Islam Hadhari were fairly 'universal', and as such can be applied to different contexts. Badawi's ideology represents a shift toward understanding the contemporary era within the purview of Islam [73]. It is the form, rather than substance that made Islam Hadhari an appealing ideological construct [48,63]. By utilizing charismatic Islamic terminology, Badawi has succeeded in reigniting the coalition's unpopular security ideology (Liow 2005). Badawi's main thrust is to recalibrate Islam as a progressive religion that values individual and communal development [76]. For instance, the fourth, fifth, and sixth principles highlight Islam Hadhari's economic undertones which reflect Badawi's promotion of Islam as a religion for development [48,51,63,57,77–78]. By restoring the sense of moderation toward the practice of Islam, Badawi had hoped that non-Muslim Malaysians would feel embraced by the regime [69].

At the international level, Badawi attempted to export Islam Hadhari to both Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The idea is to cement Malaysia's role as a model nation and leader of the Muslim world by manufacturing it as a development model based on a state-authorized version of Islam [48,63]. However, at the domestic level, the operationalization of Badawi's doctrines is questionable at best. It is not clear whether Islam Hadhari represents genuine efforts toward a progressive interpretation of Islamic thinking, or merely a strategy for securing Malaysian votes by not openly marginalizing its non-Malay and non-Muslim population [69,76].

The coalition has utilized its ideological machinery in justifying the coercive measures undertaken during a series of crackdowns against 'deviant' sects such as the Tarikat Samaniah Ibrahim Bonjol in 2004, and Terengganu or Sky Kingdom in 2005 [79–81]. In 2004, seventy members of the Muslim sect Tarikat Samaniah Ibrahim Bonjol were arrested in Selangor by Islamic religious authorities [79–81]. The government claimed that the sect treated the Qur'an as a historical text, which resulted to its 'casual' attitude toward prayer and marriage. In the aftermath of these arrests, Malaysian chief executive, Khir Toyo announced his plan to vanquish some sixty divergent sects operating in Selangor [79–81]. In 2005, another religious sect in Terengganu known as Sky Kingdom was also shut down by the Department of Islamic Development [79]. The government claimed that the movement was propagating documents that countered Islamic teachings. Its leader, Ayah Pin was presented to the public as threat to national security by espousing alternative views on religion and lifestyle that differ from those provided by the government. In doing so, Aya Pin was not only jeopardizing the country's official religion but also destabilizing the political status quo [80].

The government has portrayed these religious entities as threats to Malaysia's national security by espousing alternative views of Islam, and adopting a lifestyle different from the ones endorsed by the BN coalition. However, Sky Kingdom's 'threats' to national security were ideational rather than material in nature. These events offer a glimpse to the condition of diversity space in Malaysia despite its multiethnic, multireligious society. These events highlight Malaysia's unsecured diversity space amid a multiethnic, multireligious society, which in turn, undermines the country's national security.

Islam Hadhari has also provided the government an effective ideological apparatus for stifling its political rival, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Badawi has likened PAS' brand of Islam to a trap that must be exposed to prevent Malay Muslims from being ensnared [48,74]. Under *Islam Hadhari*, the PAS is faced with a lose-lose situation: either to comply with a BN-sponsored Islam and operate within this limited context or reject this model and become an enemy of the state [48,55,63,76]. Either way, the ideological terrain within which PAS can manoeuvre is significantly diminished. Needless to say, Islam Hadhari has further enhanced the government's monopolistic control over the organization and facilitation of Islam. Divergent sects operating beyond the provisions and boundaries

set by the coalition are more easily detected and trounced. Hence, *Islam Hadhari* becomes an extension of the implicit campaign against the expansion of the diversity space critical for Malaysia's pluralistic society.

3.2.2. Limits to the Material Security Apparatus

The government's ideational security constructs are complemented by a material security apparatus. This involves are coercive laws designed to secure the status-quo by removing all material and/or ideational challenges to its legitimacy [45–46,48,53–55,58–59,63,67,82]. A primary example is the recently re-pealed Internal Security Act (ISA) passed by PM Abdul Rahman in 1960 [83]. The ISA served as a preventive detention law which enabled the arrests of individuals without trial and criminal charges under limited, legally defined circumstances for sixty days. Moreover, the Act also allowed the extension of this detention period for up to two years upon the discretion of the Home Minister with minimal judicial review [83]. As stated in Section 73 of the Act, 'any police officer may arrest and detain without warrant any person who has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof' [83].

The ISA is further complemented by the Sedition Act, revised in 1971 by Malaysia's second PM Tun Abdul Razak which made any questioning of Malayan paramountcy an act of treason. The Act prohibits virtually all activities with 'seditious tendency', resulting to disaffection and hostility toward the government or communal ill will [84]. Despite initial controversies, the coalition has skilfully justified the presence of ISA and Sedition Act as necessary legislation for ensuring Malaysia's national security [45–46,52].Such laws are deemed to be particularly relevant in the context of the post-9/11 world order, where they serve as effective counterterrorism measures akin to the Patriot Act of the US, and the Anti-Terrorism Act of the UK.

In recent years, however, opposition to the ISA has grown considerably. Critics have argued that the Act was passed to stifle what should have been legitimate political oppositions under a well-functioning dem-ocratic society and as such had been compared to internal pre-emptive strike, given its preventive nature [53–54]. For example, during the 1987 Operasi Lalang (Weeding Operation), 106 people were arrested without proper charges under the ISA. Most of the detainees were members of the opposition party and various social activist groups. The coalition issued a White Paper explaining the arrests, stating that various groups which had played up sensitive issues and thus created racial tension in the country had exploited the government's liberal and tolerant attitude [54–55,85–86].

One of the most significant outcomes of this struggle was the introduction of section 8B of the ISA which blocked judicial review of ISA detentions including those brought as habeas corpus petitions [87–88]. In 2001, this section of the ISA was used to detain members of the People's Justice Party (PJP) dubbed as the 'Reformasi or KeADILan 10' [87–88]. The detainees, led by Anwar Ibrahim's wife, Wan Azizah Ismail pressed vocally for his release, Ibrahim had been convicted of misuse of power and sodomy in trials, which according to Human Rights Watch, were marred by coerced confessions of key witnesses [87–88]. Prior to his imprisonment, Anwar was leading rallies across Malaysia in support of his newly-formed reformasi movement, preaching to vast crowds in favour of far-reaching social, political, and economic reforms [45,54–55,86]. In response, Mahathir's side claimed that the arrested activists were planning violent protests to overthrow the government and were attempting to procure dangerous weapons and explosives [87–88]. Yet despite the serious nature of these charges, the government failed to produce any credible evidence to support its claim.

These abuses drove oppositionist groups, human rights activists, and other civil society advocates to mobilize large-scale protests against the ISA, por-trayed as unnecessary draconian law that does not bode well for Malaysia's vision of progressing toward 'developed nation' status [87–88]. The popularity of these movements, along with the resurgence of a stronger opposition after the 2008 General Election, played a crucial role in PM Najib's decision to repeal the Act. In 2012, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act or SOSMA has officially replaced the ISA [89]. The new Act is envisioned 'to provide for special measures relating to security offences for the purpose of maintaining public order and security and for connected matters.'

In contrast to ISA, the new law requires the filing of charges based on credible evidence against detainees after twenty-eight days [89]. Thus, the burden to produce reliable proof within a specified time frame is shifted to the government's law en-forcement and intelligence agencies responsible for combating terrorist activities. However, SOSMA is also being criticized from both sides. On the one hand, anti-terrorist groups argue that the requirement to bring charges within twenty-eight days under SOSMA weakens Malaysia's capacity to pre-emptively contain terrorist threats [90]. On the other, human rights groups criticise SOSMA for allowing police to authorise communication intercepts and permitting prosecutors to present evidence without disclosing sources. Moreover, acquitted suspects in the midst of an appeal may still be detained in prison or tethered to a monitoring device until the appeal is formally settled [90].

Overall, these two limits have significantly under-mined the Malaysian government's efforts to effec-tively cohabit human security (defined in terms of ethnic security) into its national security framework. The BN's ideational and material security apparatuses

ensure the preservation of a Malay-dominated status quo. In the process, the BN has become synonymous with the Malaysian nation-state. The noble objective of protecting Malays' interests is equated to the venal objective of preserving the BN's political supremacy, pursued under the banner of securing Malaysia's shrinking diversity space. In pursuing its Bumiputra-oriented social vision, the government has utilized trade liberalization, along with complementary neo-liberal economic policies, but often at the expense other Malaysian ethnic communities. In other words, they have been fervently pursued to reinforce and safeguard a Malay-imagined society. As long as the constitutional frameworks that legitimize a Bumiputra-centric Malaysian nation-state are sustained, de-ethnicizing the country's politico-economic and socio-cultural arrangements remains highly implausible. Thus, Malaysia's national security is, for better or worse, developed around Malay ethnic identity.

4. Conclusion

This article has critically examined the Philippines and Malaysia's experiences with cohabiting the human security concept into their respective national security frameworks. It argued that while on the one hand, the Philippines' primary security referent object is its shrinking development space amid a deeply-entrenched patronage system controlled by a powerful Filipino oligarchy; on the other, Malaysia's main security referent object is its contracting diversity space amid a Bumiputra-centric political economy, developed and controlled by the perpetually ruling BN coalition. Both the Philippines and Malaysia's primary security referent objects—development space and diversity space—represent the non-traditional, people-centred dimension of national security rather than its traditional, state-centric dimension.

A variety of limits have severely undermined the two countries' efforts at cohabiting human security into their respective national security frameworks. In the case of the Philippines, the limits of its democratization and its Human Security Acts have produced an enormous challenge to securing its development space, defined in terms of economic security. Whereas in the case of Malaysia, the limits to ideological and material security apparatus have presented significant constraints in securing its diversity space, defined in terms of ethnic security.

These limits have contributed to the country's lacklustre experience with cohabitative security. Nevertheless, both cases have illustrated a concrete way of giving entitlement to non-traditional, people-centered elements of security as legitimate referent objects of a national security framework. The Philippine and Malaysian experiences underscores a

two-pronged assumption: first, the meaning and provision of national security can neither be eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated without consideration of 'below the state' actors and issues; and second, the eminent status of the state vis-à-vis power in providing national security can neither be trivialized nor undermined.

Hence, instead of downplaying a state-centric concept while highlighting a people-centred model, cohabitative security amalgamates statist and humanist views of national security. This is one approach to resolving the 'entitled state versus untitled human' dilemma in which the state is ordinarily depicted as an antagonistic force obstructing the quest for human security.

This invisible yet concrete divide between states and individuals vis-à-vis communities, creates a distorted view that the state does not acknowledge the multidimensionality of national security in the modern-day era. Thus, despite claims being made by state actors with regard to their revised national security rhetoric and agenda, non-state actors continue to view national security as a purely militaristic object bereft of human sensibility. On the one hand, the state claims to have created a novel national security vision protecting human security. But on the other hand, citizens and communities equate national security to the anachronistic pursuit of sovereignty and territorial boundaries.

The employment of cohabitative security means that state security and human security become mutually constitutive and reinforce dimensions of national security. A shift in the government's perception of state security can have a corresponding impact on individuals and communities' collective perception of human security, and vice versa. Therefore, this allows the state to have a more positive and nurturing image in the security narrative. It veers away from the innate tendency to portray the state as a completely distinct security domain that must be temporarily de-emphasized and/or unaccounted for when advancing human security objectives.

In doing so, it 'unvilifies' the role of the state in pursuing a human security rhetoric and agenda. Instead of being diametrically opposed, the cohabitative security approach shows that state security complements human security, and vice versa. To some extent, the invisible divide between the 'high politics' of the states and the 'low politics' of the people and communities is bridged, enabling state actors to realize the multidimensionality of national security in the twenty-first century. A more collective understanding of national security shared by governments and citizens is therefore realized.

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
Human Security and Developmental Crisis in the Contemporary West Africa

Ayodeji A. Aduloju* and Omowunmi O. Pratt

Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria;
E-Mail: prattomowunmi@gmail.com (OOP)

* Corresponding Author: E-Mail: adulojutony@gmail.com; Tel.: +234 8032558219

Abstract: The last two decades were characterized by severe conflicts in the West Africa sub-region. The era of conflict resolution, management and peace building thus came to define the region. The destruction left by long years of protracted conflicts and the present state of development is reason enough to warrant attention both from within and beyond. The study expounds, operationalizes and clarifies the concept of human security and development, and how human security issues lead to underdevelopment. The paper investigates the human security concerns in the post-conflict period and also looks at the crisis of development in the sub-region. It highlights details on the developmental crises that have bedevilled the sub-region and at the same time exposes the threats these crises pose on national security and peace in the sub-region. This paper concludes that there is no appreciable effort in operationalizing human security in West Africa and this will lead to instability. The paper maintains that human security issues now complicate the developmental crisis in the sub-region due to its ambiguity. The paper suggests that policy makers should address human security issues in order to tackle developmental crisis in the sub-region.

Keywords: conflict and wars; development; human security; West Africa

1. Introduction

The West African sub-region is potentially one of the richest in the world owing to its large stock of natural resources. The sixteen (16) nations that constitute the region include: Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Benin Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mauritania, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and Guinea. The geographical region of West Africa is one of the poorest regions in the world, due to years of conflicts and instabilities which have impinged on development [1]. What remains of conflict in the sub-region is not guns, bullets, bombs, machetes and other weapons used in propagating conflicts and

wars, but a huge decline on human and infrastructural development. While conflict has reduced in the region in recent years, the crisis of development which has been known for a long time, aggravated by protracted years of conflicts and sustained by political instabilities, has put the international community on alert. Developmental crises such as increased poverty, hunger, unemployment, indebtedness of government, bad leadership, environmental degradation, etc. are much more visible and define the contemporary West Africa. These concerns continue to pose considerable challenge to national and regional stability as well as to human security [2].

The concept of security today in the international system has taken on different meanings from the traditional approach. This is due to the changing and emerging issues; and challenges in the system that states acquiring military power or engaging in 'hard politics' alone cannot address. Amongst these diverse meanings is the all-encompassing concept of human security. The humanitarian concerns arising from developmental crisis have undermined the protection and empowerment of individuals within the sub-region. The collapse of the security system in most West African states through the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as armed attacks in Senegal, Niger, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and more recently, Mali, the North-Eastern part of Nigeria has worsened the phenomenon of insecurity amongst the people, leading to developmental crises. It is also imperative to stress that developmental crisis could also lead to human insecurity, as is the case in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, where severe developmental crises caused armed and guerrilla warfare, thereby aggravating the human insecurity conditions in the region. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), countries in West Africa have been among the least developed countries of the world for decades; with low per-capital income, high poverty levels, high inflation, unemployment and low economic growth [3]. These Human Security concerns have future consequences on national security and prospects of peace in the sub-region.

This paper investigates human security issues in the post-conflict period and also looks at the crisis of development in the West African sub-region. It provides a detailed analysis on the future threats posed by the conflict situation on regional security and peace.

2. Defining the Contemporary West Africa

Religion and language (the spatial distributions of which form formal cultural regions) are two of the most central elements of culture. The spatial distributions of religion and language are strong indicators of the distribution of culture. As a result of imperialism, African political boundaries are often incompatible with the spatial distribution of language and/or religion. In other words, cultural groupings are divided by political boundaries. These unnatural divisions are often a source of tension and conflicts [4].

Since the end of the colonial period, West Africa has become one of the most violent places on earth. Many West African nations have witnessed political instability, with notable civil wars in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and ethnic tension in Guinea and a succession of military coups in Ghana and Burkina Faso and presently Mali. The origin of conflict in West Africa preceded the legal initiative that brought about the integration of the sub-region through the establishment of Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). Invariably, there were conflicts in West Africa before the idea of economic integration (the Nigerian civil war which began in 1967 and ended in 1970 is a case in point).

As a result of decolonization in Africa in the mid-1950s and late 1970s, conflicts in West Africa became prominent as a result of the intense ideological rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies, who used most African states to engage themselves in conflict by proxy, as seen during the Nigerian Civil war. Not only did they do this, but also scrambled for the natural resources in the sub-region in the 80s and 90s (diamonds in Sierra Leone, oil in Nigeria, gold in Ghana) which meant that both sides supported tyrannical regimes in these countries because of their vested interests. Though these conflicts varied in dimension, duration, scales and intensities, the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone became a challenge for the sub-region and the international community at large due to large scale humanitarian concerns, high level of atrocities committed, inclusion of children in the wars and the influx of refugees into other neighbouring West African countries. At the same time, the trans-border movement and proliferation of small arms and light weapons propelled countries such as Togo, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and others, to experience infinitesimal form of instabilities. These conflicts and their negative effects on the sub-region led the West African states, under the auspices of the ECOWAS and the international community, through the United Nations to intervene. The ECOWAS and the UN's conflict resolution, management and prevention helped put an end to the era of severe armed conflict in West Africa and have since intervened in the ongoing conflicts in Mali and Nigeria.

Today, the sub-region has transited from the era of civil wars to an era characterised by crises of development, a remnant of the era of armed conflict. The region is ridden with underdevelopment, forced migration, climate change, poverty, famine, drought, rising food prices and declining food stock etc.; which are key factors contributing toward West Africa's food crisis. Fifteen million people across West Africa are directly affected by the food crisis. Severe malnourishment has caused an increase in illness and the death rate in the region. It is also important to note

that the sub-region is not immune to one of the most pressing issues for human life; the challenge of HIV/AIDS. This epidemic with a global scope, affects at least 40 million people. The region most severely impacted is sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Nigeria [5].

Many other challenges such as human migration, environmental sustainability, illiteracy, unemployment and corruption define the contemporary West Africa. Corruption and underdevelopment have impacted negatively on the health sector. Health is still not 'for all', but rather characterized by glaring inequities among socio-economic groups and classes. Similarly, the adverse impact of climate change poses a further threat to the issue of environmental sustainability and to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. This also presents a significant policy challenge for a region that faces huge energy needs to power its development and industrialization [6].

3. Conceptualizing Human Security and Development

3.1. Human Security

Human security is indivisible. A general dynamic of equitable and balanced development is its best cornerstone. The growing interaction of societies on a worldwide scale increasingly demonstrates the overall need for human security, though it is not yet enough to prevent all forms of violence or conflict. The world's future depends upon a growing need for human security and a better understanding of all the risks and threats that affect populations and individuals [7].

The concept of human security has expanded the notion of security. The traditional notion of security was one where policy makers were more interested in policing their borders to deter external influence and threats. However, due to the changes occurring in the international arena, where states no longer wage war against each other; other emerging issues, threats and challenges have effectively caused states to unite (as against isolationism they employed during the national security era) and pool resources together through joint policy frameworks to tackle these challenges that individual states cannot resolve on their own. Succinctly put, the inadequacies of national security led to the emergence of human security.

While the traditional concept of national security, which dominated the Cold War era, was mainly geared towards the security of states and aimed at protecting their sovereignty and territorial integrity from military threats, the advocates of human security demanded that this traditional notion of security be deepened and widened. Individuals were also to be regarded as being imbued with security, and more attention was to be devoted to their protection. Furthermore, non-military risk factors such as poverty,

disease, and political violence were to be taken into greater account [7]. In the nuclear debate, for example, it has been argued that the stability and well-being of communities and nations rests as much on factors associated with human development, economic growth, and democracy as on acquisition of a weapons arsenal [8].

This particular concept, 'human security,' is most often associated with the 1994 Human Development Report on Human Security, drafted and championed by former Pakistani Finance Minister Mahbub ul Haq with strong support from economist Amartya Sen [9]. In defining the concept, it should be noted that as with all concepts, there is no universally accepted definition for the term. Different academic discourses have framed the term differently: as a new theory or concept, as a starting point for analysis, a world view, a political agenda, or as a policy framework [10]. Although the definition of human security remains an open question, there is consensus among its advocates that there should be a shift of attention from a state-centred security notion to a people-centred approach to security [10]. It is also imperative to stress that human security is a not a replacement for State security. Rather, it seeks to examine every aspect of human life, taking into account the various possible threats at different levels (local, national and regional). Human security entails a global approach linking security, governance, solidarity and development issues. It addresses security in a broad sense that includes all political, economic, social and environmental dangers [11].

The Human Development Report of 1994 entitled 'New Dimensions of Human Security' was undoubtedly the first attempt to define the concept in a universal way. Human Security is defined in relation to seven dimensions reflecting almost all of the key components of human development [12]. They are:

- Economic security: assured basic income; access to employment and resources.
- Food security: physical and economic access to food for all people at all times. Hundreds of millions of people in the world remain hungry either through local unavailability of food or, more often, through lack of entitlements or resources to purchase food.
- Health security: access to medical treatment and improved health conditions. Poor people in general have less health security, and in developing countries the major causes of death are infectious and parasitic diseases.
- Environmental security: living in a healthy physical environment which is spared from desertification, deforestation and other environmental threats that endanger people's survival.
- Personal security: individual security from physical violence. Threats can take several forms, for example: threats from the State, foreign states, other groups of people (ethnic tension), individuals or gangs; threats directed against women or children based on their vulnerability and dependence;

threats to self (e.g. suicide, drug use, etc.).

- Community security: most people derive their security from membership of a social group (family, community, organisation, political grouping, ethnic group, etc.). Tensions often arise between these groups due to competition over limited access to opportunities and resources.
- Political security: living in a society that guarantees basic human rights and freedom of expression [13].

This definition of security was therefore 'people-centred' and 'universal,' and also consisted of 'interdependent' components. To establish this concept 'through early prevention,' the report advocated the use of early warning indicators of human distress such as crime rates, road traffic accidents, pollution, and income inequality [14]. These indicators are now regularly incorporated in the annual issues of the UNDP Human Development Report [15].

According to Akokpari [16], the fundamentals of human security have been captured in a poetic, yet practical way by Pettman [17]. Pettman believes Human Security is;

> about the young child that did not die of neglect, the serious epidemic that did not break out, the job that was not cut, the gun that was not run, the ethnic prejudice that did not result in violence, the dissident voice that was not made silent, the landmine that was not sold and installed, the woman who was not trafficked across state borders and sexually abused, the agricultural product that was not dumped to the detriment of the poor farmers, the short-term capital investment that was not allowed to wreck an infant industry, the addictive product that was not produced and shipped, the refugee that was not forced to flee and remain abroad and so on ([17] p. 140).

In short, human security is about eradicating threats to dignified life that characterise contemporary society; it is about securing life free from threats [16].

Human security for the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is an objective link that binds globalization and international governance. In his 3rd of April, 2000 Action Plan for the 21st century, he emphasized that globalization had to emerge as a positive force for people all over the world. It had to help in building a better world for all of humanity. A world where the wellbeing of humans will be at the core of all policies, be it social, economic, political, security etc., in order to prevent the outbreak of conflict. He combined the total fulfilment of three fundamental human rights in his formulation of the notion of human security:

- The right to freedom of want
- The right to freedom of fear and
- The right of future generations to inherit a healthy planet [18,19].

While freedom from physical hurt, injury, abuse or threat constitutes the core of individual security, academic views of how the communal concept of human security should (or could) be expanded from this core differ sharply. For some, hunger, disease and environmental contamination represent grave security threats—even worse than physical violence. Thus, conditions of abject poverty or powerlessness are viewed as not qualitatively different from vulnerability to physical violence during conflict. Others have argued that human security should include the notion of 'structural violence,' referring to the structure of the relevant political-social system (such as apartheid) or the global trading system [20].

Fung [20] in his work brought to the fore the perception of Frederico Mayor, the former UNESCO Director General, who perceived Human Security to coincide with the 'protection' and 'defence of human dignity' in all circumstances. In this perspective, human security therefore becomes identified with the defence of human rights, which are universal and indivisible in their very essence. With this thought in the mind of Mayor, it is therefore the responsibility of the United Nations to promote human security in all its facets in the five continents. He further states that 'human security' consists of preserving international stability on the basis of the promotion of values such as:

- The supremacy of the law
- The respect for democracy
- The defence of human rights
- Equality before the law
- Good public affairs management
- The peaceful resolve of conflicts and
- The protection of the environment, etc.

The United Nations Commission on Human Security defines human security as the effort by states and organizations to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment as well as empowering people to provide and care for themselves. Specifically, it entails creating systems that provide people the foundation for survival, dignity and livelihood. This definition encompasses the two core strategies of human security: protection and empowerment of people [21].

In simple terms therefore, this concept emphasizes that in order for people to be secure, their lives must be free from any pervasive threats (violent or benign) to their rights and their safety. It thus encompasses both the traditional and non-traditional threats to people's security [12]. The threat range includes the following:

- Economic threats
- Food threats
- Health threats
- Environmental threats
- Personal threats
- Community threats

- Political threats
- Gender-based threats
- Demographic threats
- Crime in all forms, including terrorism
- Natural disasters
- Violent conflicts and wars
- Genocide
- Anti-personnel mines, Small Arms and Light weapons (SALW), etc. [22].

Human security represents an effort to re-conceptualize security in a fundamental manner. It is primarily an analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for an individual, not the state. As noble as this concept is, it has not been void of criticism since it gained prominence in international politics. Human security, some argue, is merely 'old wine in new bottles,' combining traditional concerns about 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want.' The former addresses political liberties and the latter economic entitlements, roughly parallel to the first and second generation of human rights. Others argue that the concept is 'too idealistic,' and fails to consider the real-world politics of geopolitical power in a rapidly changing international system [23].

In further conceptualization of the concept, it is important to state that there are at least two approaches to understanding human security. The narrow school, which is associated with Canada and, to a certain degree, with the Human Security Network [24]. Fundamentally, this school argues that the threat of political violence to people, by the state or any other organized political entity, is the appropriate focus for the concept of human security [25,26]. This perspective is mainly linked to the idea of freedom from fear.

The broad school argues that human security means more than a concern with the threat of violence. Human security does not only entail freedom from fear, but also freedom from want. This perception is associated with Japan, the Commission on Human Security [21] and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. More recently, it can be argued that a third perspective or a second generation of human security i.e. the European school, is evolving which encompasses both the narrow and the broad school [27,28].

Human security appears to appeal to 'middle powers' neither the most powerful nor the weakest states. When the UNDP definition of human security was put up for discussion at the Copenhagen Social Summit in 1995, no formal consensus was reached. Although the conference's declarations included a commitment to 'promoting social integration by fostering societies that are stable, safe and just,' the proposed human security definition was perceived at the Summit as too broad, too idealistic, and as threatening traditional concepts of national security. The negotiations concentrated on striking a balance between national sovereignty and global action: the EU countries argued for increased leverage was only sought on national policies in the name of social development, while the G-77 countries held firmly to the importance of 'territorial integrity and non-interference,' which the universal and all-encompassing elements of human security appeared to undermine.

Perhaps the strongest argument against the concept is its vagueness and breadth. If human security is comprehensive, it may be impossible to prioritize policies and actions. A series of associated terms have developed; people's security, the security of displaced people, livelihood security, environmental security, comprehensive security, and health security. How can all of these insecurities be grouped into a single concept? Which of these threats should be prioritized? Can any be excluded? A deep understanding of the Human security concept, its various components, its interplay with other political concepts and its peculiar nature (if any) in the West African sub-region may be required in charting future perspectives and priorities towards addressing the emerging issues and challenges to peace and security in the West African sub-region.

3.2. Development

'Development' is a concept that is contested both theoretically and politically, and is inherently both complex and ambiguous [29]. It would be an understatement to say that the definition of 'development' has been controversial and unstable over time. Gore [30] notes that in the 1950s and 1960s a 'vision of the liberation of people and peoples' dominated the discourse on development, based on 'structural transformation.' This perception has tended to 'slip from view' for many contributors to the development literature. A second perspective is the definition embraced by international development donor agencies that Thomas notes as a definition of development which is directly related to the achievement of poverty reduction and of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) [31].

There is a third perspective by a group of writers that Hickey and Mohan identified as 'post-modernists.' The 'post-modern' position is that 'development' is a 'discourse' (a set of ideas) that actually shapes and frames 'reality' and power relations. It does this because the 'discourse' values certain things over others ([32] p. 38). A common theme within most definitions is that 'development' encompasses 'change' in a variety of aspects of the human condition. Indeed, one of the simplest definitions of 'development' is probably a notion of 'good change,' although this raises all sorts of questions about what is 'good,' what sort of 'change' matters (as Chambers acknowledges), the role of values, and whether 'bad change' is also viewed as a form of development [33]. Although the theme of 'change' may be overriding, what constitutes 'good

change' is bound to be contested, as Kanbur states, because 'there is no uniform or unique answer' [34]. Views that may be prevalent in one part of the development community are not necessarily shared by other parts of that community, or in society more widely.

Until fairly recently great reliance was placed on GNP per capita as a convenient index of development. It was useful as a compact indicator to policy makers and provided a quantifiable measure for economists who were able to monitor its fluctuations and analyze changes due to movements in sectoral output, factor shares or categories of expenditure. Yet, experience has shown that increases in national income do not necessarily lead to the solution of social, economic and political problems. They remain, perhaps emerging in different forms and changing their dimension in countries with rising per capita income. Indeed, not only does economic growth often fail to resolve social, economic and political difficulties, certain types of inappropriate growth may actually initiate and promote them. It should be recognized that we cannot avoid making value judgements when it comes to defining a more comprehensive index of development. But whose value judgements are to be accepted? One approach would be to copy the path of industrial countries, but which of the currently rich and developed countries appear as really desirable models? Some Western countries with seemingly high incomes cannot be recommended, owing to the damage to the ozone layer from the release of industrial gases into the atmosphere and the likely consequences through global warming for all of us, particularly in the Pacific. The widespread exposure to the modern diseases of cancer, coronary heart disease and other health problems related to high intakes of artificial foodstuffs, over-reliance on politically unstable countries for strategic raw materials (e.g. oil), which often contributes to internal crisis stemming from theses unstable countries, with a spiralling effect on other regions surrounding them, are all pointers to the imperfect nature of their developmental models [35].

For a region to be termed developed, certain conditions should be attained by its citizens, to be precise, enough food and other basic goods and services, (human beings are required to consume a certain amount of calories per day), minimum levels of clothing, footwear and shelter, etc. The failure of a state to attain such an income level which allows the consumption of the minimum nutritionally determined level of food intake would warrant its citizens to be considered destitute and in absolute poverty. Another basic necessity, and a precondition for gaining enough income to rise above the poverty line, is access to a job or some form of employment, which may entail formal paid employment, unpaid work on a family farm or in a family business, or caring for children and members of the household i.e. unpaid household work. The lack of an income-generating opportunity implies labor market inactivity and unemployment,

and may lead to poverty. Even when a country realizes a high rate of economic growth, it may fail to reduce poverty and underemployment, since the growth process it is following (e.g. urban-based, import-dependent industrialization) is leaving the majority of the population untouched. Meanwhile, in some parts of Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and in sub-Saharan Africa, because population growth rates are so high, rates of economic growth and employment creation would need to be unprecedented to prevent rising numbers of households falling into poverty. In many Pacific island countries population growth rates exceed the recently attained rate of economic growth, and many households fail to realize any income growth [35].

The obvious direct link between per capita income and the numbers living in poverty is via the distribution of income. Clearly, poverty will be reduced much more rapidly where the fruits of economic growth are accompanied by their more equal distribution, yet, some would argue that equality should be considered a development objective in its own right, and that large scale inequality and massive poverty are objectionable by any religious or ethical consideration. Who could possibly defend the continuance of the existing situation whereby the average American is 117 times richer (in income terms) than the average African? Yet, the true fulfillment of human potential requires more than the above. In addition, a range of levels of basic needs, encompassed under the umbrella term 'social indicators,' need to be satisfactorily provided. They include adequate levels of education (especially literacy and numeracy), food security and nutrition (particularly of young children), mortality, life expectancy and morbidity, and access to a whole range of social services such as health, safe water, sanitation, transportation and housing. In addition, development requires a breakdown of traditional sex roles so that women can also realize their full human potential and gain the ability to freely determine—through access to family planning services—the number of children to which they give birth [35].

Furthermore, he stressed that dissatisfaction with GNP as an indicator of development has led to an interest in alternative indices of the 'quality of life.' A 'Physical Quality of Life Index' (PQLI) is usually composed of a composite of three indicators: life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy. It is often presented as a measure of how effectively various development strategies distribute the benefits of progress to the various component parts of society. The latest version of a PQLI is that of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which was unveiled in 1990 and has brought into existence 'human development' and more recently 'sustainable development.' It argues that 'human development is a process of enlarging people's choices.' These critical choices concern a long and healthy life, education and access to scarce resources [14–35].

In recent times, 'development' has been explained

using 'human development' and 'sustainable development.' Recent United Nations documents emphasize 'human development,' measured by life expectancy, adult literacy, access to all three levels of education, as well as people's average income, which is a necessary condition of their freedom of choice. In a broader sense the notion of human development incorporates all aspects of individuals' well-being, from their health status to their economic and political freedom. According to the Human Development Report 1996, published by the United Nations Development Program, 'human development is the end—economic growth a means' [36].

According to the Report, human development is defined as 'a process of widening the range of people's choices.' And human security means 'that people can exercise these choices safely and freely—and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow.' The latter is 'a critical ingredient of participatory development.' If given the opportunities to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living, people will set themselves free and ensure that they can make a full contribution to developments of themselves, their local communities, their countries and the world [15]. In this way, the Report explains that the concept of human security advanced from the perspective of development with special reference to its four characteristics: universal concern, interdependent, ensured by early prevention and people-centered [37].

Sustainable development is a term widely used by policy makers all over the world, even though the notion is still rather new and lacks a uniform interpretation. Important as it is, the concept of sustainable development is still being developed and the definition of the term is constantly being revised, extended, and refined. According to the classical definition, given by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987, development is sustainable if it 'meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.' It is usually understood that this 'intergenerational' justice would be impossible to achieve in the absence of present-day social justice, if the economic activities of some groups of people continue to jeopardize the well-being of people belonging to other groups or living in other parts of the world [38].

Social justice defined as equality of opportunities for well-being, both within and among generations of people, can be seen as having at least three aspects (in no particular order) economic objectives that include growth, efficiency and stability, environmental sustainability that aims to foster a healthy environment for all humans, ensure the rational use of renewable natural resources and the conservation of non-renewable natural resources and finally the social objectives that seek to promote equity, participation, cultural identity, social cohesion and social mobility. Ultimately, only development that manages to balance these three groups of objectives can be sustained for long [38]. Conversely, ignoring one of the aspects can threaten economic growth as well as the entire development process.

4. Problematizing Human Security and Development in West Africa

Human Security as a concept offers a better explanation for the causes and solutions to the phenomenon called conflict and war. Since the end of colonialism, states in the sub-region have had the legal rights, under various international agreements to go to war in order to protect their statehood (national security). The post-colonial regimes in the sub-region have witnessed different degrees of insecurity such as political instabilities, coup d'état, resource based conflict and recently, environmental concerns such as climate change, natural disaster and desertification, which poses new threats in the region. The examples of the Fulani herdsmen migrating and encroaching on the farm land of the Tiv tribe in Benue state of Nigeria have resulted in multiple crises over the years and more recently, the rapid shrinking of Lake Chad a source of freshwater servicing about 20 million people, cutting across four countries (Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon) has been responsible for causing droughts which lead to bad harvests, to destruction of farms and homes by floods etc. This is a major concern for the international community. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have called the situation an 'ecological catastrophe' because the impact of the drying lake is causing tensions among communities around Lake Chad. There are repeated conflicts among nationals of different countries over control of the remaining water. Cameroonians and Nigerians in Darak village, for example, constantly fight over the water [39]. In order to problematize Human Security, it is important to understand the causes of past and new conflicts in West Africa.

4.1. Causes of Past Conflicts

After the colonial era, states in the West African sub-region plunged into decades of conflict. Most of the conflicts recorded in the sub-region were intra conflict and virtually all countries in the sub-region have been involved in fighting at one time or the other. Over the years, these violent conflicts have called for global intervention due to their grave humanitarian crises. For instance, the Nigerian civil war, Liberian civil war, Ivorian civil war, Sierra Leonean civil war, the Niger-Delta crisis in Nigeria, etc. have resulted in lasting negative effects on peace and development in the sub region. According to Adeleye [40], sources of conflict in Africa are boundaries, bad governance and low economic development.

The boundary related conflicts in West Africa were the product of the Berlin Conference of 1884 and the

Scramble for Africa, where the former colonial powers shared the boundaries in Africa indiscriminately according to their interests [41]. At the end of colonialism there were clear indications that boundaries in West Africa were ill-defined. This restricted the traditional movement of people and also brought people of different origins and ancestral history together. This led to inter-tribal conflicts in the post-colonial states in West Africa. The Nigerian civil war is a case in point. Again, the ill-defined boundaries have led to boundary disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon. Governance conflicts in the sub-region were the result of huge violations of human rights, corruption, marginalisation, nepotism etc., which resulted in violent demands for democracy, coup d'état and counter coup in Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Low economic development in most West African states led to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund bailout with its stringent conditions, which complicated development in the region and led to high inflation rates, poverty and unemployment. According to Olonisakin [42], the structural causes of conflict in West Africa are weak democratic structures, spatial inequality and social exclusion, level of economic development and distribution, management of natural resources, land allocation and management. These causes of conflicts in West Africa have begot civil strife, recruited youths as militias to resist marginalization and demand equality and development.

4.2. New Conflicts in West Africa

Presently, there is an appreciable reduction in large scale violent conflict and civil strife in West Africa: 'pockets of simmering tensions, insurgencies and the re-emergence of coups d'état continue to trouble the sub-region' [43]. The Boko Haram uprising in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria, the recent crisis in Mali which threatens peace and security in the sub-region, the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire and the Niger-Delta oil conflict are all examples of recent conflicts in the sub-region. These pockets of crisis have grave implications for the sub-region because their causes are deeply rooted in previous conflicts. Significantly, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has propelled these recent conflicts. The Boko Haram uprising in the North-Eastern Nigeria can be likened to a war due to high humanitarian problems such as high death rates and the destruction of both local and international infrastructures (the bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja and the Nigerian Police headquarters). This crisis has also affected Nigeria-Cameroon relations as Nigeria recently closed its northern borders with Cameroon to shut out the Boko Haram terrorists that use the borders as launch pads for attacks.

Furthermore, another challenge facing West Africa is that of climate change and natural disasters. Though it is acclaimed that the era of conflict left a huge humanitarian crisis like poverty, proliferation of small arms, underdevelopment, poor public infrastructure, low life expectancy, etc., the crisis of environmental insecurity seems worse. Today, sea levels are rising, deserts are encroaching, flooding and erosion are leading to shortages in food supplies and famine, forced migration of people in the sub-region leading to a refugee crisis. Though the integrating legal framework in the sub-region: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) made provisions in its treaty for the free movement of goods and persons; the treaty does not make provisions for the social well-being of the citizens of the region.

In summary, it is noticeable that the causes of past and new conflicts in West Africa are inadequacies in people-oriented security frameworks or policies. If the concept of hman security brings together economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security; their absence may be the main cause of conflicts in West Africa. In spite of the democratic regimes, people are still marginalized politically: electoral crises after elections are common in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. The ideas of the right to freedom from want, right to freedom from fear and right of future generations to inherit a healthy planet [20] are not visible. Instead, people across the region are living in fear and want and there is no visible plan for the next generation.

4.3. Developmental Consequences of Conflicts in West Africa

The developmental wreckage as a result of conflicts cannot be over-emphasized due to its devastative nature. In West Africa, the raison d'état of most conflicts is the absence of the standard means of measuring qualitative well-being, which contributed to the failures of some states in the past. Though the many years of colonialism played a part in the underdevelopment of the sub-region, as expounded by Walter Rodney in his work 'How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,' the long years of conflict in West Africa can be blamed on how the sub-region underdeveloped itself. Development brings about 'good change' in all strata, security of lives and properties, and effective maintenance of social amenities, however the reverse is the case in West Africa.

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, the West Africa sub-region is the world's least developed region. The Human Development Report of the UNDP has over the years become a reference for measuring countries' standard and uses indices such as health, education, social integration and security, environment, population trend and multidimensional poverty indices to measure development. The data below show the Human Development Index trends for countries in West Africa from 1980 to 2013, and also show their 2013 ranking on the global developmental chart.

Table 1. Human development index (HDI) trends for countries in West Africa, 1980–2013.

Country	1980	1990	2000	2005	2007	2010	2011	2012	2013
Benin	0.253	0.314	0.380	0.414	0.420	0.432	0.434	0.436	0.476
Burkina-Faso	-	-	-	0.301	0.314	0.334	0.340	0.343	0.388
Cape Verde	-	-	0.532	-	-	0.581	0.584	0.586	0.636
Gambia	0.279	0.323	0.360	0.375	0.383	0.437	0.440	0.439	0.441
Ghana	0.391	0.427	0.461	0.491	0.506	0.540	0.553	0.558	0.573
Guinea	-	-	-	0.331	0.342	0.349	0.352	0.355	0.392
Guinea-Bissau	-	-	-	0.348	0.355	0.361	0.364	0.364	0.396
Côte d'Ivoire	0.348	0.360	0.392	0.405	0.412	0.427	0.426	0.432	0.452
Liberia	0.298	-	0.304	0.301	0.334	0.367	0.381	0.388	0.412
Mali	0.176	0.204	0.270	0.312	0.328	0.344	0.347	0.344	0.407
Mauritania	0.340	0.357	0.418	0.441	0.454	0.464	0.464	0.467	0.487
Niger	0.179	0.198	0.234	0.269	0.278	0.298	0.297	0.304	0.337
Nigeria	-	-	-	0.434	0.448	0.462	0.467	0.471	0.504
Senegal	0.322	0.368	0.405	0.441	0.454	0.470	0.471	0.470	0.485
Sierra Leone	0.255	0.247	0.244	0.315	0.331	0.346	0.348	0.359	0.374
Togo	0.357	0.382	0.426	0.436	0.442	0.452	0.455	0.459	0.473

Source: [3].

Table 2. West African countries human development index (HDI) for 2013.

Country	HDI Rank (2013)
Benin	165
Burkina-Faso	181
Cape Verde	123
Gambia	172
Ghana	138
Guinea	179
Guinea-Bissau	177
Côte d'Ivoire	171
Liberia	175
Mali	176
Mauritania	161
Niger	187
Nigeria	152
Senegal	163
Sierra Leone	183
Togo	166

Source: [3].

The scale value of UNDP HDI is 1.00, out of which developed countries like Norway, Australia, United States, Canada, Sweden and Ireland fall within the HDI range of 0.9–1.0, while countries in West Africa are between 0.3 and 0.5 (Sierra Leone had a HDI index less than 0.2 during its civil war). The HDI

values and the 2013 development ranking of the UNDP indicate that the most impoverished countries of the world are mainly found in the sub-region. From the current ranking of Ghana and Cape Verde it can be inferred that the relative stability (through governmental affirmative action towards human security) that Cape Verde has experienced over the years and that of Ghana in recent years have contributed immensely to the visible developmental progress. Ghana, categorized amongst the low developing countries of the world in 1980 with HDI index of 0.391, had achieved astounding progress by 2013 with an HDI index of 0.573 that positioned it as medium developed country and ranked it as the 138th country in the global ranking of human development. Niger's HDI trend of 0.179 in 1980 to 0.337 in 2013; and its 187th position in the global ranking of human development can be linked to series a of Tuareg invasion of the 1990's and series of conflicts associated with electoral crises that ended in 2010. The Malian state has still not recovered from the developmental crisis the conflict created.

According to a report of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) [44], humanitarian crises like food shortage and insecurity, forced displacement, water shortage and outbreak of diseases are resurfacing in Guinea as a result of inter-ethnic violence, leaving in its wake approximately 30'000 people that have been displaced, dozens of civilians who have died and the destruction of several infrastructures. Also, the DRC monitoring team in Northern Nimba, Liberia; has also identified recent movements of Guineans including cases of separated children who left the country due to continuous hostilities and increased tensions in Nzerekore [45]. In summary, a detailed review of the history of instabilities in each West African state resulting from Human insecurity will provide a glaring linkage between such instabilities and the developmental crises that abound in the sub-region.

5. Human Security Issues and Developmental Crises in West Africa: Interface and Interchange

5.1. The Interface

It has been established in the previous sections of this work that human security is human centred. This explains the security demands of this contemporary international system to think of the protection of individuals rather than the states. The major causes of internal crises are largely the ones that affect the livelihood of individuals (human insecurity) within the states, rather than the state itself. The final outcome of insecurity (war and conflict) leads to heighten developmental crises such as inadequate social infrastructure, poor health, high illiteracy rate, high inflation rate, debt burden, unemployment, food crisis, famine, outbreak of diseases, forced migration, poverty, political disenfranchisement, election rigging, marginalization etc. Human insecurity issues in West Africa have resulted in civil wars in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia, which further caused underdevelopment, or put differently, developmental crises. In Liberia and Sierra Leone for instance, the conflicts left behind underdevelopment tendencies such as forced migration, poverty, food shortage and the outbreak of diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS, Polio, Malaria, Cholera etc.). Furthermore, the UNDP report in 2001 claimed that Sierra Leone had the world's lowest GDP per capital, which stood at 448 USD, Mali 753 USD and Guinea Bissau 678 USD compared to Luxemburg with 42'769 USD [46]. In this same year, the UNDP was unable to get data on Liberia because it was embroiled in conflicts that nearly collapsed its sovereignty.

Figure 1. The interface between human security and developmental crises.

The interface between human insecurity and developmental crises is that they affect people, as well as the state and its citizens, and the aftermaths of both have adverse effect on the state and the people. Human insecurity leads to developmental crises vice versa. When policies directed towards achieving the broad human security objectives of freedom from 'want' and 'fear' are operationalized and achieved, this will lead to development. Also, human insecurity and developmental crises lead to conflicts and wars since individuals can take up arms or revolt if their basic needs are not provided. While developmental crisis is not human insecurity and human insecurity is not developmental crises, they both have the same con-

sequences (conflict and war) on both individuals and state.

5.2. The Interchange

The aftermath of past and causes of present crises in West Africa have revealed that human insecurity and developmental crises can switch place. Both are human centred with the ability to cause conflicts and can alternate with the other to be effective in solving humanitarian concerns. In conflict and war scenarios in West Africa, the objectives are shaped by human insecurities and developmental crises. Developmental crises can swap places with human insecurity in order to justify conflict or war, while the end of conflict and war leads to developmental crises. This is not to say that both cannot occur together during conflict, but when one is used as motive for conflict, the other will further explain the devastating effect of conflict.

For instance, the neglect of its citizens by the Nigerian government in the wealth distribution and development in the oil-rich Niger Delta region has led to conflict between the people of the region and the State. The fundamental issues behind the conflicts are related to human security concerns such as environmental pollution and despoliation, disempowerment and subjugation, marginalization and exclusion. Long years of oil exploration in the region created huge environmental disaster for the oil pro-

ducing communities, through oil-spillage. This impinged on their access to drinkable water, green environment and at the same time made fishing and farming, which are their main occupations difficult. This caused pervasive poverty and the underdevelopment of the region. The situation got worse in November 1999 when the former president of Nigeria ordered military action on Odi community in Bayelsa state [46]. The employment of military action proliferated militant groups, and caused combustion of armed attacks on the state and oil companies, hostage taking and vandalism of oil installations. In 2009, the then president late Musa Yar'Adua granted amnesty to repentant militants with a promise to develop the region.

From the example given above, it is evident that while human insecurity started in the form of environmental pollution and ethnic marginalisation, developmental crises like poverty and unemployment food crises were the outcome. Human security created a developmental crisis; their heightened level due to negligence created armed conflict, which later made the region volatile and underdeveloped. The level of interchange is at the point of justifying the motive for attacks and kidnappings (human insecurity). While the amnesty granted by the government is a policy agreement of rapid human development in the region. Human security and development crisis interchange in order to understand conflict and post-conflict period.


Figure 2. Interchange between human security and developmental crises.

In other words, the interchange explains how human security issues and developmental crises revolve around the same environment in order to define and justify conflict or war and developmental crises.

6. Security and Development in West Africa: A Conclusion

Human security and development is people centred, multidimensional, interconnected and universal. In principle, human security and development reflects the aggregate gains as a result of the mitigation of each and every factor that contributes to insecurity. In practice, there is need to focus on a core of insecurities and developmental crisis within each specific context. For the concept of human security and development to thrive, it must be operationalized, applied and enjoy global acceptance.

Consequently in West Africa, conflict and war are interrelated. The states of the sub-region have influenced and can still influence the shape of future conflicts and wars. Human security and development should involve policies that can address democratic governance, transnational crimes, human rights, refugee crisis, poverty, unemployment, socio-economic exploitation, basic needs, public health issues and civil unrest arising from ethnic identities, greed and grievance. Human security and development formulas should extend to internal security, because the region is now plagued with pockets of conflicts within the state. Providing national security alone does not ensure internal peace; there is need to shift from state-centric security and development to re-thinking the people as the central security concern. In all, human security includes what we have understood as humanitarian aid, peace and stability, which brings sustainable development.

Finally, human security and development provides a holistic approach to promoting peace. In other words, the presence of human insecurity automatically translates into developmental crisis and vice versa. Using development-security nexus is in line with the modern approaches and debate on human security and development will provide a basis for the deeper understanding of the concepts at the international level. Despite being broad, and given the challenges from other schools of thought, the human security and development paradigm provides an ideal shift in understanding peace, security and conflict transformation. Peace may not necessarily mean absence of war, but attaining human security and development would mean promoting a stable environment [47]. In various states where conflicts have ended or are boiling underneath, there is the need to adopt the development-security nexus to tackle the menace.

As a final point and result, this paper highlights how human security issues complicate developmental crisis in West Africa due to its ambiguity. The paper suggests that policy makers should address human insecurity by tackling developmental crises in the sub-region. There are lessons from other regions of the world that emphasise the urgency of the need to address the lingering issues of human insecurity and developmental crisis. While the relative failure of the Arab spring exemplified by the descent of Egypt and Syria into chaos and destruction may currently be a deterrent for a 'West African Spring,' the resentment for governments' inability to institutionalize human security and effectively address developmental crises to enhance the standard of living of the people is undeniable. The exposure of the teeming young and middle-aged class in the sub-region to the high standard of living in the developed world through increased access to conventional and social media raises important questions. How long can the region hold on before it descends into chaos and anarchy with grave humanitarian concerns for the entire sub-region if the status quo of underdevelopment and human insecurity does not change?

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The Fragility of the Liberal Peace Export to South Sudan: Formal Education Access as a Basis of a Liberal Peace Project

Ngambouk V. Pemunta[1,]* and Eno-Akpa R. Nkongho[2]

[1] Department of Cultural Sciences, Centre for Concurrences in Colonial and Postcolonial studies, Linnaeus University, 35195 Växjö, Sweden
[2] Department of Public Policy, Central European University, Nador utca 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary;
E-Mail: enoakpar@yahoo.com

* Corresponding Author: E-Mail: vitalispemunta@gmail.com; Tel.: +46 729469558; Fax: +46 47083217

Abstract: This study examines the disjuncture between the policy transposition of the Liberal Peace Project (LPP) in South Sudan from the country's local context. It underlines how deep rooted historical exclusion from social welfare services reinforces political exclusion and exacerbates poor civic engagement among different ethnicities in the country causing a constant relapse to violence. The study combines a qualitative review of data from Afrobarometer, the National Democratic Institute, international NGOs, and South Sudan's government reports with in-depth interviews and participants' observation. The research finds that restricted access to formal education alongside the conservative and orthodox approaches to peacebuilding, which broadly focus on centralised urban political institutions and exclude diverse local needs and preferences, limit citizenship participation to elections and preclude an equitable social order in South Sudan, establishing a continuum of fragile authoritarian peace, institutional peace and constitutional peace. In an emancipatory approach, the study proposes a framework that prioritizes an extended access to primary and post-primary vocational education as a more credible establishment for sustainable civil peace in the country. The LPP by the international community needs to be tailored to enhance the political will of the South Sudan government to extend free primary education access, incentivize primary education with school feeding programmes and to invigorate vocational training curricula. These will yield civil peace dividends, which avert South Sudan's structural source of relapse into violence with sustainable disincentives. Apart from women's empowerment through education and in all spheres of life, the government needs to ensure sustainability by guaranteeing a sustainable future for the present and for returning refugees by reducing the effects of climate change so as to cope with the increasing pressure on natural resources.

Keywords: conflict; formal education; liberal peace; peacebuilding; post-conflict settlement; South Sudan

1. Introduction

The world's newest nation-the Republic of South Sudan (RSS), is once again in prolonged international media coverage, and has been since 15 December 2013. Characteristic of her history, the potracted conflict over socio-political and economic marginalisation by the Republic of Sudan of then South Sudan has resurfaced in the RSS, ending not just the euphoria of its independence from the Republic of Sudan on July 9, 2011 but also, crippling hopes for a politically inclusive state with an equitable social order. In retrospect, one is obliged to wonder whether the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending decades of civil conflict against the people of South Sudan and subsequent peacebuilding attempts in the post independence federal, presidential democratic RSS, are apt enough to yield sustainable civil peace. Peacebuilding or the Liberal Peace Project connotes the processes aimed at reviving the state's capacity to identify, support and strengthen her socio-political and economic structures in view of averting structural factors that cause or nurture a relapse into violent conflict [1,2]. However, the LPP in RSS has evidently failed and the country is back to war, echoing a political power tussle with ethnic undertones opposing the majority Dinka of president Silva Kiir and his ex-deputy Riek Machar from the Nuer ethnicity. Empirical evidence suggests a concentration of civil wars in countries with little education like the RSS. Conversely, in a country with a higher proportion of its youth in school, the risk of conflict is significantly reduced [3–6].

2. Aim and Method

This paper examines the mismatch between peacebuilding and locally felt needs of conflict resulting from the LPP in the RSS. The crux of the argument is that the lack of formal education opportunities constitutes a structural source of relapse to conflict in South Sudan. Consequently, the consolidation of democratic institutions, modelled on the conservative and orthodox approaches to peacebuilding that characterize the current practices of the LPP in the country does not target the root causes of violence and its recurrence. The paper concludes that the prioritization and provisioning of formal education opportunities is justifiable and would serve to attain the LPP objectives of civil peace. The paper underlines the fact that though the emancipatory approach of the LPP—the bedrock of international peacebuilding initiatives is highly considered of theoretical and impracticable value [7], it could operationalize the approach through institutions of primary and post-primary vocational education. The study highlights the need to accomplish meaningful social, political and economic inclusion of a population easily induced to violence in South Sudan's peacebuilding process through increased access to primary education and post primary vocational training as an urgent policy implementation option that would disincentivize recourse to violence and rather induce durable or civil peace.

The study made use of bottom-up (felt needs) and a top-down methods that underpin the emancipatory approach of the LPP. It involves substantial, qualitative, desk research that reviewed reports, surveys and documents of peacebuilding stakeholders (civil society organizations, bilateral aid donors, multilateral peace agencies) and the national government of South Sudan. Individual in-depth interviews and participant observation were also used to abduce information from stakeholders.

3. Background: Agitation and Resistance from Social and Political Exclusion

Sudan's history is characterized by a specter of unending civil wars that has significantly affected Southern Sudan, accounting for the relapse to conflict in the new country. Sudan, from which South Sudan gained independence suffered two major civil strifes between 1955 and 1972 and from 1982 to present. This 'long history of political vulnerability and exclusion' ([8] p. 1) disproportionately affected Southern Sudan. During the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899–1934) the British imperial government, and later the ruling northern elites, used education as a tool for the perpetuation of socio-economic and political marginalization of both majority rural communities and Southern Sudan in particular. The British 'Northern policy' encouraged and perpetuated the socio-economic exclusion and marginalization of Sudan at the detriment of the then Southern Sudan. They modernized the economy and infrastructure of the north while Christian missionaries provided the much needed 'moral guidance' rather than economic development in the Southern Sudan. This 'Northern policy' did set the stage for political vulnerability and exclusion of Southern Sudanese.

In a glimpse of recognition of the problems of Southern Sudan in the time of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Britain passed the 'Closed District Order' of 1922. This Order was an anti-Islamic policy meant to curtail northern dominance and slave raids in Southern Sudan. Within this policy framework, vernacular languages in Southern Sudan became the language of instruction while English was the official language. Arabic was banned from school and government offices in Southern Sudan. Although these policies were 'based on indigenous cultural values and Christian cultural norms', and instilled a sense of identity in Southern Sudanese, the real aim was to link Sudan with East Africa for easy administration as part of British indirect rule system.

However, these policies woefully failed to spike socio-economic development, but instead widened the existing inequities between the North and South. In the 1940s, South Sudan's educational infrastructure was comprised of a limited number of missionary

schools, few elementary government schools, one teacher training centre, one commercial school and one senior secondary school ([8] p. 2, [9] p. 3,[10] p. 86). Worse still, the British represented the indigenous population as lazy and unenthusiastic in improving their socio-economic wellbeing ([11] p. 32). However, at the end of World War II the unity of Sudan took greater impetus due to pressure from Egypt and the northern elites, causing the British to address the need to accelerate economic and educational development so as to put Northern and Southern Sudan at par ([10] p. 88).

This explains why in 1957, the Government of Sudan took over mission schools in South Sudan, and in 1962 expelled Christian missionaries from the South for allegedly inciting South Sudanese against the Arabization and subsequent Islamization of schools. This suggests that one key factor for anti-government agitation is the adoption of policies that exclude South Sudanese from formal education opportunities, a situation that also reflects a quality of education far removed from the context of South Sudan. This exclusion of South Sudanese from formal educational opportunities further explains how lack of formal education affected the ability of South Sudanese to participate in government beneficially, or to yield the positive externalities of an educated environment which would generally have led to improved welfare of the population in question [4].

The exclusion of Southern Sudanese from formal education severely curtailed their access to schools-legitimized their cultural suppression and social exclusion. Furthermore, it lowered the retention rates of Southern Sudanese at school, implying their exclusion from skilled professions, from public service institutions and political participation [4,12]. This lends credence to the fact that in civil strife endemic areas—(the lack of) education generates significant negative externalities. Independence was eventually brokered with the northern elites, who became the new colonial power. Thereafter, Sudan slipped into a 17 year civil war that ended in 1972.

In the post-independence era—the northern Sudanese elites and the Sudan central government effectively used the educational apartheid paradigm as a political tool, underpinned by Arabo-Islamism as the cornerstone of national unity. The educational system was tacitly used to undermine the religious and cultural diversity of Sudan since recognition of diversity was perceived as incompatible with the racio-cultural equity of the southern part to the northern part of the country. Islamization was used as a tool of civilization with the aim of erasing "the pagan patrimony". This explains why Arabic came to replace English as the language of instruction leading to intense widening of the gap between north and south. Additionally, apart from rewriting the history, Northern Sudanese historians simultaneously erased—"the Sudanese indigenous history" while the culture and

tradition of the latter "have never been imparted in education policy since the dawn of independence in 1956" ([8] p. 2). During the four years preceding Sudan's independence, less than 8% of children in the South were in school, while the share of girls was almost zero, compared to 20% of girls in the North who were enrolled in all primary streams ([8] pp. 3–4). After self-autonomy in 1982, the Sudan central government failed to provide adequate resources and social and economic services further incapacitating Southern Sudanese. With an estimated population of 20 million, primary school enrolment was 40% in Northern Sudan, while it was less than 12% in Southern Sudan. The 'Southern policy' of forging a Sudanese identity for both the northen and southern parts, which was based on the Arab-Islamic paradigm with the educational system as the basis, led to frustration and Southern Sudanese took up arms in 1982 agitating for independence with the hope of establishing a more equitable and inclusive society.

At independence in 2011, the RSS was extremely fragile due to decades of conflict with the Republic of Sudan, partly over oil wealth. Prior to this date, since independence in 1956 Sudan has been engulfed in two major civil wars (1955–72, and 1982–present). The country's new leadership is comprised largely of former rebels who had often fought each other. Most notably, Silva Kiir and his ex-deputy Riek Macher and others split away from the main rebel group—the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1991. The independence of the RSS has since been only a lull as the rift between the protagonists Macher and Kiir gets deeper and—intractable, inducing socio-political and economic exclusion along ethnic lines, commemorating—the political fractures that triggered the RSS's fight for independence. The civil strife in the RSS now exacerbates deep-seated ethnic animosities and tensions. At independence the RSS was dismally bereft of basic social services and infrastructure: the outcome of decades of civil strife and decades of neglect despite its huge oil and mineral wealth. Corruption and nepotism orchestrated on regional and ethnic lines remained rampant and widespread [13].

Although precluded from the United Nation's Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) due to data constraints, the 2006 Household Health Survey [14] and the 2009 National Household Baseline Survey [15] provide some insights into human development trends in the country. In 2009, infant mortality rates were 102 out of 1'000 live births, a slight improvement from 131 in 2008 and lower than rates for Burundi (106). In the same period, under-five mortality rates dropped from 381 to 135 per 1'000 live births. These improvements were the result of a slight increment in public expenditure for primary health care and the temporary return of peace following the signing of the CPA. This notwithstanding, South Sudan topped the global maternal mortality chart in 2009 with 2'054 per 100'000 live births, and the

lowest life expectancy in East Africa at 42 years. Education and formal literacy levels remained extremely low: only 27% of children over 15 years old were considered literate (compared to 77% in Rwanda, 73% in Uganda, 70% in Tanzania, 62% in Kenya and 47% in Burundi). While the net school enrolment rate was merely 48%, only 37% of the total population above six years old had attended school. These trends are attributable to long periods of internecine strife during which there was an acute shortfall in the delivery of public goods and services as well as to the accompanying insecurity. Low literacy is further compounded by poor access rates, inadequate educational infrastructure and the potential increase in demand for schooling with the return of refugees. The net intake rate to the first year of primary school stood at 14.6% [16]. The pupil/teacher ratio was 52:1, the pupil classroom ratio was 129 children per classroom and the net enrolment rate stood at 48% ([17] p. 17). South Sudan ranks at the bottom of all human development indicators: 8 out of 10 persons live on less than $1.63 a day; a net primary education enrolment of 46%; a qualified teacher to pupil ratio of 1:117 and a literacy rate of 27% [18]. Estimates of the female illiteracy rate exceed 80%, it has the the world's highest maternal mortality rate, less than 100 kilometres of paved road, suffers from the risk of increased violence and harm to civilian population and permanent humanitarian suffering [18] given the ongoing political turmoil in the country. About 38'000 children under 18 years of age have reportedly been conscripted into the army, forced labour or slavery over the past 15 years in Southern Sudan. These abductions have eventuated into a demographic imbalance: a drastic decrease in the number of males in the 20–39 age bracket when compared to females ([20] p. 1). The country is bedecked by lack of basic services, poor harvests, rising food prices, lack of jobs, lack of governance skills in public officials, corruption/nepotism in public institutions and political domination [18]. The country's economy is unhealthily dependent on oil that guarantees 98% of GDP from which 35% of revenue is spent on state security and security sector reforms and 7% and 4% respectively are devoted to health and education [21]. Education in South Sudan is facing several challenges: poor coordination of education services, lack of national goals, policies and standards for education, increased insecurity, frequent displacement and the constant recruitment of male children by warring factions as 'child soldiers'.

Compounding this situation and further threatening the ephemeral peace with human security implications is climate change that tends to exacerbate the degradation of the environment—and lead to resource use conflicts and pose both direct and indirect threats to food security. In South Sudan, the duration and timing of rain is becoming erratic. Rainy seasons are increasingly not only delayed but also shortening at a rate of 30–40% [22]. As a result, the incidence of drought and flooding are not only inevitable but are increasingly becoming more frequent- temperatures are rising in winter, often with disastrous consequences for the population and the environment. These changing rainfall patterns spell doom for rural farmers in particular and the population at large. Further consequences of climate change include, but are not limited to: cholera outbreaks, poor crop yields and late harvests, as well as severe crop losses. The drying of permanent rivers is resulting in seasonal rivers, reduction of water tables in boreholes, delays and shortening of rainy seasons. Simultaneously, some regions are generally receiving less rain, and the amount of water is dropping, leading to drought. The reduction in rainfall has turned millions of hectares of already marginal semi-desert grazing land into desert. People have been forced to migrate and added significant stress on the livelihoods of pastoral societies as pastoralists and agriculturalists are at each other's throats for access to scare natural resources. On the other hand, some areas have more intense rain events, driven by climate change, which contributes to more run-off and floods, threatening food security and settlements, and leading to diseases such as cholera. The Sahara Desert is also expanding southwards [23]. The change in rainfall patterns has led to food insecurity, vast migrations and loss of animals, especially cattle. Crops and livestock are threatened in a country where about 80% of the population are cattle rearers leading a pastoralist lifestyle. There is also intense competition for natural resources which are increasingly scarce due to global warming, leading to rapid deforestation, land grabbing, and tenure insecurity due to resettlement of people returning to South Sudan after the war, as well as high rates of land privatization. The vicious cycle of multiple stresses "endemic poverty, ecosystem degradation, complex disasters and conflicts, and limited access to capital markets, infrastructure and technology have all weakened people's ability to adapt to changes in climate" ([23] p. 3, [24] p. 2).

Deforestation is accelerating due to wood being collected for fuel, charcoal production, livestock, agriculture, bricks, and the collection of construction materials. There is also intense competition for portable water between people and livestock, as well as habitat degradation for livestock and wild life due to vegetation degradation and desertification (most accentuated in the North and Southeast). It has been estimated that in the Upper Nile province, each removed tree results in the deforestation of 0.03 ha and that the annual use of charcoal of one family accounts for 2.6 ha of deforestation in that area. Furthermore, huge quantities of charcoal (60'000 bags) representing 2'700 hectares of deforested land are also exported from the Renk County in Upper Nile to Sudan ([22] p. 4, [37,38]). A study conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) found that temperature anomalies significantly affect the risk of conflict. Through the prism of the

local weather in South and North Sudan between 1997 and 2009, the organization maintains that, in the future, the risk of violent conflict caused by global warming is expected to magnify in a range of 21–30% under a median scenario, while factoring in uncertainties in both the climate projection and the estimate of the response of violence to temperature variations. The report further underlines that extreme temperature shocks are found to strongly affect the livelihood of violence as well, but the predictive power is hindered by substantial uncertainty [22,23,25].

The latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis conducted in April and May 2014 in South Sudan indicates that a conjuncture between conflicts, displacement, destroyed markets and disrupted livelihoods has led to the deterioration of food security since the outbreak of conflict in 2013. Most people in the three most conflict-affected states of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei scored 4 on the IPC scale of 5 showing an alarming increase in the number of people in the IPC Food Security phase. Some 1.3 million of the country's 11.5 million people are experiencing emergency levels of food insecurity. Additionally, 2.4 million people are in the IPC Food Crisis Phase (scoring 3 in the IPC scale of 5) suggesting that they need urgent assistance [25]. These figures indicate that more than one-third of South Sudanese are facing exceptional levels of food insecurity. These figures further suggest a conjuncture between widespread hunger, and growing malnutrition, diseases, livelihood losses and the likelihood of death.

The situation is likely to deteriorate as the food security crisis spreads to previously unaffected areas, except farmers are able to plant their fields, fishing communities can freely have access to rivers and water ways and herders can migrate between grazing areas. Food secure communities are feeling the strain of conflict as they experience the burden of hosting internally displaced people. This has engendered conflict over scarce resources, leading to accentuated environmental degradation [22,23,25]. The lack of access roads makes intervention by humanitarian agencies challenging, as most displaced communities are increasingly being cut off by a vicious cycle between rains that bring seasonal flooding and inadequate access due to conflict. A cholera outbreak has already claimed the lives of 23 people in Juba and forced more than 670 others to seek treatment [26].

The surging and thriving of conflict is correlated with low HDI and human insecurity. In the RSS, human development and conflict are intertwined: "War and violence pervade all aspects of human development". The impacts may be direct, when people are killed or injured. "Or they may be more indirect conditions of insecurity blocking farmers from working their lands, women from leaving their homes for fear of sexual violence or children from attending schools. The absence of peace constrains the choices and freedoms of people. Peace provides the foundation for

life, human development and human freedom". Human security argues for placing the human individual at the centre of security attention, rather than focusing on the rise or fall of state power alone. The risks stemming from multiple threats to the human individual and communities in (South) Sudan emerge as a key means to understand and assess security challenges, from violent conflict to lack of adequate drinking water or access to medicines to manage diseases. "Human security effectively serves as a mirror of human development: while human development as an approach focuses on expanding the real freedoms people enjoy, human security ensures the protection of these freedoms" ([27] pp. 18–19).

The human security framework is underpinned by the premise that high human development can help generate conditions for peacebuilding by removing economic and social injustice as a cause for grievance. And that peace in turn can help to establish human security conditions that further human development achievements. This reinforcing relationship can break the vicious cycle of low human development and conflict experienced in Sudan ([27] p. 19). Low levels of human development and high levels of poverty and inequality act as drivers of conflict. The lack of schools, or poor education quality with thwarted aspirations and high levels of unemployment can create a volatile pool of disaffected young people. The population of South Sudan is estimated at 8.3 million: 4 million (48.2%) are female and 4.3 million (51.8%) are male. It should be noted that a large proportion of the population of South Sudan are still refugees living in other countries. The population was estimated to have expanded to 10.6 million by July 2012 due to the return of refugees [17]. There is a high concentration of the population in rural areas. The annual population growth rate stands at 2.9% with a low population density of 13 people per square kilometre. About 72% of the population is aged below 30 years, 51% under 18 and 30% under 10. Most South Sudanese people are young, live in rural areas. The CPA (2005) led to the temporal restoration of peace, saw improved development indicators, the return of refugees and improvement in fertility and life expectancy. This has resulted in increased demand for extra resources to deliver public goods, especially in rural areas ([17] p. 8) where poverty is a lived reality.

More than half of the population (50.6%) is considered poor. However, poverty is gendered with women accounting for 51.6% of those living below the national poverty line of US$ 28 per month. Poverty is accentuated in rural areas, home to nine out of ten poor people. This is significant, given that 24.4% of urban against 55.4% of rural people are considered poor. The incidence of poverty varies across states: three quarters of poor people are found in Northern Bahr El Ghazal whereas, only a quarter of the population in Upper Nile are considered poor ([17] p. 9). The geography of poverty in South Sudan is further

characterized by high inequalities in incomes. A huge gap exists in consumption between the poor and non-poor. The Gini-coefficient (a benchmark used to estimate inequality) puts the gap between the poor and non-poor at 45.5. Collaborating this estimate, the 2009 National Household Baseline Survey showed that consumption per person in the uppermost 90th deciles of the population was more than ten times that in the lowermost 10 deciles and that on average, poor people consumed about 25% more than the non-poor [14]. The existence of significant development disparities between urban and rural areas is driving rural-urban migration and growth in the informal sector, thereby depriving rural areas of productive human capital and exacerbating poverty.

Nevertheless, poverty and low human development achievements are only partial causes for insecurity. Colonial roots and environmental degradation also play important roles. "Sudan might be the first site of violence induced by climate change. The movement of the Sahara desert up to 150 kilometres in some locations poses a severe threat to migratory groups or settled population over dwindling resources. This makes environmental stewardship a central concern for peace and human development in Sudan" ([28] p. 20).

4. Education and the Liberal Peace Project

Critical scholars on peacebuilding are unanimous on the need for social justice and welfare inclusion to the LPP as a desirable emancipatory approach to achieve sustainable civil peace in post war environments [7,29–32]. This is because post Cold War civil conflicts are multidimensional. They involve tensions around ethnic identity; the failure of legitimate or effective governance, discriminatory politics, widespread poverty and socio-economic inequality between constituent groups, war economies thriving on the capture and trade of natural resources, and easy access to small arms and light weapons [33–34]. As a consequence, international efforts at peace operations have evolved through four generations: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, International Statebuilding into peacebuilding or the Liberal Peace Project—LPP [2]. Boutros Boutros-Ghali first injected the concept of Peacebuilding into the UN system in his An Agenda for Peace, raising the need for multilateral international interventions in conflict zones to effect policy reforms beyond monitoring disarmaments and supervising the implementation of peace agreements among warring parties to effecting post conflict peace-building [1].

From the 1990s, multilateral peacebuilding actors assumed that "there is a universally agreed normative and cultural basis for the liberal peace (model) and that interventionary practices derived from this will be properly supported by all actors" ([35] p. 111). Subsequently, the international policy of post war reconstruction emphasized peace agreements, security sector reform, democratic institutions (constitution building, elections, rule of law institutions, human rights enforcement) and the installation of a free market economic model in post-settlement Peacebuilding [29,36]. Unfortunately, about half of the peacebuilding missions failed in about five years of liberal peace import, as evidenced by recurring violence, and thereby raising policy failure alarms [37], raising a need for the LPP to move from institutional peace (non-violent status quo based on anchoring post conflict states within the normative and legal contexts of transnational organizations such as the UN) and constitutional peace (resting upon the establishment of democratic values and free trade in post conflict states) to civil peace—founded on averting violence through immediate post conflict state response to citizen advocacy and mobilization for welfare needs and social justice [7].

Both its critics and its advocates argue that the LPP paradigm is in crisis because it prioritizes building government capacity (which tends to guarantee institutional and constitutional peace) that will deliver inclusive, social welfare services only in the future over more immediate capacity building and instant service delivery, which brings about civil peace [29,7,31]. Critics argue that liberal peace missions have largely recreated states (Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Haiti and even Cambodia) with weak domestic governance incapable of providing public goods, poor human rights records and contexts where the rule of law is increasingly questionable and where conditions for a relapse to armed violence are imminent [37,38]. Furthermore, lack of local ownership [36], close ended time frames of liberal peace mission that conceive of peace as a state of affairs rather than a dynamic process and lack of strategic coordination and inadequate attention to domestic tensions and local context [29,38] have been invoked as the causes of the failure of liberal peace. As a concept, the LPP connotes provision of post conflict humanitarian assistance; political, social and economic reconstruction; security sector reform and international statebuilding. The LPP is underpinned by conservative, orthodox and emancipatory theories [7] but the practical methods for achieving sustainable peace or civil peace in post conflict countries like South Sudan are elusive [32,7].

Robin Luckham, a key advocate of the emancipatory approach to peacebuilding emphasises the relationship between democracy, security and development as being the cornerstone of global liberal governance. This relationship, he concedes, should inform the conceptualization of the fourth generation peace interventions [39]. Peacebuilding is thus—reconstructed through local and international agencies, and their mediation, to include institutions, rights, needs, culture, and custom, from security, political, economic, social welfare and justice perspectives dictated by the internal context of the mission [40]. Commenting on the fragility of the LPP in South Sudan, Ylonen suggests that there is need for the peacebuilding interventions and the South Sudan government to create political,

economic and social institutions that are inclusive as well as providing wider access to welfare services [32]. However, the practical ways to deliver civil peace through this emancipatory approach that guarantee structures preventing a relapse into conflict have remained elusive.

Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to the independence (2011) and post independence of South Sudan, peacebuilding has suffered from a lack of local reception, a lack of durable participatory governance and a frequent relapse into violent conflict [32]. It has been argued that liberal peacebuilding in South Sudan is detached from the internal reality thereby making stability in the country fragile. Among other things, "tangible development progress, such as (the) building of hospitals or gaining access to quality education, are seen as vital in establishing peace and this realization needs to be at the heart of peace-building activities" ([30] p. 10). Formal education—the medium for imparting pedagogic instruction, shared values, good attitudes and behaviours [41] is a social welfare institution, a social justice mechanism for marginalized and disgruntled groups and a locally acclaimed means for the emancipatory approach to the LPP to take root in South Sudan. In countries emerging from wars, a well designed formal education curriculum may ease psychological violence (fear and hatred) in the minds of survivors and victors, helping them to desist from being fanatics, or supporting ideology that legitimize structural violence [42]. It must be stated that formal education, in post war settlement countries may make or mar new publics either creating "a conglomerate of self indulgent consumers; … (and) angry soulless, directionless, hopeless masses; indifferent,confused citizens; or a public imbued with confidence, sense of purpose…respect for tolerance" ([43] p. 18). This implies that the formal education curricula in peace reconstruction countries like the RSS should foster positive social relations, multiethnic integration and community development.

A 1994 review of 98 country cases from 1960–1990 by George Psacharopoulos shows that the private and social rates of returns from primary education stand at 20.8% and 18.2% in annual returns of the initial costs, reducing poverty and enhancing social welfare for countries that opt for policies that broaden access to primary education [44,5]. Moreover, post-primary vocational training would yield social benefits (positive externalities such as modernization and social integration of ethnic groups, improved civic engagement and improved standards of living). In addition to private gains (e.g. jobs, greater income, savings, investments), formal vocational training will help broaden the government revenue source and sustain peace dividends and the production of public goods for example, security and basic services [6]. We argue that the private returns of education can be easily measured in quantitative terms (e.g. in income or contribution of taxes coming from such income to government revenue or jobs that are created because of training and its impact on Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Social returns of education are qualitative in nature and it is common knowledge that for the more literate populations of the North, it might be less easy to persuade citizens into patronage politics. Such citizens tend more than their uneducated counterparts to issues of the day and engage into political and civil life in more beneficial ways.

However, in its 2011–2013 Development Plan, the Government of South Sudan recognised that its education and health indicators are among the lowest in the world, reflecting the impact of protracted conflict and limited provision of social services. Only 27% of the adult population is literate and less than half of all primary-school-age-children are in school (51% of boys and 37% of girls). The ratio of qualified teachers to pupils stands at 1:117 [21]. Yet education is positioned with regard to the budget as the last priority area in its development plan. Apart from the fact that external actors (foreign states and intergovernmental organizations) commit inadequate funding and capacity building to revive access to quality education in South Sudan—6% of 2009 donor funding [45,18], the new deal for measuring progress in peacebuilding excludes education and only focuses on legitimate politics, security, legal justice, economic foundation and state revenues [45].

In fact, most international agencies "opted not to support and facilitate the creation of a conducive education policy environment but rather to work in isolation under the pretext of supporting the community-based education initiatives". Also, the donor communities have different perspectives to education in conflict areas. While the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) supports education in South Sudan, other donors have taken a rather lukewarm attitude towards education ([8] p. 11). This is the case even when education has been recognised during civil war as a right for all children as well as a need that must be met. Such arguments, following Sommers have 'tugged more at the heart-strings than the purse strings of major international donors' ([46] p. 24). While USAID supports basic education, other international donors have been preoccupied with the misplaced view that education is a luxury in emergencies and not a humanitarian need ([47] p. 9). As a collective responsibility, the provision of education to all children despite prevailing conditions calls for coordinated efforts and actions even in situations where international NGOs do not normally work [46]. One of the ingredients that ignited war in Sudan was the marginalisation and exclusion of South Sudanese through the education system, which eventually led to deep differences in political and economic relations between North and South Sudan. Education promotes global human values and citizenship both in peace time and during civil wars.

The dark cloud of interethnic conflicts in the history

of South Sudan suggests that peace accords that do not target the structural causes of conflict—exclusion from social welfare services, domination or suppression of ethnic identities, centre-periphery inequality, conflict over resources, intra-elite competition and brute causes or criminality risk- relapsing into a cycle of violence [48]. If accountable institutions are not in place to guarantee immediate socio-political inclusion, social welfare and economic equity for the majority of her citizens, a country risks not attaining durable or civil peace but an unstable institutional and constitutional peace.

5. International Intervention and the Quest for Durable Peace

The historical causes of conflict in South Sudan (categorized as 'new war') may seem intractable [34] but the internal causes of regular post-settlement violence suggest that statebuilding priorities retain ma-jor elements of the structure of political power that undergird the historical past of the RSS [49]. In prioritizing this statebuilding, the LPPs in the RSS are undermining durable peace in the country.Schomerous and Allen's incisive review of the LPP in the RSS reached the same conclusion ([30] p. 10). International peacebuilders use the orthodoxy approach of the LPP: prioritizing internationalization of the RSS by habituating new political norms that tend to reflect conditions and benchmarks of global governance institutions, promoting values like accountability, transparency, separation of powers and elections. To sustain liberal peace in the RSS, however, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) recommend that these interventions would have to consider concomitantly more emphasis on "better access to services that leads to improvements on the quality of life and guarantee peace dividends" to marginalized and politically excluded groups ([50] p. 71).

Table 1. Key areas of conflict addressed by international interventions.

Reform of justice and security institutions	Culture of justice, truth and reconciliation	Good governance	Socioeconomic development
Reintegration of demobilised soldiers is insufficient	Uncertainty about the future and false expectations	North/South disparities, and intra-South marginalisation	Status of the Three Areas. International attention diverted from the Three Areas.
Undeveloped police and justice systems	Hardening of ethnic identities	Tensions around centralisation and weak structures at State levels	Migration of armed pastoralists (this has not featured in 2005); discontented and under-employed youth
Incomplete disarmament among the population	Unresolved issues of access to natural resources	Lack of representation	Returnees want access to resources. Return destabilies communities

Source: ([51] p. 43).

Table 1 shows the orthodox approaches of multilateral interventions like the UN and bilateral (largely, the US) promotion of liberal peace. The bolded areas of intervention in post conflict Sudan are indicated on the figure including the following: reintegration of soldiers, development of police and justice systems, addressing tensions around centralization/weak state structures and the reintegration of returning refugees do dominate the LPP in the RSS. However, these peacebuilding endeavour must be pursued at the same time with felt needs of the local communities if peace is to be sustained. By comparing what international peacebuilders pursue, what the Government of the RSS pursues and the funding priorities of the main actors of peacebuilding, we discover a gap between the international objectives of legitimating the new state and the actual local needs for sustainable peace. As Roland Paris rightly warns, while "immediate democratization and marketization" (stable market democracies) of war-shattered states is good wisdom, hastily resorting to this process is likely to be counterproductive: "market democracy is not the miracle cure for internal conflict". Political and economic liberalization is an inherently unsettling process. It can instead aggravate social tensions and undermine the prospects for stable peace in the fragile post-war conditions typical of countries just emerging from civil war. Good wisdom dictates that post-conflict peacebuilding begins with the establishment of a network of domestic institutions that are capable of dealing with the unfettered effects of democratization and marketization, as well as the gradual phasing in of political and economic reforms at the appropriate time. For this to be effective, peacebuilders must refrain from the unrealistic view that war-torn states can be rehabilitated over night ([29] p. 14).

Figure 1. Funding priorities of the RSS (GoSS) versus funding priorities of international peacebuilders. Source: ([51] p. 3).

Figure 1 shows how peacebuilding funding to some basic services such as water and education easily elude international intervention in post conflict Sudan, despite the felt local need of access to these services. When this figure is cast against the wider Government of South Sudan (2010) budget, security accounts for 35% of the country's expenditure, basic services like health and education account for 7% and 4% respectively and rural development accounts for 3.4% of the budget [18]. From the perspective of the emancipatory approach to liberal peace, the RSS was increasingly being set for relapse into violence because of the lack of peace dividends and adequate social welfare among marginalized and rural communities emerging from conflict. Returnees expected better levels of services, non discrimination along tribal lines (or Dinka domination) and deconcentration of development in Juba. Without these, and as predicted by Afrobarometer [51], the local masses have been constantly anticipating violence. Politicians have continued to develop power bases centered on ethnic identity which eventuated into the crumbling of the current existing negative peace as of 15 December 2013.

International intervention into peacebuilding in Sudan has largely been a top-down process aimed at replicating westerity without regard to local context. The current LPP approaches highly prioritize centralized urban political institutions over heterogeneous local needs and preferences, which retard the bringing about of peace that the citizenry wish for themselves leading to authoritarian peace that narrows down political participation of citizens in elections. To guarantee durable civil peace in the RSS, Oliver Richmond suggest that orthodox peacebuilding must depart from the LPP and focus on "how one can move beyond hegemonic, authoritarian peace towards an everyday notion of peace sensitized to the local as well as the state and the global… and resting on a just social order and solidarity" ([40] p. 109).

6. The Local Context of Social Welfare Exclusion and the LPP in South Sudan

Afrobarometer's survey on what legitimizes a democratic society showed that 89% of respondents pointed to basic needs provision (water, food and shelter) while 75% want "democracy to deliver … education, … more strongly … they insist on regular elections, majority rule, competing political parties or freedom to criticize the government" ([52] p. 2). Similarly, a survey of Southern Sudan by the NDI reported that the move for secession from Sudan is "to avert domination of Arabs … and … that independent Southern Sudan will be more prosperous" ([53] p. 7). This implies that the fragility of the democratic institutions in the RSS that translates into frail liberal peace is wanting from the perspective of delivering immediate improvements in the socio-economic sphere.

Afrobarometer's survey of nineteen African states undergoing peacebuilding in 2008, found out that 66% of the populace saw their government's economic policies as not benefiting, but instead worsening the standards of living of the poor. Also, 50% of survey respondents opined that their local government institutions were illegitimate, using revenues for private gain rather than providing public services [54]. This suggests that in a country recovering from conflict like the RSS, the attainment of durable peace can tend to be fragile.

In a bid to graduate from an orthodox to an emancipatory approach that leads to durable peace in the LPP, it has been suggested that governments that have weak institutions must concentrate on providing public services such as security in poor neighbourhoods and in local markets. Also, the government in such a situation should concomitantly assess what needs constitute, as well as what local populations' perception of peace dividends is [55]. This implies that international intervention in South Sudan's LPP would best yield

durable peace if it supports the country to efficiently respond to services needed by the most vulnerable of the local masses in the short and long term.

A foreign peacebuilding actor in the RSS conducted a survey using 67 focused group discussion sessions and a sample of 700 persons representative of all states, locations, tribes, religions, genders and age groups from March to June 2011 on two issues: Firstly, on the preference of the local masses as to the anchor of peacebuilding among Democracy, Development or both. Secondly, on what democratization agenda should be pursued in peacebuilding. Participants over-whelmingly (59.1%) preferred that in peacebuilding, development (well being, improved standards of living) should precede democracy (elections); 37.7% preferred democracy to development whereas 3.2% preferred that both democracy and development be pursued simultaneously in the LPP. While those who preferred development thought of democracy as politics and an urban affair, those who believed in democracy defined it in terms of the socio-economic dividends it may offer in post-conflict times [56]. This resonates with the view that the narrow definition and support for liberal peace by the international community in line "with the over-arching neoliberal economic paradigm and failure to embrace an inclusivist approach to peacebuilding" works against "effective reconstruction, growth and development" ([57] p. 192). A primary-school-edu-cated, Christian male in Juba for example, said "with democracy, government will hear the cry of the people and then bring development." Democracy was further thought of as a way to handle tribalism, nepotism and corruption that make public service institutions inefficient and ineffective ([58] p. 15). The Second sur-vey question on which priorities public services must focus on in peacebuilding showed that: as a first, second and third preference for peace dividend, education constitutes 24.9%, 32.8% and 21.8% of the whole sample surveyed. In general, access to edu-cation is the second significant measure of expected peace dividend in the RSS. It is only second to access to water as the first, chosen by 27.5%, 14.6% and 19.5% of the survey respondents as their first, second and third preference in public service provision if the LPP in is to yield durable peace. In general, healthcare provisioning features as the third public service provision that should underpin durable peace in the country.


Figure 2. Local preferences for peace dividends in the RSS.
Source: ([57] p. 17).

The data presented in figure 2 above corroborate a joint survey of the RSS by the London School of Economics (LSE) and the Partners Achieving Change together (PACT)—a development organization. The LSE/PACT study concluded that better access to social services guaranteed through infrastructural devel-opment and improved quality of life would be the most remarkable aspects of any durable peace in South Sudan [30]. But how should social welfare be initiated and sustained for South Sudan's most ven-erable groups? A religious leader in Raja County, South Sudan puts it thus: "information and knowledge is desperately needed for us to become informed citizens" ([30] p. 71). This is because as argued below, education does not only improve the quality of civic engagement but also the quality of life for the educated and of the community in which he or she lives as a whole.

7. Formal Education and Liberal Peace in South Sudan

Formal schooling and training in conflict trans-formation sensitizes a society to the inequities of the system to facilitate intergroup dialogue, healing and reconciliation, and nurturing the idea or capacity for peace through integrated schools having curricula related to community relations, vocational training and

community development at primary and post primary vocational levels [41]. The need for education to help citizens to contribute to quality participatory governance has been avidly expressed in South Sudan [30]. It has been made clear that restricted access to education or an inappropriate curriculum such as the Arabization or Islamization of Southern Sudanese schools [4,8–9,11], has led to the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations [42], created an unskilled, corrupt, and Dinka dominated civil service [18], making liberal peace unstable in the country. Although the United Nation's International Children's Emergency Fund's (UNICEF) current Peace Education initiative in South Sudan organizes workshops in mediation, negotiation, conflict management and non-competitive dialogue, it is a top-down process that helps in resolving immediate and proximate causes of violence and not the structural causes in rather abstract ways [42].

Peacebuilding education should rather be a bottom-up process in which pupils of primary school age are incentivized (through provision of meals at school, for instance) to keep them at school, where they will be reoriented to attitudes of peace. In a limited top-down process, international peacebuilders should support the RSS to build primary schools and post-primary schools, teacher training colleges and vocational institutions so as to support durable peace. It is a process founded on the experiences and opportunities to augment the capacity for wellbeing among a highly unskilled and unemployed South Sudanese youth by providing them with immediate and relevant vocational training that facilitates entrepreneurship, trade and higher incomes that incentivize them to avert proclivity to war. As an indispensable factor, peace-building education should be immediately incorporated into current orthodox democratization and free market institutionalization of the current LPP in Sudan in order to actualize the emancipatory approach to the LPP that results in durable civil peace.

8. Access to Primary Education and the Durability of Liberal Peace

After the CPA the number of pupils enrolled in primary school increased from about 700'000 to 1.6 million. However, the the RSS does not yet have the capacity to keep up with the demand for education. Additionally, donor support for education remains highly insufficient through reconstruction programmes in the country [58]. UNICEF estimates that in Sudan 70% of children aged between 6 and 17 have never been to school, 1 out of 10 pupils complete primary school and less than 2% of the population have completed primary schooling [58]. Worse still, a 2009 assessment revealed that 96% of all teachers in South Sudan have no formal training [59]. The lack of access to education is captured in figure 3 below in which school pupils in Yei, Jonlei state are seen sitting on makeshift benches under a tree.

Figure 3. Pupils studying under a tree.

The picture above tells the tragic story of the acute lack of space for teachers and classrooms for learning. Wandera, an adult learner in Kuol, South Sudan who thinks that education will preclude war in the country asserts that: "Education is very, very important for peace. If you are educated you will be able to know what peace is, you will be able to educate people about reconciliation, forgiveness and coming together to solve problems". While equating education to peace, respondents were unanimous that "an educated individual will be able to think and act well, put his or her education to good use for development and will have an open-mind" (Jacob, Interview, Dengnhial, 11 May 2013). According to the North-South Institute,

a combination of peace, civic and citizenship education will instill a sense of responsible citizenship that "fosters a culture of peace and peacebuilding through conflict mitigation, resolution and reconciliation. Civic education seeks to build an understanding of the democratic system based on notions of civic and human rights. Citizenship education attempts to teach an awareness of rights and responsibilities and instill respect for others' rights and viewpoints" ([60] p. 1). Figure 4 below shows Dengnhial primary school pupils appealing to the SPLM/A to turn war policies into development projects.

Figure 4. Calls for the transformation of war policies into development policies.

Reychler Luc holds that formal education facilitates sustainable peace in three ways that are relevant to the South Sudanese context, if the curricula are designed to foster community relations and community development [42]. Firstly, primary education would be a forum for effective interethnic communication. Considering that about 66 ethnic languages are spoken in South Sudan [26] , the use of English as a common language will serve as a good medium for fostering and nurturing interethnic communication. Secondly, it helps dismantle sentimental walls related to perceived domination by the Dinka or other forms of groupings such as the SPLM. Increased access to primary schooling takes away despair from victims of social exclusion because it nurtures individuals with requisite skills for future political participation and in the long run, solves political tensions. Hannah Bol, in Kuol, asserted that "Now that schools have been opened, everyone has seen that education is important and that they need to come, and that war and guns are not the future!" [26]. Thirdly, formal primary schooling in integrated schools promotes an integrative political climate [42]. The government of the RSS currently runs on the basis of exclusive circles of patronage and marginalization [46]. Participation in governance would therefore, become skill-based with the introduction of formal education.

9. Vocational Education, Peace Dividends and the Durability of Liberal Peace

This study has established that there is a strong correlation, almost a favourable causal link between the provision of peace dividends (schooling, health services, jobs, higher living standards, social development) and the durability of peace. "The lack of livelihoods opportunities for youth and the potential for creating and exacerbating tensions and relapse to violence" in post war states has also been noted ([49] p. XVII). This has been recorded especially in Lakes, Warrap, Jonglei and Upper Nile States, which are the most conflict-affected regions in South Sudan. In the survey conducted by the NDI on what locals in South Sudan preferred as peace dividends, some said "If we are educated…we would not so much think of government to do for us everything;" "we would create our own project and work on our own roads but we do not have the skills so we really need education to be the priority here" ([60] p. 9). One respondent told us that "Giving us education is like teaching us how to fish, and help ourselves instead of perpetually depending on others" (Joseph, Jonglei, interview of 20 May 2013).

This suggests that for international peace building interventions to solidify peace, the RSS must be sup-

ported to create an enabling environment for young people's livelihoods and/or employment [62]. Considering the very low literacy levels in South Sudan, the setting up of rural craft schools in carpentry, masonry, pottery, and agriculture and institutes for electricity and electronics, maintenance, production engineering, dress making, nursing, clerical studies are necessary if durable peace is to be attained. For our intent, vocational studies help academically less able students, instilling technological knowledge related to some particular function, craft and trade [62]. The following figure is a framework showing how vocational education can bring about peace dividends to sustain peace.


Figure 5. The links between vocational training and peace dividends.

In the past, vocational training has been criticized as a financially costly policy to implement, being of lower value to academic or general education in terms of the low income it attracts and the false probability that it can guarantee quicker employment [62]. Nowadays, vocational education is seen as training that facilitates the acquisition of specific vocational skills for a lifetime that would manifest in entrepreneurship, poverty reduction and the integration of idling young people [in South Sudan] into the working world of the informal or private sector [63,64].

In practice, vocational education would train the workforce for self-employment and raise the productivity of the informal sector [63]. The availability of skills would attract more foreign direct investments, modernizing South Sudan and promoting heterogeneous communities that facilitate interethnic integration.Vocational training is analogous to some form of social engineering: transforming unemployed youth to find employment, providing poor segments in society with a rising income and improved living standards and supplying to a community emerging from the destruction of war, middle level technicians such as, nurses, midwives, plumbers and brick layers [61]. This is why vocational education is considered socially useful work, which would help citizens develop stronger awareness of the contribution of their work to the wellbeing of society [62]. When social welfare

development for all is triggered through the extension of access to formal schooling, the democratization and institutionalization of the free market that yield fragile authoritarian peace, constitutional peace and institutional peace graduate into an emancipatory approach that addresses social injustices to yield durable civic peace.

10. Conclusion

This study has found that the deeply rooted causes of relapse to violence in South Sudan are historically situated on ethnic segregation orchestrated by the Anglo-Egyptian rule of the then Southern Sudan. This dual rule left the area bereft of public goods, social welfare institutions or solid economic development outcomes. This segregation extended to political exclusion as at independence, of more than 900 positions of postcolonial administration, people from the three states of southern Sudan only got appointed into 8 [21].

Shortly, after independence, restricted access to social welfare, especially formal education informed ethnic domination over or the exclusion of Southern Sudanese in the realm of political participation. Consequently, the incomprehensible nature of the CPA that legitimized the Dinka's domination of the SPLM/A government caused the exclusion of significant local

actors from the peace deal. Subsequent political participation has further undermined the search for durable peace. Because most of the liberal peace building in independent South Sudan fails to implement projects that simultaneously strengthen democratic institutions as well as addressing the deep rooted causes of relapse to conflict, for example the lack of social welfare institutions that should lead to peace dividends, the liberal peace that is this far instituted or constituted is indeed, fragile.

Surveys conducted by Afrobarometer [52] and the NDI [60] indicating local preference for the immediate delivery of formal education, health and other basic needs (clean water) over democratization, suggest that the Liberal Peace Export to South Sudan is divorced from local context, making the transposition of liberal peace projects ineffective and making liberal peace fragile in the country. This asymmetry of information on what constitutes need for durable peace between international peacebuilders (principal) and the South Sudanese citizens and locals (agent) has exacerbated ethnic marginalization and made the institutional installations of the LPP faulty. This dovetails with the failure of neoliberal peace project in post-conflict Sierra Leone [56].

The issue of marginalization translates to lack of services (like water, health and education) against areas/peoples in the Jonglei and Blue Nile states. These areas are also lagging behind in terms of representation in political structures. The role of the State in regulating such disparities has been minimal or even negative. It operates on the basis of exclusive circles of patronage and marginalization. Marginalization plays out as the stick and patronage as the carrot within the context of social welfare exclusion and inclusion among different ethnic groups [45]. Although the emancipatory approach is considered impractical in the LPP, this research recommends the provision of primary education and post-primary vocational education as a policy implementation path to actualize the emancipatory approach to the LPP in South Sudan.

A low level of female education in the RSS translates into the inability to control birth rates, implying continuous growth in population and insufficient consumption. Many households in the RSS are already "living on a sub-sustainable level, due in part to an uneven distribution of resources, but also because in many regions (…) population has outgrown essential resources". Among various methods identified by the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), September 1994, Cairo, Egypt, and applicable to the RSS are the: (1) empowerment of women and girls in the economic, political and social spheres (2) removal of gender inequalities in education and (3) integration of family planning in synergy with other efforts to improve mother and child health [64]. Poverty is perpetuated and exacerbated by poor maternal health, gender discrimination and lack of access to birth control. This calls for the need to prioritize the advancement of human development for women and for all victims affected by violence and insecurity as well as the creation and implementation of a national strategy for human development so as to support peacebuilding and its sustainability, advance the human development process, enhance the needs of children, the elderly and all victims of conflict ([27] p. 6). Research evidence suggest an inverse relationship between levels of female education, and birth rate: an educated woman is more likely to make better use of existing health care services for both preventive and curative health services, "to accept medical advice and to make timely recourse to modern health care facilities, greater identification with the outside world, more social confidence at handling officials and willingness to go out of the home for services" ([65] p. 20, [66]).

Additionally, sustainable environmental governance will mitigate the impact of climate change and permit the government to cope with increasing pressure on natural resources so as to ensure a sustainable future for current and returning populations.

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Appendix 1. List of Abbreviations.

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Accord
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EFA	Education for All
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human immuno virus
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
LPP	Liberal Peace Process
LSE	London School of Economics
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PACT	Partners Achieving Change together
RSS	Republic of South Sudan
SSCCSE	South Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation
SPLM/A	the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UNICEF	United Nations Children Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Journal of Human Security

Research Article

Can the Pragmatic East Asian Approach to Human Security Offer a Way for the Deepening of the Long Peace of East Asia?

Timo Kivimäki

Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 54, 00014 Helsinki, Finland;
E-Mail: tikivimaki@gmail.com; Tel.: +358 503183966

Abstract: East Asia (including Southeast and Northeast Asia) has witnessed the most spectacular pacification in the world during the past 30 years. Certain dimensions related to human security have been perceived as weak points in the long peace of East Asia. Despite progress, authoritarian violence is still a reality in East Asia. At the same time, certain other dimensions of human security—most distinctively those elements related to "freedom from want"—have developed very well during the long peace of East Asia.

This article will study whether the concept of human security constructs realities that are useful for peace in East Asia. For this, the article will look at how the way in which "human" and "security" are linked, serve and deepen the existing social realities of peace in the region. Furthermore, the article will look inside the concepts of "human" and "security" to see how human security is constructed and whether the construction serves to deepen the long peace of East Asia. The article will argue that the East Asian human security debate could be an intellectual adaptation strategy useful for the promotion of the long peace of East Asia in a deeper sense.

Keywords: constructivism; East Asia; Human Security; long peace of East Asia; post-structuralism; speech acts

1. Context, Aims and Objectives

East Asia (including Southeast and Northeast Asia) has witnessed a spectacular pacification in the world during the past 30 years. If we compare the period from the end of World War II until the end of the 1970s with the period after that, we can see a virtual disappearance of battle deaths in traditional interstate conflicts (decline of over 99%), a drastic reduction in battle deaths during domestic conflict (almost 40%), and a substantial reduction in number of conflicts. Furthermore, violent repression has decreased and governments have become more constrained in the use of power on their citizens. As a result, one-sided

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violence by armed groups or the state against unarmed people is also on the decline. Even violent crime seems to be on the decline [1].

Despite progress, authoritarian violence is still a reality in East Asia. More than two thirds of the population live under regimes that place only slight to moderate limitations on executive authority. This is the main issue where the long peace of East Asia needs deepening. One could also say that peace in East Asia should move from negative to positive peace [2] by establishing institutions that could ensure a lasting peace and the formation of an East Asian security community. This prospect is under investigation in this article. At the same time, certain other dimensions of human security—most distinctively those elements related to "freedom from want"—have developed very well during the long peace of East Asia. Peace in the sense of an absence of wars (negative peace) has been built upon a economic development-oriented conflict management which, as a by-product, had already lifted over 400 million Chinese out of poverty by the end of the second decade of the long peace of East Asia [3]. Despite critics that say that freedom from want is still an unrealistic goal, and that economic development should be sustainable—which it has not always been in East Asia—it is important to acknowledge this side of human security: economic development has been a huge contribution to human welfare in East Asia, even if the region should now aim at making economic development more ecologically sustainable.

The aim of this article is to review the East Asianist human security debate and see if the concept of human security could reconcile some of the weaknesses of the long peace of East Asia. For this the article will look at a) the contents of the two concepts, "human" and "security", b) at what kinds of human security concepts the East Asian concept competes against (and replaces if successful), and c) at the way in which "human" and "security" are linked. While looking at what human security can offer to the long peace of East Asia, this article will not claim or study the causal connection between the concept and the long peace.

By East Asianist debate I mean, first, the authoritative public documents on human security, mainly authored by the Japanese government and the ASEAN secretariat; second, the East Asian debate consisting of writings by Japanese scholars, especially those facilitated by the Tokai University, such as Yusuke Dan, Kazuo Tase, Keizo Takemi, Tatsuro Matsumae, Akira Enoki and Akiko Fukushima; and third, the East Asianist debate having been lead by the great Asian theorists, Amitav Acharya, Surpong Peou, Chung-in Moon, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan, Evelyn Goh, Yu-tai Ts'ai, and many others.

2. How Should the Human Security Concept Be Assessed?

Since the critical security study's introduction, the concept of human security has spun off very interesting theoretical discussions on security. But these theoretically interesting debates have not been restricted to the original critical studies or to the newer Copenhagen School approaches. The East Asian debate has also been theoretically innovative and interesting. However, the East Asian debate has not been very explicit or reflective about the use of theoretical concepts. The debate has not gone back to the foundations that could legitimize a concept. This is why I think it could be interesting to make an interpretation of the explicit foundations that could justify the East Asian usage of the concept of human security.

If we look at what was defined as the East Asian debate on human security at the beginning of this paper, one can see a clear commitment to a pragmatic, empiricist effort to relate concepts to something real and concrete in East Asia. According to Peou [4]: "If human security is to stay analytically useful as a concept that can be operationalized and relevant in policy terms, we need to prioritize policy commitment, motivate policy action, and assess policy outcomes." Thus Peou sees the truth of human security as crucially dependent on the pragmatic consequences of it as an adaptation strategy to reality, or even as a conceptual construct of social reality. Furthermore, Peou [4] also assesses the concept of human security from the point of view of whether or not it can be "sold" to the policy community: "My hope is that the concept … can be better accepted and applied if we succeed in building a concept that is neither too elastic nor too restrictive, combining theoretical insights into one that is neither too parochial nor too eclectic." While it would be possible to say that the concept has already been adopted by the policy community—in 2014 the concept turned 20 years old and it has been adopted and used in agencies of the UN, EU and other political organizations—the practice of human security is always dependent on how much it has been socialized in societies and how high priority it gets in policy-making [5].

In addition, the merits of considering something as a security issue area are thought of in the East Asianist debate as a matter of practicality. The original ideas of the securitization theory [6] have been criticized in the East Asian debate for their lack of empirical focus, for the disinterest in real policy consequences and the unintended effects of securitization [7–9].

All this sounds much like the teachings of the pragmatists [10,11] who rejected concepts and theo-

ries as explanations of reality, and truths as mirror images of reality. Instead, they saw knowledge as a pragmatic strategy of adaptation to and manipulation of the surrounding world [12,13]. If we take the idea that knowledge is a building block of the social reality we live in (as constructivist say) seriously, pragmatic attitude to this truth makes the articulation of interpretations strategic activity. As Chalk said, pragmatic research should therefore study knowledge production, such as the introduction of the concept of human security, as strategic symbolic creation of social realities in interaction between articulators of interpretations and their audiences. Symbolic inter-actionalism [14] that studies this interaction does not just analyse which constructs, created by symbolic interaction, exist; it is also interested in studying the actual "symboling", the manipulation of symbols by active persons, defining and redefining their social realities [15]. Thus the articulation of "human security" can be judged as a rhetorical strategy on the basis of how it advises us to adjust to the social and material realities that surround us and to change conflict-prone structures and processes. In this article the criterion is how successful it is in creating realities that help the long peace of East Asia. From the point of view of an intellectual, the question is also whether it is realistic to expect that the concept will be accepted among the policy community.

According to Chaim Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [16] and the theorists of the new rhetoric [17], political argumentation is based on the effort to associate the policies one tries to promote with some policies about which one's audience already feels generally positive, and to dissociate one's projects from those of which one's audience disapproves. Enos puts it thus: "To create one's rhetorical structure of reality … is to make use of a structure to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote [18]." This is what the proponents of human security are doing by concretely linking "human" and "security" in one concept. They are creating a rhetorical association between human well-being (survival in tolerable conditions in absence of want and fear [19,20]), and security, often the dominant security concept; that of national security. This is done in order to associate human well-being (something that one wants to promote) with national security, which, in our pre-agreements of argumentation (something that the audience already accepts as truth or as a norm), is undeniably regarded as something crucially valuable. Thus, the priority on the survival of national sovereignty is also claimed as vital to human survival/well-being.

How the association between human welfare and security is made is crucial for the pragmatic value of the reality of "human rights" (association): does the introduction of human welfare into the security realm affect the way in which traditional security is con-structed or does it just change the way in which hu-man welfare is seen. Since human security concept is a discursive/argumentative strategy, what kind of conceptualization East Asian human security is intended to replace needs to be studied strategically. Furthermore, the type of human values included in the issue area to be securitized is important. What is inside the concept of human security (human rights or economic development, for example) is also highly relevant, as is the political context in which the East Asian concept of human security is articulated. Thus I will now move on to the examination of the pragmatic value for the long peace of East Asia by investigating the implications of the content of "human" and "security," the role of the East Asian concept as a substitute of the European idea of human security, and the implications of the way in which the two concepts are linked.

3. The Content of East Asian Concept of Human and Security

While the idea of human security can be traced far back into the history of Western thought [21] the actual term was launched into political terminology by an Asian intellectual, Mahbub ul Haq, in the UNDP's Human Development Report of 1994. The concept was first introduced in an extensive, development-empha-sizing form that now is seen as "the Asian version" of the concept. The concept presents five new commonly accepted elements to security thinking.

First, all human security thinking is based on the concerns of human beings; either as individuals or as a humanity. As the Japanese government puts it, any policy guided by a concern for human security "puts people at the center of concerns" (the "human" part) and "emphasizes benefiting people who are exposed to threats" (the "security" part) [22,23]. Putting value on human survival and well-being is the first nor-mative basic premise of the concept of human se-curity. The types of human values seen as belonging to the scope of security are debated. While survival is accepted by all proponents of human security, the East Asian debate often also defines a wide variety of values related to human well-being and freedom as security concerns [24,25]. Instead of going into the debate on whether the concept loses its normative relevance if it distances itself too much from its survivalist core, I will simply focus on those definitions that do indeed stay close to this core.

Second, threats to and the aim for human security are not only national, as is the case with national security, but transnational [26]. The assumption that the sender and the target of threats can be not only national, but also transnational or sub-national, is the first common ontological premise of all human se-curity thinking. The transnational nature of human security means, on the one hand, that the source of a threat is not always an intentional, national agent. While national security challenges are posed by

intentional actors—mostly nation-states, but sometimes also alliances of several nations—human security challenges can be posed by non-actors, such as climate change or viruses. These kinds of threats exist in absence of "enemies." In some cases, human security threats are posed by actors that the international community refuses to consider legitimate, such as criminals and terrorists. This is problematic for security theory, which often creates models that assume bargaining between the sender and the target of a security threat. Security actors never negotiate with viruses or the ozone layer, and rarely with criminals or terrorists.

Furthermore, the transnational nature of human security means that while national security in its classical form means the absence of a threat to one nation from another (and is therefore inter-national), human security challenges such as environmental degradation, hunger or authoritarian violence can be local ones (such as flooding in a river delta), national ones (such as human rights violations), transnational ones (such as drought in a region covering parts of several states), or global ones (such as climate change).

Third, human security thinking also assumes that threats may be of a different sort from those previously seen. While traditional security thinking has focused on military threats, human security thinking complements this thought by pointing out non-military, soft threats, such as the problems of nation-building, famine, antagonistic feelings between ethnic entities, etc. Chung-in Moon and Edward Azar gave form to theories based on this difference, linking it to the realities of the third world. They criticize the traditional military view for its overexposure to the realities of the developed world [27]. According to Azar and Moon, the "software" side of the security problematic in the Third World is more important "as opposed to the traditional Western analyses of security, which tend to concentrate on the 'hardware' side of the problem." This broad view of the soft versus hard nature of threats is the second common ontological premise on which human security thinking rests.

Fourth, some theorists also say that the logic of human security is fundamentally different from that of national security. In the latter, self-help is the main mode of action, while the former is concerned with helping others "other-help", [4]. The need to go beyond the partisan principles of self-help is the first common praxiological premise of the human security concept. A focus on the well-being of the weakest individuals in national development cooperation policies would make it difficult to reduce human security operations to the traditional logic of self-help. Alternatively, if one thinks of the referent object of human security as all of humankind, one could conceive of human security as humanity's self-help.

Finally, while traditional security threats can be seen as being tackled by military response (however, many traditional security threats nowadays are tackled by what is now being called civilian crisis management), the remedy for human security threats might not be military, but can, as the Human Development Report of 1994 suggests, be development. The broader approach to tackling security threats is the second common strategic principle of human security. The inter-departmental, multi-agency nature of responses to human security challenges has played a central role in putting human security into effect in the Japanese government's evaluation of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. According to the evaluation's definition, the Trust Fund "promotes mainstreaming the human security concept in UN agencies, and it stimulates multi-sector and multi-agency activities of the UN agencies based on issues beyond the mandate of each agency. This leads to mainstreaming the concept of human security not only in the UN agencies, but also in the member countries and civil society." [28,29].

However, in addition to concepts in common, the interpretation of human security has many differences. Many of these differences cut across the divide between the "West" and East Asia. For some (mostly Western) theorists, the focus on human beings replaces the focus on national security while for others (mostly East Asian scholars), national security is instrumental to human security. The role of the state as a threat to or an instrument of human security is a fundamental alternative ontological premise of human security.

Many Western approaches to the enlargement of the security concept—such as critical security studies and human security—are contrasted with the narrow national security view. Booth, , Krause, Williams and Betts & Eagleton-Pierce [30], for example, frame human security more in alternative than complementary terms, emphasizing how often states kill their own people instead of defending themselves [30–33]. Rudolph Rummel shows conclusive data for this by pointing to the fact that governments kill more than six times as many of their own citizens as do intra-state and interstate wars put together [34]. According to Andrew Mack "the realist paradigm is incapable of dealing with the threat states pose to their own citizens. This is the primary reason why proponents of human security argue that the individual should be the referent object of security." [35].

On the level of policy debate, Canada represents the extreme end of the spectrum at which the human security concept is mainly reserved for intrusive interventions for the sake of the well-being of individuals against states that cannot or will not secure them. According to a Senior Policy Advisor in the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [36], the two main proofs of the effects on policy of the concept of human security are the banning of landmines and the establishment of the International

Criminal Court, both acts that went against states' sovereignty.

In the East Asian debate on human security, the instrumentalist concept is the mainstream one. According to this view, states are instruments (but not the only ones) of human security and thus national security is also important for human security [4,37,38]. Barry Buzan echoes East Asian logic by criticizing the reductionist notion of human security [39].

This is why in the East Asian debate human security is seen as threatened especially in the context of state collapse [37,38]. The Japanese sponsored UN Council for Human Security reveals its pro-state orientation by placing a special focus on people on the move, that is, people who cannot attain security via the protection of their own states. With the concept of human security, national security also receives new justifications: "when we focus on the security of the human persons, of the individuals, we're making sure that state security and state sovereignty are effectively implemented to help, to protect, to promote the welfare, the well-being and the dignity security of their own people ..." [40].

A derivative of the debate on the relationship between national and human security is the question of the relationship between sovereignty and the principle of non-interference on the one hand, and human security on the other. If states, especially authoritarian ones, present threats to human security, most Western approaches claim that sovereignty should not be allowed to restrict activity (especially by democracies) to guarantee human security. However, if states are a crucial instrument of human security as is often believed in East Asia, sovereignty should not be compromised. These two views are the first main alternative strategic premises of human security. The fact that an intrusive Western interpretation was perhaps more prominent originally meant that the concept of human security got a slow start in East Asia. Despite the activity of the Japanese (and Korean and Philippine) government and the former Thai foreign minister and former ASEAN Secretary General, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, accepting the concept of human security, it has not been easy for East Asian intellectuals, let alone for governments [40]. According to Paul Evans, "East Asia is resistant to concepts of security that, in normative terms, have the potential to erode traditional concepts of sovereignty" [41]. The human security concept that East Asia sympathizes with the most is one where sovereignty cannot be compromised, as it is an instrument of national security and thus an important element in human security: "the human security concept is a rather comprehensive concept, but it will not be in competition with the issue of state sovereignty. In fact, it is making the state sovereignty more meaningful" [40]. This deviation from the Western discourse is understandable taken the differences in historical experiences of East Asia and the West.

While the last big war in Europe was diagnosed as a result of extreme nationalism and thus security was associated with lowering state borders, in East Asia, the two biggest wars (Vietnam and Korea) were experiences where intervention and interference magnified the impact on humans of the war. In these differing historical contexts it is understandable that the Western concept of peace and human security prescribes the lowering of borders, while the East Asian prescription is to the opposite [42]. If we go further back in history, we also encounter the impact of colonialism on the East Asian interest in the protection of sovereignty. The hesitance of East Asian countries to accept Western concepts that could legitimize Western interference in the domestic affairs of East Asian nations is understandable against this historical background. To some extent also Japan has in some countries been perceived as a "semi-colonial" power due to the history of colonialism and expansionism during the Second World War, and as such Japan has not been a perfect advocate for the concept of human security.

While the disagreement on the role of the state as an instrument of or as a threat to human security is most distinct in political security issues, such as the question of human rights, it is a relevant divide also in questions related to economic human security. However the divide between supporters and opponents of income-distribution-sensitive development strategies does not cut across the divide between the West and East Asia. East Asian capitalist as well as socialist discourse often criticizes Western approaches that are not interested in the economic security of the state or individual poor people, but instead, are driven by individual greed. A good example of the capitalist critique can be found in the recent discourse on moderation in world affairs by Malaysia's prime minister Najib Razak [43,44]. This discourse does not emphasize only economic human security of individuals, but that of the nation. Lee Jones interprets this emphasis, not only in Malaysia, but in the entire Southeast Asia, as an emphasis of the interests of the class of capital owners. The emphasis on the interests of the "national economy", rather than economic human security of the poor, simply shows the class foundation of the Southeast Asian states [45]. Radical [46] and developmental [47] socialist critique of the Western economic policies, again, criticizes both the class-based capitalist economic prioritization as well as the neglect of the economic human security of the poor in the West. While in the former the subject of economic human security was the class of the proletariat, in the latter, despite of the original rhetoric (by Deng, for example), not the worker, but the entire national economy. In reality, however, the collectivist approach to economic human security has made it easy for the East Asian states occasionally also to neglect their poor.

Another important divide between East Asian and Western concepts of human security is the greater focus of East Asian (and, actually, Northern European) concepts on economic security. The view that human security can mainly be preserved through political and developmental means is the second main alternative strategic premise of human security. While the Western human security concept has often been focused on political freedoms [21,36], the Asian concept is more closely tied to development. The Unit for Human Security at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs takes a middle road including both political and developmental means in the menu of strategic choices for human security. "Human security threats cannot be tackled through conventional mechanisms alone. Instead, they require a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and the interdependencies between development, human rights and national security" (emphasis added).

The link between development and security in the East Asian debate is sometimes seen as a causal association from development to security [19]: that is to say, without development it is not possible to achieve security. This is very much the view that is repeated in the inaugural documents of ASEAN [48]. Sometimes the association is seen to go in the other direction. President Beningno S. Aquino III sum-

marized this view in the 13th ASEAN Summit as follows: "The Philippines views regional security as a valuable element in the evolving Asian architecture. The preservation of peace and stability in our region is an imperative if we are to continue to prosper and develop." [49]. Finally, the concepts of human security and comprehensive security have conceptually bound security and development together as one complex approach. According to the blueprint of the ASEAN Political-Security Community: "The APSC subscribes to a comprehensive approach to security, which acknowledges the interwoven relationships of political, economic, social-cultural and environmental dimensions of development." [50]. This conception is increasingly common in East Asian rationalization of peace; peace is needed for investments, which again are needed for prosperity. It is not possible to speak of positive peace in the absence of development.

In short, the main positions of the Western and East Asian human security debates are summarized as follows (Table 1).

Differences in definitions of human security persist. The two main differing points at which the East Asian debate needs to defend its position are related to the way in which national and human security relate to each other, and to the role of economic well-being in the content of human security.

Table 1. Common and Differing Positions on Human Security.

	Western debate	East Asian debate
Normative premise	The concept of national security is insufficient, as the security of human beings is valuable as such, too.	The concept of national security is insufficient, as the security of human beings is valuable as such, too.
Nature of threat	Senders and targets of security threats are not only national, but also sub-national, transnational and global.	Senders and targets of security threats are not only national, but also sub-national, transnational and global.
Nature of threat	In addition to military threats, soft non-military threats, such as famine or lacking governance can threaten individuals.	In addition to military threats, soft non-military threats, such as famine or lacking governance can threaten individuals.
Nature of threat	States are often threats to, rather than instruments of, human security.	Generally, nations are an instrument of human security. Thus national security is an instrument of human security.
Approach to security	The narrow concept of self-help has to be broadened when dealing with threats to human security.	The narrow concept of self-help has to be broadened when dealing with threats to human security.
Approach to security	Military means are insufficient in the promotion of human security.	Military means are insufficient in the promotion of human security.
Approach to security	Human security needs to be tackled mainly as a political issue.	Human security should be tackled mainly as a developmental issue.

4. The Battle between Alternative Contents of Human Security

The main debate in terms of the definition of human security between East Asia and the West is related to the balance between political and economic values as issue areas to be securitized. While the UNDP defines human security as freedom from fear and freedom from want, the East Asian consensus can only be found relating to the latter [37]. To some degree, the Asian association of human security with development is historically determined. The first time an East Asian government endorsed the concept was right after the Asian economic crisis. At that time, Foreign Minister (later Prime Minister) Keizo Obushi emphasized compassion in the aftermath of an economic crisis and called it an important element in the development of "human safety". Later, his terminology changed and he integrated his thinking with the human security terminology of the UNDP [51].

However, the most prominent explanation for the economy-based definition of human security is related to the overall "developmentalist" security thinking in the East Asian security debate [52]. "National security is often perceived to include the security and welfare of the state and the people" [53]. Development in general has been seen as central to the prevention of conflicts since the time of President Magsaysay in the Philippines, and as the theoretical basis of developmental security thinking within the spheres of traditional security in Indonesia's President Suharto's concepts of national resilience, Deng Xiaoping's concept of security though the four modernizations, Korea's Prime Minister Lee's administration *Global Korea Vision* and Japan's Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's doctrine on *Comprehensive Security* [54]. If traditional national security has already been associated with development, then it is no miracle that the same is true of human security.

In general, a developmentalist orientation to human security is in line with the overall East Asian orientation to security and the purpose of states. I have shown this by first defining criteria for a developmentalist orientation and ranking East Asian regimes according to these criteria into three categories. Then I looked at how a developmentalist orientation has been associated with success in conflict prevention (through examining conflict fatalities). According to my findings it seems that the discourse on development is significantly associated with peace [52]. Rather than claiming a causal association between exogenous variables, this shows that peacefulness and a developmental orientation are part of one approach or discourse which values peace and sees the promotion of economic development as an important task and identifying quality of states.

In some East Asian countries, the foundation for a regime's legitimacy has consisted of development, rather than democratic credentials. In this setting, one might think that an emphasis on "freedom from want" as a matter of security would downgrade the priority of democracy. For example, demonstrations are sometimes suppressed in China, Singapore, Vietnam, and previously in Suharto's Indonesia; seen as something harmful to foreign investments and thus economic development—and security. In this way, economic human security could serve repression in the name of overall security. However, if one looks at associations between democracy, developmentalism and peace, it seems that developmentalism is no longer part of a discursive package that is seen as an alternative to the discourse of democracy. On the contrary, a regression analysis of democracy (as per measures from the Polity IV data), developmentalism, and conflict fatalities show that developmentalism, rather than being an alternative foundation for a regime's legitimacy, has recently become part of a "modern package" in which democracy and developmentalism are positively associated [52,55]. The role of the state has become the promotion of modernity along with economic development and democracy. The discourse on modernity has thus linked freedom from want with democracy, instead of seeing developmental needs as security issues that can be used against democracy as justifications of authoritarian violence. This is especially clear in the debate on human security, while the debate on "non-traditional security" as an alternative to human security often tends to see the realization of development goals, rather than individualistic democratic principles, as legitimizing for East Asian states [56]. Thus, economic human security serves the political purpose of promoting the long peace of East Asia without seriously increasing the risk of authoritarian violence, even though "non-traditional security" has a more dubious relationship with democracy.

While democracy and developmentalist human security concepts are associated today, the total lack of a priority on development/security tends to be the case in countries that are the least democratic and that have the most authoritarian violence. Of all East Asian countries, only in North Korea and in Burma/Myanmar is the priority on security clearly separated from developmental priorities. In these countries, national security interests can thus justify policies that are suicidal from the point of view of development. The lifting of the priority on human economic survival to a par with national security priorities could therefore greatly reduce human suffering, but whether it would increase East Asian peace, is, of course, a matter of definition. A true example from Burma's Chin State illustrates the potential effects.

During the time of famine in the Chin State of Burma/Myanmar in 2007–2008, villages with stockpiles of rice could not effectively offer their surplus rice to villages in areas where rice had been destroyed by rats, due to troop movements in the area which had forced villagers to help with transportation of

ammunition. Furthermore, due to the risk of externally instigated subversion and espionage, foreign organizations could not be allowed to move freely in the area to help the starving people [57]. If Burma/Myanmar's government had framed famine as a human security threat—if it had securitized human well-being—the argument that the overriding threat to national security was a justification for inaction in the face of famine could not have been presented. If famine was also a security matter, the Burmese army could not have been insensitive to the human costs of securing the border by means of ammunition deliveries to prevent foreign intrusion into its territory. While promoting the political side of human security could be useful for East Asia, it is the promotion of the economic side that is more likely to bear fruit there. Governments that have a poor human rights record can be brutal to their challengers, while governments where national security enables economically suicidal policies are murderous to all citizens.

The emphasis on freedom from want in the East Asian concept of human security and comprehensive security also has political power implications. On the one hand, the centrality of development has given rise to economic technocrats, who are no longer considered to be ordinary members of the bureaucracy, but instead to be experts central to security. At least in Indonesia, the role of the "Berkeley Mafia" became central under Suharto's rule and something similar could be seen from the 1960s in Thailand. Economic technocrats have also become central in the Chinese administration after Deng Xiaoping's consolidation of power. Furthermore, due to the centrality of development for security, the Indonesian military had to assume a central role in the economy: if economy was central to stability and only the army could be trusted, the army had to be a strong control over the economy, too. The dual (military and economic) roles of the militaries and the centrality of military officials in big companies in authoritarian regimes in East Asia have often been unintended consequences of the securitization of development. In the long run, it has meant that, especially in Indonesia, the military has received only a small fraction of its income from the public sector, while the majority of its funding has come from military businesses. This meant that until the collapse of 1998, the economy had to be highly regulated by licenses and permits so that the military-controlled public sector could exercise control over economic development. Only in this way could the military force its share out of companies and keep it meaningful for bigger companies to keep military men on their boards in order to ensure that the licenses necessary for business would be forthcoming [58,59]. While this has not helped economic development, it has made it impossible for the Indonesian bureaucracy and politicians to make economically suicidal decisions; development and the economic interests of the military always had to be a factor in all policies.

The lack of political substance in the East Asian human security concept relates to the authoritarian history of East Asian states. It would be difficult for countries that use repression of citizens' political rights as a political power strategy to accept a security concept that could bring political rights on a par with urgent national security priorities. Yet one could claim that in an area where the world's most genocidal regimes in absolute (Cultural Revolution China, and China during the Great Leap Forward) and relative (fatalities/population) terms (Pol Pot's Cambodia) can be found [34], one could assume that raising the priority on the political rights of citizens could prove a significant contribution to the long peace of East Asia.

If one looks at the political debate on human security [60], it seems clear that the Japanese offensive in the promotion of human security did not only intend and manage to promote economic human security thinking in East Asia, but that it also contributed to the pre-emption of the much more radical Canadian concept of human-rights-focused human security. In this sense, the contribution of East Asian human securitization could be framed against other possibilities. A realist might perhaps say that the Japanese initiative was more realistic as there could never be political support among East Asian authoritarian regimes for a politically oriented human security concept. Successful securitization of a politically loaded human security concept would perhaps have been unrealistic. Yet, if such a concept were more fruitful from the point of view of pragmatism, there would be no excuse for governments to challenge it.

5. How are "Human" and "Security" Linked in the East Asian Debate?

The association between human well-being and national security can be made in several ways. The new issue area that is being introduced into the security realm can be seen as the authentic origin of all securities. Alternatively, it can be seen as something equal to national security. Finally, it can also be introduced as something that is important, but instrumentally subordinate to, national security.

In critical security studies of Booth [32], Smith [31] and Betts & Eagleton-Pierce [30] the state is implicitly seen as valuable only through its effect on the security of its citizens. In these writings human security is used as the yardstick, and since many states are seen as poor instruments of human well-being, national security is not a valuable concept, and human security is presented as an alternative.

However, this is not the way that human and national security concepts are linked in the East Asian debate. Peou [4] expresses his East Asian view perhaps most clearly by saying that human security gives national security a new dimension: national security is also important for the safety of citizens. This means that only a certain dimension of national

security can be reduced to human priorities. In this way of thinking, national security and human welfare are linked, but in a way that allows some independence for both. There can be national security that is neutral to human security, and there can be human security separate from national security.

Furthermore, human security, especially its economic dimension, can be instrumental to national security. After the East Asian states assumed a state-identity that emphasized the role of the state in the promotion of prosperity and development, national security apparatuses of East Asia started promoting the idea of pro-poor economic policies as a way to secure regime legitimacy and fight violence challenges to the state. This was already the strategy of the Philippine military under president Ramon Magsaysay in the 1950s [61,62], while it became a strategy more widely accepted within the ASEAN after the establishment of the organization [63–65], Development became a way to pacify the people in China after the ending of the cultural revolution: as in ASEAN, economic grievances were tackled head-on, instead of using military means as the first option. The obsession to develop, rather than tackling political grievances is obvious in the Chinese documents of their policies in the restless provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang [66,67].

In the East Asian human security debate the value of national security is partly independent from the value of the nation, and since the nation is a vital instrument of human security, one cannot readily justify compromising national security in the name of human security. This way of linking "human" and "security" in East Asia has avoided making the concept a justification for rebellions or for intrusive humanitarian intervention. The strong Japanese role in the articulation of the concept of human security must have been partly motivated by this East Asian desire to divert the concept from its radical roots [60]. According to the progressive input of the Commission for a New Asia, a group of 16 respected Asian intellectuals, humanitarian concerns can justify intervention, but only as a last resort, for purely humanitarian purposes, under a UN mandate, with the acceptance of the population of the country, and only if there is an extreme threat to human security and legality [53]. The fact that intervention can be possible only in extreme cases of threat to human security and legality is justified by the fact that national security and sovereignty are values in themselves.

Another way of avoiding reductionism is to see national security as a vital instrument of human security, although in certain countries and certain historical periods the nation might seem a poor instrument of human security. An international normative construction in which strong nations are not allowed to interfere in the domestic affairs of smaller nations could be valuable for human security, since it is a convention that generally yields value for human survival.

The latter interpretation is often present in the East Asian human security debate. According to the former Japanese prime minister: "both threats to a sovereign nation and the international system also clearly threaten humanity and therefore the individual" [25]. The overall East Asian diagnosis of the relationship between national and human securities is more positive to the state, and this is understandable, taken the historical context of East Asia. East Asia's last great conflicts before the peaceful period after 1979 multiplied due to the lack of respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. In terms of human lives lost, two of these conflicts—the Korean War and the Vietnam War—were the world's most serious conflicts after World War II. In Southeast Asia, President Sukarno's radical thinking in the 1960s about the new emerging forces (communists and third world nationalists) opposed by the old established forces (imperialists and neo-colonialists) also constructed a world with little respect for national sovereignty. Sukarno's disrespect for the sovereignty of neighboring countries also caused insecurity for Malaysians and Singaporeans. These mistakes were formative for the East Asian emphasis on peaceful respect for sovereignty, as were the experiences of ultra-nationalist authoritarianism for European integration-based peace. In addition to inter-state conflict, an insufficient level of nation-building has also caused intra-state wars, and thus many Asian intellectuals feel that Asia needs a strict primacy of national security. According to ([53] p. 53) "Security is still seen very much in terms of national security ... (this is) felt keenly in Asia because nation-building is still in progress and national consciousness is high in most if not all countries." Thus it is understandable that the principle that human security does not in normal circumstances justify intervention supports the normative and interpretative construct on which the long peace of East Asia after 1979 and ASEAN peace have been based.

On the level of rhetoric, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation [48] could be considered the founding document of both peace periods. Three out of the six main principles of this document emphasize non-interference and respect for sovereignty as common rules of interaction between signatory nations. According to the Uppsala conflict data, Southeast Asian countries had supported each other's insurrections militarily 29 times before they joined ASEAN, while during the peaceful period after joining ASEAN, this has not happened once. Clearly, a concept of security that gives little excuse for threats to national security rules the long peace of ASEAN. The same is true for East Asia. During the Cultural Revolution and proletarian internationalism in China (and in Pol Pot's Cambodia), respect for sovereignty was not part of the normative construct, and thus, states extensively supported each other's insurrections—they were sometimes seen as necessary for human welfare,

liberation and justice. The area witnessed 35 cases of intervention in support of insurgents that fellow Asians felt represented a better concept of justice and security. However, once the long peace of East Asia started in 1979, all this stopped. Non-interference therefore seems to belong to the successful East Asian peace strategy. Even though one could say that non-interference also offers political elites an opportunity to repress their populations in impunity, it is also the case that in the peaceful period when East Asian states respected national security objectives by avoiding military intervention into each other's internal disputes, pacification has also lead to a decline in authoritarian violence [68]. Thus, non-interference has not increased the authoritarian threat to human security.

Then, if military non-interference has clearly been part of the successful normative construction of the long peace of ASEAN and the long peace of East Asia since 1979, it might be tempting to say that the association between security and human survival, well-being and freedom should have such a relationship to the concept of national security, that there could be no justification for military interference in domestic governance. Of course, non-interference is not a necessary objective condition for peace, and the current normative, identity-based and interpretational constellation behind the relative peace in East Asia is not unchanging, nor is it the only possible construction that can succeed in preserving peace. The long peace of East Asia is not perfect. But still, it seems that East Asian history has taught us some lessons about the value of sovereignty for human security. These lessons have given rise to local ownership of the norms of non-interference. Thus, one should probably not insist on interpretations of the relationship between national and human security which give easy justification for inter-state military intervention. An articulation of the values of human security and national security as independent entities and the assessment of the value of national security for human security, both typical to the East Asian human security debate, can therefore lead to a useful increase in East Asian relative peace.

While the consequences of East Asian relationship between "human" and "security" can be assessed from the point of view of peace and war, it is also possible to assess it from the point of view of power politics. If human security does not facilitate legitimate humanitarian intervention, it means that citizens cannot expect military assistance from outside the country against their rulers. The East Asian concept of human security has been criticized for elitism: an Asia-specific cultural context has been used to legitimize the sanctity of even brutal elites against international power. Protected by cultural diversity and the natural acceptance of a nation-based international system, authoritarian power interests legitimize oppression against their citizens [45]. At the same time, taken

that the international system is no more democratic than that of the authoritarian countries, more intrusive human security concepts may lend support to international authoritarianism, as was experienced during the "colonial protection of East Asian subjects" or during the international occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. This is why most East Asianist voices against the intrusive human security concept see such concepts "as part of a 'West against the Rest' effort to impose individualistic and culturally inappropriate Western notions of human rights and humanitarian intervention on the developing world" [35].

Even if the East Asian concept of human security does not dominate national security, neither does it constitute a reality within which national security can dominate human security. The economic survival of citizens was already a security matter at the time when several East Asian countries were seeking "comprehensive security". In these regimes (Thailand since Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda, post-WWII Japan, South Korea since the 1970s, Suharto's Indonesia, Magsaysay's Philippines and the Philippines after 1986, and Deng Xiaoping's China) where development was seen as a security issue, economic suicides (like President Sukarno's trade embargo against Singapore in 1965, the Burmese military's decision to abolish the value of some legal tenders, and Pol Pot's decision to demonetize the Cambodian economy) could not have been committed in the name of national security. Later regimes that subscribe to the principles of human security have had difficulties in using national security as an argument for political repression. Thus, even a weak concept of human security (one that does not dominate national security) can create a reality where the survival of citizens takes on a greater priority. Internal security acts and authoritarian control in the name of national security mostly take place in countries where human security does not belong to the political vocabulary. Yet even in those countries where human security has some value, the treatment of conflict areas often lacks sensitivity to human security, and especially to the political freedom aspects of it.

6. Conclusions

East Asian human security does not justify rebellion or uninvited humanitarian interventions, due to the fact that human security does not take priority over national security. The normative orientation that the East Asian human security concept constitutes in relation to humanitarian intervention seems useful for the long peace of East Asia.

East Asian human security has a developmentalist core: it is the developmental concerns of human survival that get the priority in terms of security issues. This can present two problems. On the one hand, if military security and development are the core functions of states, these priorities can easily justify

compromises in competition with democracy. Economic efficiency could be seen as a reason for not opening the political system up for greater participation. However, development in East Asia is increasingly seen as a twin value to democracy within the context of modernization [55]. The modern missions of states include both the provision of development and an interest in democratic governance. Thus, the economic content of human security is likely to further the long peace of East Asia, and also in the sense that it reduces authoritarian violence. Still, a greater political content for the concept could be useful in light of the historical challenges that authoritarian violence has posed to East Asian human security.

On the other hand, the emphasis on the concept "economic" in East Asian developmentalism still poses a challenge to human security, unless economic priorities cannot be considered on the long term and reconciled with the priorities of the environment. Focusing on environmental human security could offer a great new potential for East Asian human security debate. Such a focus would not stir the sensitivities related to the norm of non-interference in East Asia, and yet a focus on environmental security could be a significant contribution to positive regional cooperation for human well-being.

In conclusion, therefore, the East Asian debate on human security could create realities that strengthen regional peace and well-being. Thus, if a concept promotes progressive political realities, scholars ought to endorse it regardless of the analytical implications.

Most of the complaints about the analytical value of human security are related to the search for a mirror image of reality. Yet, even as such, the problems of the concept have been exaggerated. Andrew Mack, for example, claims that if one wishes to examine the interconnections between war, poverty and governance, then these variables should be defined in an analytically independent manner [35]. However, the concept of human security does not prevent categories that cut across or disaggregate the concept of human security. Conceptual categories that reveal similarities in one dimension do not imply similarity in all dimensions. If the concept of human security lumps issues with different causal dynamics together, then we will have to create concepts underneath the conceptual umbrella of security that make it possible to develop models that differentiate, for example, between security threats generated by an intentional enemy (such as a neighboring country or an ethnic group), and threats that arise from non-intentional sources (such as the environment). If different security elements have causal connections with one another (such as poverty and conflict), human security, which covers both, does not, as a concept, prevent analysis on the relationship between the two. Human security does not make the sentence "poverty causes conflict" a tautology, just as the concept "universe" has so far not prevented us from studying relationships between various, analytically separate elements of the universe.

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